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I. INTRODUCTION
Privately held wealth and its unequal distribution, and perhaps especially
the transmission of such wealth across generations, have long been thought to
pose particularly pernicious influences in a liberal democratic state. Thus, some
form of a wealth transfer tax-most commonly an estate or an inheritance
tax-has typically been a part of real-world and theoretically supported
comprehensive tax systems. As our ideas about the role of other taxes have
shifted, both in practice and in theory, our intellectual allegiance to a system
of wealth transfer taxation in the United States has remained more or less
fixed. The present estate tax is similar, in its essential form, to the initial estate
tax implemented in 1916,' and scholarly support for some type of wealth
transfer tax, although far from universal, remains strong.2 Recently, some
1. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, §§ 201, 203, 38 Stat. 756, 777-78. The gift tax was
first in place for two years in 1924-1925 and then enacted permanently in 1932. JOSEPH A. PECHmAN,
FEDERAL TAX POLICY 236 (5th ed. 1987). For historical background, see generally John E. Donaldson,
The Future of Transfer Taxation: Repeal, Restructuring and Refinement, or Replacement, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 539 (1993) (advocating abandonment of present estate and gift tax system and proposing
two alternative models focusing on transferee); David M. Hudson, Tax Policy and the Federal Taxation
of the Transfer of Wealth, 19 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 9-32 (1983) (discussing history of federal wealth
transfer taxation); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Estate and Gift Tax Changes of 1981: A Brief Essay on
Historical Perspective, 60 N.C. L. REV. 821 (1982) (reviewing, in historical context, changes made by
Ninety-Seventh Congress to estate and gift tax regime).
2. For representative tax policy theory on the estate tax, see DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY:
ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977) [hereinafter DEATH,
TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY]; W.D. Andrews, What's Fair About Death Taxes?. 26 NAT'L TAX J. 465
(1973); Mark L. Aseher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1990); Gerard M. Brannon,
Death Taxes in a Structure of Progressive Taxes, 26 NAT'L TAX. J. 451 (1973): David G. Duff, Taxing
Inherited Wealth: A Philosophical Argument, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3 (1993); Louis Eisenstein,
The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, I I TAX L. REV. 223 (1956); Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the
Estate Tax. Not To Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259 (1983); Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth
Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1983); David Westfall, Revitalizing the Federal Estate
and Gift Taxes, 83 HARV. L. REV. 986 (1970). For a careful discussion of reform proposals designed to
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scholars have even called for a confiscatory estate tax, or an abolition of
inheritance altogether.'
But times have changed since 1916. Our political-philosophical ideas have
evolved. The federal income tax has grown from a relatively small surcharge
on the highest incomes into a massive, broad-based tax system.'
Corresponding to this expansion in breadth, we have shifted, both in theory
and in practice, from an income toward a consumption tax model.' Over three-
quarters of a century of experience with both estate taxes and nominal income
taxation has strengthened our understanding of the possibilities and limitations
of tax systems, all during a period of continued inequality of wealth, income,
and consumption.6
make the present gift and estate tax regime more effecti,c. complete ssith numerous citations to the ,,ider
literature, see Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Eass-To.%tliie Line5. 43 TNx
L. REV. 241 (1988). For a carefully worked-through accessions tax model. %e Ed.ard C Ilalbach. Jr.
An Accessions Tax. 23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J 211 (1988) For an interesting historical perspectise
on estate tax theory, see Zelinsky. supra note I For a careful stud%. largel, critical of estate taxation.
see GEORGE COOPER. A VOLUNTARY TAX"- Nt-v, PI.RSP[-CTI\i-S ON SOP|IISnTI ( tI) E" T.ri T.'.
AVOIDANCE (1979). For recent criticisms of the gift and estate tax. see Joel C Dobris. A Brief for the
Abolition of All Transfer Taxes. 35 SYRACL SE L. RE% 1215 (19841. Donaldson. supra note 1. Charles
0. Galvin, To Bury the Estate Tax. Not To Praise It. 52 TAx Nort-s 1413 (1991) For a general
discussion and criticism of the lack of solid empirical grounding for theories on sealth transfer taxation.
see HERBERT KIESLING. TAXATION AND PUBLIC GOODS: A WEU-ARE-EcO'soIIc CRMQL I Of- TAx
POLICY ANALYSIS 197 (1992) (suggesting that an, book on distortie effects of gift and estate taxes
"would require a considerable body of empirical work. most of shich has also not been done and is
again overdue"); B. Douglas Berheim, Does the Estate Ta- Raise Revenute'. in I TAx PoLIwY AND TIu
ECONOMY 113, 121-32 (Lawrence H. Summers ed.. 1987). Alan S Blinder.A Model ofInherited Wealth.
87 Q.J. EcON. 608, 608 (1973) Ihereinafter Blinder. Inherited Wlealthl ("Josiah Stamp's lament that
'scientific economic inquiry into the subject of inheritance has titus been sery scanty' is as true in
1973 as it was in 1926."); Thomas A. Robinson. The Federal Wealth Transfer TLte5-A Requiem'. I
AM. J. TAX POL'Y 25. 38. 43 (1982).
3. See Ascher, supra note 2. at 73: D.W. Haslett. Is Inheritance Justtfied'. 15 Pill. & Pt 0 AIFAIRS
122 (1986). There have also been recent political proposals to tighten he gift and estate tax See. e g.
Barbara Kirchheimer, The Estate Tax: AlI-Ainerican or Un-Aineriean. 57 TAX Notts 1232. 1232 (1992).
Marianne Taylor, Some Fear Congress Will Make Death More Tainig. CIII TRIB . Dec 7. 1992. at CI
4. See generally JOHN F. WITTE. TIlE POLITICS AND DE\t.LOPMEN",T OF TilE FEDERAt INCOMIE TAX
110-30 (1985) (chronicling rise of income tax from elite to mass tax)
5. I detail some of this movement, and make citations to the exiensise literature on the income-
versus-consumption debate, in Edward J. McCaffer,. T It Poliev Under a Hbrd hicoine.Consumption
Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1145 (1992) (hereinafter McCaffery. Hsbridl I discuss the consumption tax in
much greater detail, infra parts V.B and V.C. For nos,. the reader unfamiliar , ith the literature can best
consider the consumption tax model in terms of the oft-cited Haig-Simons definition of income Income
= Consumption + Savings. This celebrated definition is little more than an accounting identity. it tells
us that sources equal uses. or. equivalently, that all income is either spent (consumed) or not (saved)
The definition also highlights the ease with which a broad-based tax can become a consumption model
Simply subtracting Savings from both sides of the abose identity yields- Consumption = Income -
Savings. We can, and in fact largely do. have a consumption tax model when sc subtract sa, ings from
income; think, for example, of the treatment of IRAs or qualified pension plans. See McCaffery. Ilsbrid.
supra, at 1150-55 (discussing consumption ideal and present hybrid), and citations therein
6. See Edward N. Wolff. Changing Inequalty of Wealth. 82 Am ECON REV 552 (1992) Wolff's
data suggest that there has been a slight decline tn wealth inequality over the 20th century. but that this
decline is almost entirely traceable to discrete periods of poor macroeconomic performance, such as the
Great Depression and the stock market declines of the 197 0's \Wolff'. data also suggest that large inter
vivos gifts contribute significantly to wealth inequality. Id. at 557: infra part IVA I. see also STEPHEN
R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 380-95 (1990) (discussing role of gratuitous transfers in producing
unequal wealth); Henry J. Aaron & Alicia H. Munnell. Reassessing the Role for Wealth Transfer Ttses.
The Yale Law Journal
Meanwhile, the estate tax does not, in fact, appear to be working. It does
not raise significant revenue. It is and has always been riddled with large
exceptions, exemptions, and exclusions. Most striking is the fact that the tax
has never been and is not now popular. At the same time, a more sophisticated
tax scholarship has given us a wider range of policy options than our untutored
imaginations put forth eight decades ago. These changes, in theory and in
practice, make the case for the estate tax 7 more uneasy than initial intuitions
might otherwise suggest.
What is most surprising in my analysis is that unease over the estate tax
arises specifically on liberal grounds. The linkage between liberalism and some
form of wealth transfer tax has been so strong that severing this connection
seems deeply counterintuitive, and thus highlights the wisdom of rethinking
basic theoretic approaches, not just to issues of taxation, but also to social
theory in general. Indirectly, at least, this Article is an exercise in how tax
policy analysis and political theory can learn from each other.
My argument over tax policy shall be political and interpretive. By
"political," a term I am borrowing in this regard from John Rawls, I mean a
style of analysis that eschews any reliance on formal, essentialist concepts like
"income" or "consumption," or on "metaphysical" notions, such as of the
natural rights to individual earnings or entitlements.8 A political theory of tax
takes seriously the idea that legal and economic rights and institutions are
human-made; that tax rules are, so to speak, up for grabs.9 By "interpretive,"
I mean a style of social theory that looks for norms in society's actual
practices and beliefs. Interpretive theories have played a major role in judge-
centric, common law fields such as torts or contracts or constitutional law,'"
45 NAT'L TAX J. 119, 122-30 (1992) (discussing persistent wealth inequality and inefficacy of current
wealth transfer taxes).
7. Throughout this Article, I use the terms "estate tax," "gift and estate tax," and "wealth transfer
tax." The particular tax we now have is a unified "gift and estate tax," for which I use "estate tax" as
shorthand, and it is an example of a "wealth transfer tax." Most of my arguments cast all forms of wealth
transfer taxes into some doubt.
8. Rawls, of course, has been pursuing such a "political" theory far more generally. See JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 11-15, 134-40 (1993) [hereinafter POLITICAL LIBERALISM]; John Rawls.
Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223 (1985); John Rawls, The Law
of Peoples, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 41,42-43 & n.2 (Stephen Shute
& Susan Hurley eds., 1993). See generally S.A. Lloyd, Relativizing Rawls, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 709
(1994) (defending Rawls' political conception against metaphysically grounded challenges). Lloyd's fine
essay addresses some of the more obvious objections to Rawls' project, such that any "political" theory
is predestined to accept whatever ideas are currently popular or accepted. Id. at 713-15. 731-35. The
project of grounding political philosophy on a specifically political theory is not, of course, original or
unique to Rawls. See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS
TASK 151-69 (1987). Sorting through the different senses of "political" in the theoretic literature is
beyond the scope of this Article.
9. UNGER, supra note 8, passim.
10. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 45-86 (1986) (discussing interpretation and law);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 251-68 (4th ed. 1992) (interpreting common law
as "implicitly" economic); see also Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV.
(forthcoming 1994) fhereinafter McCaffery, Cognitive Theory] (manuscript at part II.B, on file with
author) (discussing use of interpretivism in tax policy). See generally JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND
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and Rawls himself takes a decidedly interpretive turn in grounding his
"political conception of justice" on "certain fundamental ideas seen as implicit
in the public political culture of a democratic society."" Interpretivism,
however, has generally been absent from contemporary discussions of tax
policy.12 The political and interpretive work hand in hand. The political
freedom to seek new answers makes more important the grounding of such
answers on the at least implicit ideas and conceptions of a modem democratic
society, and calls for a more careful and sensitive reading of our actual
practices. Careful and sensitive interpretation, in turn, helps to lead politics to
reasonable answers.
At first blush, some may think that a political, interpretive theory, however
well suited to other legal domains, is hopelessly out of place in the area of tax.
Explicitly rejecting this view, or even detailing what I mean by a political,
interpretive theory, is beyond the scope of this Article, except insofar as these
points emerge implicitly, by example. Indeed, estate taxation offers an
especially rich illustration of a political-interpretive theory of tax, responding
crisply to at least two prominent objections. One such objection is that we
cannot turn tax over to unbridled democratic politics, because the people will
be predictably base and self-interested, as James Madison foresaw clearly
enough in the Federalist No. 10.3 The principal response to this objection,
of course, is that the procedural and epistemic safeguards placed on a political
conception of justice-paradigmatically, Rawls' original position and veil of
ignorance devices-are set up to correct for precisely this kind of narrow self-
interest off a base of existing advantages. But we do not even need Rawls'
devices in the case of estate taxation, because Madison's fear has not come to
pass. Part of what makes the estate tax such a fascinating example is that
neither envy nor any "soak the rich" populism can explain the tax's
unpopularity and its practical evisceration, here and in other democratic
societies; our experience with estate taxation seems to reflect exactly the
opposite-some form of anti-envy. The majority of citizens and our well-
evolved practices are opposed to levying a tax exclusively on the wealthiest
elite. Part of the current project is to figure out why.
A second objection is that interpretivism is unpromising in regard to tax
because tax is too complex and the people are too ill informed for our implicit
WRONGS (1992) (advancing, inter aha. "middle leel.' or interpretive theory of tort lass). MICHAEL
WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM (1987) (descnbing social entic as interpreter)
1I. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8. at 13.
12. 1 now see my own arguments in McCaffery. Isybrid. supra note 5. as being interpretive- See also
McCaffery, Cognitive Theory, supra note 10.
13. The apportionment of taxes on the vanous descnptions of property. is an act
which seems to require the most exact impartiality: yet. there is. perhaps. no
legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are gi'cn to a
predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Esery shilling %% ith ,% hich
they overburden the inferior number is a shilling saved to their own pockets
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961)
1994]
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practices to mean much of anything at all. (That these implicit practices mean
simply that the people only want others, besides themselves, to pay tax is
another way of putting the first point.) But the estate tax example overcomes
this objection as well, at least in a prima facie way. There is nothing
particularly confusing or confused about the people's opposition to the very
idea of estate taxation, or about the absence of any popular clamor for more
revenue on account of estate taxes. In the case of estate taxation at least, we
have good reason to let the political-interpretive project go forward, to see
where it leads. I shall aim for an interpretation that "fits" with our settled
practices and with a reasonable, democratic conception of justice. The ultimate
proof of the wisdom or attractiveness of this approach will come later, in the
pudding, so to speak, of the practical recommendations that emerge.
My argument follows three basic steps: (1) The current gift and estate tax
does not work, is in deep tension with liberal egalitarian ideals, and lacks
strong popular or political support. (2) While the failure of the status quo may
suggest a stronger wealth transfer tax as an alternative, such an answer suffers
from two distinct problems: (a) a stronger tax is neither practical nor popular,
and (b) given the many imperfections of the real world and the likely
consequences of a strengthened transfer tax, such as reduced work, reduced
savings, and increased inequality in consumption, a stronger wealth transfer tax
may not be preferable even on ideal liberal grounds. (3) Motivated by the first
two points to think through matters more deeply, we can arrive at alternative
tax systems that both comport better with liberal first principles and fit well
with the implicit spirit of our actual practices and beliefs, without any form of
estate tax at all.
This argument leads naturally to a proposal for comprehensive tax reform,
specifically a progressive consumption-without-estate tax. By responding to our
objective preferences for work and savings while giving institutional form to
our suspicions over the large-scale private use of wealth, such a tax system
indeed fits best with liberal principles and with the often-inchoate spirit of our
actual practices. To those who would immediately object that the private
possession of wealth alone is a distinct liberal concern, not reached by a
progressive consumption-without-estate tax, I hasten to add that the altered tax
regime changes the very meaning, and hence the risks and dangers, of the
"private possession" of wealth. The meaning of this phrase is not a constant,
but rather depends on the legal rules in place. A liberal society's reasonable
concerns over possession alone reduce largely to dual concerns over possession
qua potential or actual use; the ability to use one's wealth, the threat of doing
so. or the actual ongoing use of wealth as consumptive investment is what
ought to concern the liberal. But a progressive consumption-without-estate tax,
designed under a political theory of tax, changes matters by redefining property
rights. In the end, it appears that our practices may be moving toward a better
place, on strictly liberal grounds, than any answers that our most rarefied
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political theory alone could produce.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II presents the traditional liberal
egalitarian case for wealth transfer taxation, focusing on the work of John
Rawls, and then lays the foundation for the liberal case against such taxation.
Part III begins by briefly describing the current gift and estate tax law, and
then analyzes how the law raises scant government revenue and adversely
affects capital formation. Part IV moves to a dynamic. behavioral focus,
aiming to complete the liberal case against the status quo by examining how
the current regime affects inter vivos giving, work-leisure, and savings-
consumption choices, as well as by canvassing the law's general distributive
consequences. Both Parts III and IV contain analytic strands questioning the
wisdom and efficacy of any move toward stronger, tighter. or confiscatory
wealth transfer taxes.
Turning to the Article's second major theme, Part V situates the discussion
in a general, comprehensive theory of tax. The central idea here is that the case
against wealth transfer taxation has implications for our broadest theories of
tax. In particular, both normative and interpretive reasoning support the reform
proposal for a progressive consumption-without-estate tax. Normatively, this
plan comports reasonably with the dictates of liberal egalitarianism-a point
that emerges most strongly when we see the necessity, or at least wisdom, of
taking an objective, political view of tax. 4 Interpretively, the proposal fits
closely with the often-inchoate tendencies of our actual practices, as these have
emerged over the better part of the twentieth century. Part V develops the case
for this proposal. Part VI then completes the argument by criticizing two
reasons to do nothing. Finally, Part VII provides a brief conclusion.
II. THE LIBERAL EGALITARIAN CASE FOR (AND AGAINST)
WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION
Over the years, proponents of estate taxation have advanced many reasons
for the estate tax, including revenue raising,'- "backing up" the income tax
system,' 6 and breaking up large concentrations of wealth.' 7 1 discuss these
14. In referring to an "objective" view. I am borrowing the term and ideas of TM Scanlon See
T.M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72 J. PHIL. 655. 658-60 (1975)- 1 ha,, already commented
above on what I mean by a "political" view. The connection is this: Scanlon's argument is that wse do
not simply accept subjective valuations, but take an objective views of the relative urgency of wsants In
rejecting a thoroughgoing, preference-based utilitarianism, Scanlon opens the door for sinctl, political
arguments. I develop this theme more fully throughout the rest of this Article. espcciall, in Part V
15. Ascher. supra note 2, at 91-93; Eisenstein. supra note 2. at 238-57. see also infra part III B
16. Gutman, supra note 2, at 1185-86, 1189-97. Other commentators hae offered slight %anants
on this theme. See, e.g., Henry J. Aaron & Harvey Galper. A TrLT on Consumption. Gifts. and Bequests
and Other Strategies for Reform, in OPTIONS FOR TAX REFORM 106. 111-12 (Joseph A Pechman cd.
1984); Graetz, supra note 2, at 284.
17. Michael J. Boskin, An Economist's Perspective on Estate Taxation. in DtiATi. TAxt-s AD
FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 2, at 56, 65 ("lAIny attempt to reduce (substantiall) inequality in the
distribution of wealth via estate and gift taxation is doomed to failure I see a much less ambitious
1994]
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rationales, all of which are of questionable justificatory strength when held up
against the reality of the existing legal regime, in passing. 8 In contrast,
support for the estate tax has drawn its greatest strength from philosophical
foundations and intuitions, recently advanced by such liberal egalitarian
political theorists as John Rawls, 9  Ronald Dworkin,2" and Bruce
Ackerman.2' I proceed directly to these philosophical arguments to set out the
liberal case for wealth transfer taxation.
There are, of course, important differences among liberal theorists, for
example with regard to how strongly they orient themselves toward a rights-
based, deontologic position, as opposed to allowing consequentialist
considerations to shape the institutions of justice. Liberal theorists also differ
in the extent and nature of their solicitude for actual practices. For most
purposes, however, I shall call them, collectively and generally, "liberal
egalitarians." 22 An important point of commonality is that all liberal
egalitarians see intra-generational uses of wealth in a different light than inter-
generational transmissions.23 While they uphold a range of principles, they all
tend to emphasize equality of starting points and fairness in socioeconomic
institutions. Liberal egalitarians typically are willing to allow intra-generational
outcomes to diverge considerably, as persons make different choices in the use
of their initial endowments in just transactional settings.24
Inter-generational transmissions of wealth, however, pose other, more
troubling problems for the liberal egalitarian. Ackerman, for example, argues
at some length that such transmissions fatally interfere with the equality of
starting points?5 Liberal egalitarians who call for confiscatory estate taxation
role for these taxes: preventing extreme concentrations of wealth from being passed from generation to
generation."). A useful catalog of other reasons for estate taxation is provided by Duff, supra note 2.
18. See also Donaldson, supra note I, at 539-50 (criticizing popular justifications for current gift
and estate taxation).
19. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter THEORY OF JUSTICE].
20. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 207-08, 269-71 (1985) (hereinafter
DWORKIN, MATTER OF PRINCIPLE]; Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? (pts. I & 2), 10 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 185, 283 (1981).
21. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (I 980) [hereinafter
SOCIAL JUSTICE]. For additional views of other liberal theorists, see generally JAMES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE,
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY (1983); MUNZER, supra note 6; Haslett, supra note 3.
22. See WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 50-94 (1990) (discussing "liberal
equality" as philosophical school characterized by Rawls).
23. For another statement of this political-philosophical approach, see generally ERIC RAKOWSKI,
EQUAL JUSTICE (1991). For a discussion of wealth transfers, see id. at 149-66.
24. Ackerman puts the case in general language that is perhaps more evocative than any specific
examples can be:
[l~n the end there will be a great disparity in personal histories. Some will have used the
transactional system to gain enormous wealth; others will die with nothing but their name.
Some with few material possessions will exercise great moral leadership... others will amass
material fortunes to find themselves the objects of widespread contempt. Still others are
solitary and poor-some brutish, some wise.
SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 201. Given the twin conditions of fair entitlements and just institutions
(the "transactional system," in Ackerman's phrase), these disparities are all fair play.
25. Id. at 202-27.
[Vol. 104: 283
Wealth Transfer Taxation
tend to follow this line of argument.26 This sort of objection has even led the
libertarian Robert Nozick to back off from his earlier claim that bequests
represent a fair use of resources, a "right" of the donor that raises no
distributive concerns, given an initially fair starting point.2 7 Nozick now
concedes that we should place some limits on the power to make bequests.2'
This liberal egalitarian perspective led Rawls to suggest a rather precise
tax system in A Theory of Justice. It is helpful to have this tax plan before us,
because it represents the best concrete form of the liberal egalitarian ideal, and
it highlights the strongest case for wealth transfer taxation. Rawls' system
entails a proportionate, or, equivalently, a flat-rate consumption tax, coupled
with a steep, although not confiscatory, 29 bequest or inheritance tax. The flat-
rate consumption tax follows the pattern of solicitude toward intra-generational
outcomes. It is significant that Rawls qualifies his support for this aspect of the
plan with the assumption that "'income is fairly earned"; Rawls sees these
general taxes primarily as a way to raise revenue, and he presumes that
fairness in market outcomes has already been achieved." Rawls advocates
bequest or inheritance taxes, on the other hand, "not to raise revenue ... but
gradually and continually to correct the distribution of wealth and to prevent
concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value of political liberty and
fair equality of opportunity."3 Rawls also explicitly allows for inheritance,
subject to his general principles of justice: "[Ilnheritance is permissible
provided that the resulting inequalities are to the advantage of the least
fortunate and compatible with liberty and fair equality of opportunity."32 This
interesting qualification opens the door to consequentialist arguments, or at
least a consideration of consequentialist effects, not readily made under the
more rights-oriented liberal egalitarian approaches, such as those set forth by
Ackerman or by recent scholars calling for confiscatory inheritance taxes."
As the selective quotations from Rawls indicate, the liberal egalitarian case
26. See, e.g., Ascher, supra note 2. at 88-91: Haslett. supra note 3. at 137-55
27. ROBERT NOZICK. ANARCHY. STATE, AND UTOPIA 150-53. 155-58 (1974)
28. ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE: PHILOSOPHICAL MEDITATIONS 30-33 (1989) Nozick's
new plan is actually similar to one proposed much earlier in the century by the Italian financier Ernest
Rignano, which involved higher levels of accession taxes on more remote descendants See KIESLING.
supra note 2, at 157-59 (discussing Rignano-type plans): John K. McNulty. Fundnmental Alternatives
to Present Transfer Tax Systems, in DEATH. TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY. supra note 2. at 85. 87-89
(discussing Rignano's plan).
29. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 277-79. Rawls reiterates virtually all of his tax-related
proposals in his widely circulated manuscript, John Rawls. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 130-31
(1990) [hereinafter Justice as Fairness) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). where he makes
clear his correct understanding that "consumption" and "expenditure." and "proportionate" and "flat-rate."
are equivalents.
30. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 19. at 278-79; see also id. at 279 (discussing tax systems under
nonideal theory).
31. Id. at 277.
32. Id. at 278.
33. See generally Ascher. supra note 2 (calling for end to inheritance or for "confiscatory" transfer
taxes); Haslett, supra note 3 (same).
1994]
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for some form of wealth transfer tax is intimately linked with the "fair equality
of opportunity" ideal. This principle, technically first set forth as a part of the
second aspect of Rawls' second principle of justice,34 holds that people of
equal abilities and aptitudes "should have the same prospects of success
regardless of their initial place in the social system, that is, irrespective of the
income class into which they are born. 35 Rawls does not claim, either in the
passages setting forth fair equality of opportunity or in his sketch of an ideal
tax system, that the institutions of society should be set up to ensure that
individuals in fact be born into the same "income class." Rather, Rawls has the
comparatively more modest concern that unequal income classes should not
adversely affect important life opportunities or "prospects of success. ' 6
Rawls clearly is concerned, however, that unfettered rights to inherited
property can interfere with even this more flexible and modest notion of fair
equality of opportunity. In setting out an equal-opportunity ideal that is distinct
from equality of outcome or result, and in seeing some form of wealth transfer
tax as a central institutional embodiment of the equal-opportunity ideal, Rawls
is well within a characteristically American liberal egalitarian tradition. 7
It is also interesting to note that in his recent Political Liberalisn,8
which is on several levels a refinement and extended commentary on A Theory
of Justice,39 Rawls clarifies what might have been only implicit in his earlier
work: The fair-equality-of-opportunity norm does not yield determinate
institutional answers. Rawls concludes that the entire fair-equality-of-
opportunity principle does not rise to the level of a "constitutional essential":
"[W]hile some principle of opportunity is surely such an essential, for
example, a principle requiring at least freedom of movement and free choice
of occupation, fair equality of opportunity (as I have specified it) goes beyond
that and is not such an essential. 40 In generally discussing the principles
"covering social and economic inequalities," Rawls now states that "[t]hese
matters are nearly always open to wide differences of reasonable opinion; they
rest on complicated inferences and intuitive judgments that require us to assess
34. See THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 60-75.
35. Id. at 73; see also id. at 83-90, 299-303.
36. Id. at 73.
37. See SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 43-45, 107-09, 202-07; DWORKIN, MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE, supra note 20, at 187, 191-96, 205, 206-07; see also FISHKIN, supra note 21, at 50, 51-55.
38. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8.
39. Id. at xv-xvi. Rawls writes:
Indeed, it may seem that the aim and content of these lectures mark a major change
from those of Theory .... But to understand the nature and extent of the differences, one
must see them as arising from trying to resolve a serious problem internal to justice as
fairness, namely from the fact that the account of stability in part III of Theory is not
consistent with the view as a whole. I believe all differences are consequences of removing
that inconsistency. Otherwise these lectures take the structure and content of Theory to remain
substantially the same.
Id.
40. Id. at 228.
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complex social and economic information about topics poorly understood.""'
The cursory musings on tax structure in A Theor
" 
of Justice are absent from
Political Liberalism; Rawls now sweeps tax aside with the single reference that
"[m]any if not most political questions do not concern . . . fundamental
matters, for example, much tax legislation and many laws regulating
property. 4 2 Rawls seems to have realized that the transition from ideal theory
to real prescription is even more difficult than he had envisioned at the time
of A Theory of Justice; he now distances himself from those *'hunches" put
forth two decades earlier. Alternatively, Rawls may have come to appreciate
the unavoidably political nature of questions of tax, as I shall discuss
throughout this Article.
The subtle transition in tax philosophy from A Theory of Justice to
Political Liberalism, admittedly an issue to which Rawls devotes little space
in either work, sets an appropriate stage for this Article. I am pursuing the
particular questions concerning wealth transfer taxation in depth, in part to see
how "complex social and economic information" speaks to questions of tax
design under liberal first principles. Far from taking exception to Rawls or to
liberal egalitarianism more generally, I explore how we might better implement
a liberal vision in practice. My claim is that the result of this essentially
normative inquiry may be counterintuitive to first impressions derived from
liberal theory alone. At a minimum, this possibility illustrates the wisdom of
Rawls' caution in addressing questions of social and economic ineclualities;'
it also helps show how a thoroughly political social theory can lead to some
surprising results.
Specifically, I level five distinct though related criticisms of the general
liberal egalitarian support for the estate tax. Each of these arguments accepts
the moral and ethical bases of liberal egalitarianism, say of the Rawlsian
variety, but questions the fit between liberalism in theory and wealth transfer
taxation in practice. I aim to establish that alternative comprehensive tax
systems that do not incorporate any form of an estate tax can both better
protect prior liberties and improve the welfare of the lower classes; that
reasonable citizens acting under conditions of mutual freedom and equality
would concur; and that, in fact. actual citizens have concurred.
41. Id. at 229.
42. Id. at 214.
43. See THEORY OF JUSTICE. supra note 19. at 278 (arguing that setting practical line, in limiting
matters such as inheritance "is a matter of political judgment guided b) thcor . good sens,. and plain
hunch, at least within a wide range"); see also id. at 279 (excluding other tax detail-, from ht theorN of
justice).
44. POLITICAL LIBERALISM. supra note 8. at 228-29. see also D%%t. SkrIr.R t) PRI%,(IPt I.
supra note 20. at 207 ("Obviously any practical program claiming to repect both these principles [of
meritocracy and equal opportunityl will work imperfectl) and %%ill ine itabl, insole peculation.
compromise, and arbitrary lines in the face of ignorance") But l Bruce Ackemian. Politital
Liberalisms. 91 J. PHIL. 364, 371-75 (1994) (cnticizing Political aiberahsm for backing olf of claims
concerning economic and social inequality).
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First, the current income-plus-estate tax system undercuts its own best
theoretical support. Liberal egalitarianism is concerned with, among other
goals, mitigating unequal starting points. The actual gift and estate tax regime,
however, encourages frequent, large, inter vivos gifts, systematically excluded
from the income tax base, and it thus can dramatically undermine the pursuit
of equal opportunity and level playing fields.45 When combined with the
sizable gaps in our major intra-generational tax, the nominal income tax, 6 the
existing tax system results in large intra-generational wealth disparities and
even encourages the inter-generational transmission of this disparate wealth.
I illustrate this point both by discussing the doctrinal features of the income
and estate tax regimes that facilitate this counterproductive result, and by
attempting to establish the facts of significant inter vivos wealth transmission.
Further, the current, and indeed any, wealth transfer tax encourages
consumption, or the personal use of wealth. But consumption by the very
wealthy turns out to be a particular liberal problem, as I argue more fully
below. In encouraging inter vivos gifts and large-scale consumption by the
rich, the current estate tax is illiberal.
Second, no feasible wealth transfer taxation system, under both practical
and political constraints, can support the liberal egalitarian ideal. This point
extends the factual first point into a more theoretical, though practically
situated, impossibility theorem. I illustrate this argument in several ways. I
point out the doctrinal difficulties in moving toward a confiscatory tax,
underscoring the exceptions allowed and their potentially severe consequences.
I discuss the unpopularity of stronger, more widespread wealth transfer
taxation in the United States, along with the recent repeals of estate or
inheritance taxes in Australia, Canada, Israel, and California. I also discuss
emerging theories and evidence on why and how people save, which suggests
that the majority of savings may be inter-generational in character, indicating
that a strong wealth transfer tax system runs counter to deep-seated human
motivations. Finally, I point out that any wealth transfer tax encourages inter
vivos giving, consumption, or both.
These first two arguments are narrowly practical. The third and fourth
arguments question the wisdom of a wealth transfer tax on purely liberal
grounds, even if such a tax were practically feasible; for these arguments, we
can posit an improved estate tax. The third argument is that even such an
improved tax is inappropriate in a nonideal world. Neither of the background
conditions of the liberal egalitarian, equal-opportunity model-equal initial
entitlements and just social institutions-materialize in the real world. The fact
of ongoing inequalities ironically makes the role of wealth transfer taxation
45. See infra part W.A.1.
46. As I discuss further in Part V, what we persist in calling an income tax is in fact a complex
income-consumption hybrid. See generally McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 5.
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more complex and more contestable than it might at first appear. Once we
have moved away from simple merit-based assumptions, such as the idea that
one is entitled only to whatever she has personally "earned," any middle
ground becomes a bit uneasy. As noted above, the current, ineffective system
of wealth transfer taxation may exacerbate intra-generational inequality by
encouraging large inter vivos transmissions and increased consumption by the
rich. A confiscatory wealth transfer tax, on the other hand, would result in
even greater inequality in consumption, as well as diminished savings. These
effects might predominantly harm the lower classes both by interfering with
prior liberties, as large-scale consumption by the rich may well do, and by
lowering general standards of living, as diminished capital would almost
certainly do. In contrast, allowing inheritance might improve the fate of the
least-well-off class, especially if certain safeguards on the use of wealth were
put into place, without interfering with liberal principles such as the fair
equality of opportunity. The practical liberal egalitarian ought to look for
alternatives to wealth transfer taxation, as well as at the possibility of a better
balance between intra- and inter-generational norms.
Fourth, it is possible to make out a strong argument against wealth transfer
taxation sounding in ideal theory. The traditional liberal egalitarian tax scheme,
as envisioned by John Stuart Mill and Rawls," rests largely on an
individualist or subjectivist ethic. This tax scheme presumes that individuals
are entitled to their "earnings," but views the private possession of "unearned"
wealth as uniquely and particularly inimical to, or at least in severe tension
with, liberal egalitarian values. While my third argument questions the role of
a wealth transfer tax in a world where the factual basis for "earnings" has
come into doubt, my fourth argument is that, even if wealth is indeed "fairly
earned," society may nonetheless have objective, political reasons for opposing
estate taxation. Simply put, and finessing metaphysical questions over desert
and entitlement, liberal society likes earnings and savings, both of which
47. Dworkin appears to have seen this point most clearly, or at least (charactensticallk) put the
matter most eloquently:
[A liberal's] theory of economic justice must be complex. because he acccpt, two principle%
which are difficult to hold in the administration of a d) namic cconom) The first requires that
people have, at any point in their lives, different amounts of wealth insofar as the genuine
choices they have made have been more or less expnsise or beneficial to the
community .... The second requires that people not have different amounts of wealth just
because they have different inherent capacities to produce what others want, or are differently
favored by chance. This means that market allocations must be corrected in order to bnng
some people closer to the share of resources the), would have had but for these sarlous
differences of initial advantage, luck. and inherent capacity
DWORKIN, MATTER OF PRINCIPLE. supra note 20. at 207 Duorkin continue, to note the practical
difficulties of implementing any liberal program balancing these two pnnciples Id at 207-08
48. See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAl ECOoIY 808-13 0J tM Robson ed. 1965)
(1848) (advocating proportionate income tax with base-lcvel exemption) Ra Is does qualify his opinion
in A Theory of Justice with the comment, "It does not follow that. gieen the injustice of existing
institutions, even steeply progressive income taxes are not justified %%hen all things are considered-
THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 19. at 279.
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contribute to a certain metaphoric "common pool," and only or at least
especially suspects use, particularly the large-scale, rapid dissipation of capital
by the wealthy. Earnings and savings each represent goods to the liberal
majority, whereas use represents an individual imposition on the collective and
is therefore not a liberal good. Put conversely, claims of inequality are most
compelling vis-h-vis the use of resources; the justice of earnings is logically
and ethically distinct from the justice of use. Furthermore, large-scale use may
distort the allocation of resources and interfere with the fair value of prior
liberties; it is the use and not the mere concentration of wealth that threatens
reasonable liberal values. But because any wealth transfer tax is a tax on
possession alone that encourages use and penalizes earning and saving,
especially by the very wealthiest citizens, it is perverse on strictly objective,
political grounds.
On this view, wealth transfers from the wealthy may even be, ironically,
the preferred liberal result. Because liberal society likes earnings and savings
on objective political grounds, but does not like excessive private use, it must
allow the rich to pass on their wealth: Something has to give. This argument
leads to the strongest condemnation of the reigning liberal tax policy wisdom,
which has consistently advocated progressive income and wealth transfer taxes.
By getting our reasonable political judgments wrong-by taxing work and
savings while condoning, even encouraging, large-scale use-the status quo
impedes the liberal project. Even under the most basic, static conception of
progressive redistribution, an income-plus-estate tax is a poor option because
it compels liberal society to choose between progressivity and objective goods,
i.e., work and savings. In contrast, a consistent, political focus on use changes
the very meaning and hence the dangers of private "possession," responding
to the liberal egalitarian's equal-opportunity concern over the mere ownership
of resources. The real threats to liberty and equality from private possession
alone turn out, on closer scrutiny, to relate to possession qua potential or actual
use, each of which can be addressed-indeed, can best be addressed-in a tax
system without an estate tax.
Both the third and fourth arguments cast a different light on popular
resistance to estate taxation, which informed the first two arguments. Now it
appears-mirabile dictu!-that the people just might be right in opposing the
estate tax, on liberal grounds. I now arrive at my fifth argument: The best
feasible liberal tax system features no wealth transfer tax at all. The plan that
I believe best responds to liberal egalitarian ideals, as mentioned above, is a
progressive consumption-without-estate tax. Such a plan can include a special
rate structure on inherited wealth that, in principle, will achieve some of the
effects desired by advocates of wealth transfer taxation and begin to blur
positivist distinctions between tax forms. Whereas any estate tax encourages
use and punishes thrift, a progressive consumption tax appropriates "private"
wealth at precisely the moment when an individual is about to use it
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excessively for personal purposes. The proposal thus goes a long wav toward
redefining the very concept of possession that has concerned liberal
egalitarians; it takes away the unfettered right to rapid, large-scale use of
"private" funds. We can also insist that the "private" wealth accumulation that
is encouraged by the plan be invested in socially approved or regulated
vehicles, designed to address the dangers of consumptive investment. We could
design these vehicles, akin to pension plans or the government regulation of
the nonprofit, charitable sector, so as not to lose all of the efficiency gains of
private capital, while making literal the public claims on the wealth. The
proposal thus looks to forge a convergence between liberal egalitarian theory
and our actual practices; it is grounded both in independent normative analysis
and interpretive theory.
The five arguments can now be summarized and related as follows.
(1) The current estate tax is porous, ineffective, and counterproductive on
purely liberal grounds. (2) No stronger version is popular or practical, in part
because (3) the liberal theory supporting an estate tax does not fit in a nonideal
world where individual earnings lack presumptive, decisive moral weight, and
in part because (4) our objective, political values, even under ideal conditions,
lead liberal society to approve of work and savings and only or at least
especially to disapprove of the wanton private use of resources, and any wealth
tax is perverse on these scores. (5) Therefore, our practices have been moving,
at least inchoately, toward a progressive consumption-without-estate tax. If we
more consciously and consistently implemented what our practices suggest, we
would have a better liberal egalitarian system than any featuring a wealth
transfer tax. By meeting our objective values and changing the very meaning
and hence the dangers of the private possession of wealth, we achieve in the
end a happy convergence between liberal egalitarian theory and our actual
practices.
III. THE ESTATE TAX: LAW, EFFERIS, AND CONSEQUI:NCES
This Part sets out the basics of the current gift and estate tax law and then
discusses its possible economic effects on revenue and capital formation. This
discussion of the law and its effects begins the extended examination of our
actual practices that will provide much of the substance underlying both the
ultimate critique and the alternative positive program.
A. The Law
Most people do not have to think about the complex gift and estate tax
regime that now exists in the United States. Taxes potentially begin to apply
only when the sum of includable lifetime gifts and testamentary bequests
1994]
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exceeds $600,000 per donor.4 9 Gifts that fall within the "annual exclusion
rule" of up to $10,000 per donee per donor per year do not count against the
total.50 Most transfers to a spouse," payments for educational or medical
needs,5 2 and charitable gifts53 are also excluded. Until a married couple
accumulates an estate approaching $600,000, they hardly need to consider gift
and estate taxes at all. Once a couple reaches this threshold, the husband and
wife need proper planning to ensure that each uses his or her exemption
amount, for a total household threshold of $1.2 million. 4 For couples near
this level, there are various tactics for avoiding the sting of the tax, ranging
from simple use of the annual exclusion gifts to more sophisticated
strategies. When all is said and done, only about 1% of decedents leave an
estate with any estate tax liability.
56
Yet it is also true that, for couples or individuals well over the relevant
thresholds, the estate tax can be quite a large burden indeed. Rates begin at
37% and rise rather quickly to 55%. There is a fairly substantial "phase-out"
range in which the estate tax rate hits 60%, and the net effect for the very
wealthy is a flat rate of 55% above the exemption level. 7 Some key statistics
illustrate the burden of the estate tax on the very rich. In 1991, the estate tax
raised $9.1 billion. More than half of this amount, almost $4.7 billion, came
from taxpayers with gross estates over $5 million, even though such estates
represented only 1420 of the 24,761 taxable returns (less than 6%).5' Table
1 shows the average estate tax paid by a taxable estate in each of three high
wealth ranges:
49. In terms of the statute, one derives this number from the rate schedule set out in I.R.C. § 2001
(1994), plus the "unified credit" provided by I.R.C. § 2010, and the unification of the gift and estate tax
evidenced by I.R.C. § 2502. There has been some discussion lately about lowering this threshold level.
50. Id. § 2503(b).
51. Id. § 2056 (estate tax); id. § 2523 (gift tax). The reason for the qualification to "most" transfers
is the rather technical rules governing partial interests in property conveyed to a spouse.
52. Id. § 2503(e). The educational exclusion extends to qualified tuition payments only. hi.
§ 2503(e)(1).
53. Id. § 2055 (estate tax); id. § 2522 (gift tax).
54. The reason that proper planning is necessary is that without it, the surviving spouse will simply
inherit from the other spouse and will be left with only her or his own exemption amount.
55. A dated but still useful source is COOPER, supra note 2. Planning points can be found in many
sources. See, e.g., MYRON S. SCHOLES & MARK A. WOLFSON, TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A
PLANNING APPROACH 575-608 (1992); C. David Anderson & Nancy E. Howard. The Mathematics of
Estate Planning and Estate Freezing, in ESTATE FREEZING: TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES 7-1 (Douglas K.
Freeman ed., 1985).
56. See Barry W. Johnson, Estate Tax Returns. 1989-1991, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN, Spring 1993, at 76, 76-81, The report notes that 2.3% of U.S.
decedents had gross estates that exceeded $600,000 in 1989 and thus filed an estate tax return. Id. at 76.
More than half of these, however, paid no tax, largely because of the marital deduction. See infra note
62 and accompanying text.
57. I.R.C. § 2001(c).
58. See Johnson, supra note 56, at 88-91 tbl. I.
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Size of Gross Estate Average Estate Tax
$5-10 million $1.7 million
$10-20 million S3.2 million
over $20 million S10.1 million
TABLE I. Average Estate Tax Paid, by Size of Estate. 1991
The figures for average estate taxes paid are clearly significant, even to the
very wealthy families who are the only ones paying them.
Once comfortably within the estate tax's reach, a person has only limited
techniques for avoiding the tax. To have a real example before us throughout
our discussions, let us consider the case of H. Ross Perot, whose personal net
worth is estimated at $3 billion.59 If a taxpayer of Mr. Perot's wealth is at all
concerned with the tax, he will have a strong incentive to minimize the size
of his estate by aggressively using his annual exclusion gifts and unified credit
amount, and he may go even farther by engaging in a pattern of inter vivos,
taxable gifts. 6° Otherwise, Mr. Perot has three basic choices: (1) he can give
the money to charity, now or upon his death; (2) he can bequeath 45% of the
money to his children or other noncharitable beneficiaries and incur an estate
tax of 55%; or (3) he can spend the money.6' Mr. Perot can combine any of
these strategies. By using the "marital deduction," he can postpone the tax or
charitable contribution until the later of his or his wife's death. 62 He can also
engage in various strategies, some of them of dubious propriety, to reduce the
59. Actually, there is some uncertainty about Perot's net worth. One estimate puts it at "at least $2 4
billion." Billionaires, FORBES, Oct. 18. 1993. at 112. 121. A media estimate from May 1992. confirmed
by a Perot campaign official as accurate, was S3.3 billion. Randall Lane. What's Ross Real6 Worth .
FORBES, Oct. 19, 1992, at 72. 1 assume a net worth of S3 billion, although neither of the other figures
would alter Perot's marginal incentives. The Perot example in part suggests that all consumption
expenditures under a back-ended wealth tax share the structure of "tax expenditures" under an income
tax. That is, the government loses money by virtue of taxpayer action. When an mdividual receives a
nontaxable fringe benefit, for example, the tax expenditure logic argues that the government has thereby
foreswom revenue that it would have received had the taxpayer received ordinary salary instead The
same is true whenever a wealthy taxpayer consumes under a back-ended wealth tax This wealth would
have been subject to a 55% estate tax but for the expense, and we could therefore think of this as a "tax
expenditure." (There is no need to engage in any present value discounting of the tax burden, because
if the wealth were not consumed it would presumably grow at the discount rate). I mean to avoid any
lengthy discussion of the normative status of various claims under traditional tax expenditure analysis.
which would lead us too far astray in an already weighty project. See generalls STANLEY S St'RREY &
PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985); Boris I. Bitker. The Tar Erpendsture Budget-A Reply
to Professors Surrey and Hellmuth, 22 NAT'L TAX . 538 (1969) (cnticizing tax expenditure analysis)
60. See discussion infra part v.A.I.
61. By "spend." I mean a final use of resourcs-i e., spending by dining in line restaurants or
traveling the world, as opposed to "spending" on assets, such as yachts, that would then stay in the
estate. Of course, the depreciation in value of assets like cars, yachts, and houses vould count as estate-
tax-avoiding "spending." See. e.g., William D. Andrews. A ConsumptiannTpe or Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113. 1155-57 (1974) [hereinafter Andres%. Consumption-Typel
(discussing treatment of "consumer durables" under a consumption tax ideal)
62. I.R.C. § 2056 (1994).
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perceived value of his estate.63 These latter techniques are not necessarily
anything to sneeze at: Taxpayers and their advisors spend a good amount of
time and money devising strategies to avoid the estate tax.
At some quantum of wealth, and barring a change in the tax laws, these
choices become the only meaningful ones available to the truly wealthy
taxpayer. To the extent that such taxpayers are altruistically inclined or able
to create nonaltruistic linkages across generations,6 the law encourages
frequent, early, and generous use of all available exceptions, which can result
in the transmission of sizable fortunes inter vivos. At the same time, the law
discourages work and savings and encourages large-scale spending among the
rich. While the government has a large stake in all of these decisions, the
current law constrains it to wait by idly to see how it all comes out.
B. Revenue Effects
The revenue effects of the gift and estate tax regime are certainly not my
major concern. Nevertheless, a discussion of these effects nicely frames the
analysis, in part because some commentators have relied specifically on
revenue-raising as a principal justification for estate taxation.65 A discussion
of revenue effects also illustrates the practical and political limits of the estate
tax, and it moves us further into a consideration of empirical and behavioral
issues. To that end, this Section examines revenue effects in a cash-flow or
partial-equilibrium sense.66 That is, I shall look to immediate, observable
consequences without accounting for any long-term, dynamic, or behavioral
responses that would further complicate matters. A partial-equilibrium analysis,
for example, assumes that the tax rate or structure will not affect basic
individual decisions regarding work versus leisure or savings versus
consumption, and so on.
The strongest way to see that revenue is not the central concern is to
consider the claim that the gift and estate tax might actually be losing money
63. For example, Mr. Perot could create a difficult-to-value family business and use common law
principles such as "minority discounts" to get excess value out of his estate. See generally COOPER, supra
note 2 (criticizing estate tax as easily avoidable); SCHOLES & WOLFSON, supra note 55 (discussing
various tax avoidance strategies). This point illustrates other biases generated by an estate tax-toward
certain types of assets and certain forms of ownership.
64. See discussion infra part IV.A. I.
65. See Ascher, supra note 2, at 93 ("Depriving rich parents of the right to decide who will own
their property after death is a similarly painless and appropriate way to raise revenue."); see also MILL,
supra note 48, at 822; Eisenstein, supra note 2, at 238-52, 256-57. See generally JEREIY BENTHAM,
SUPPLY WITHOUT BURDEN (1795), reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 585 (John Bowring
ed., New York, Russell & Russell, Inc. 1962).
66. The next section, Part III.C, broadens this discussion by relaxing the ceteris paribus assumption
to determine the real, bottom-line revenue effects of having a wealth tax in place. Specifically, Part III.C
adds potential capital stock effects to the mix. Because the analysis in Part ilI.C covers many other




for the government. The federal government may collect more revenues from
repealing the tax, regardless of any indirect effects through variables such as
work effort or the capital stock. Proof of this claim, of course, does not alone
doom the estate tax under the liberal egalitarian ideal, although it would indeed
raise troublesome questions and knock out at least one basis for the tax's
support; Rawls, for example, explicitly advocated wealth transfer taxes "not to
raise revenue."67 But a practical, commonsensical wisdom might make us
skeptical of taxes that do not raise revenue, even if the very absence of
revenue may sometimes suggest that the tax is working-as conceivably ought
to be true in the case of "sin" taxes on cigarettes and alcohol.
Why might the gift and estate tax regime lose money every year'? Begin
with the fact that the actual yield of the taxes is low. Gift and estate taxes
brought in $7.6, $8.7, and $11.5 billion in 1988, 1989, and 1990, respectively.
Although these numbers might seem large, they represent only 0.2% of gross
domestic product (GDP) and less than 1% of federal revenues for the years in
question. 6 1 (The jump in revenues between 1989 and 1990 was largely due
to increased gift taxes, itself an interesting development that I discuss below.)
These taxes have always had a low yield, despite their high marginal rates.
While gift and estate taxes once accounted for a larger share of total federal
revenues, their share of GDP has always been meager, although, to be sure,
both of these values are now below their historic highs.6
67. THEORY OF JUSTICE. supra note 19. at 277: see also supra note 31 and accompan) Ing test.
68. During the years 1988, 1989, and 1990. gift and estate tax receipts as a percentage of total
federal government receipts were 0.836, 0.878. and 1.12. respectively As percentages of gross domestic
product, the figures were 0.159, 0.169, and 0.213. respectively. See 0FICE OF MAsAGEIIt ."T & BUDGET,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. FISCAL YEAR 1992. HISTORICAL TABLES. Ibls 1.1, 1 3.
2.5 (1991) [hereinafter HISTORICAL TABLESl.
69. The following table shows the changing magnitudes of the gift and estatc tas burden ocr time
Taxes Paid % Federal %C
Year (S millions) Revenue GDP
1940 353 5 39 0366
1945 637 141 0.300
1950 698 I 77 0.262
1955 924 1.41 0.239
1960 1606 174 0.318
1965 2716 2.37 0.405
1970 3644 1.89 0.369
1975 4611 I 65 0.302
1980 6389 1 24 0.240
1985 6422 088 0 163
1990 11.500 1 12 0213
TABLE 2. Gift and Estate Tax Revenues. 1940-1990
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From this humble base, we ought to subtract the administrative costs of
collecting the tax. I was unable to generate an actual figure for the cost of
administering the estate tax, and the IRS itself could not furnish the statistic.
Nevertheless, the figure is apt to be substantial.7' The estate tax is expensive
to monitor. Questions of valuation and ownership structure are persistent and
complex, and taxpayers often choose to litigate because of the large stakes and
the basic indeterminacy of the valuation and other questions involved. The IRS
maintains a separate estate tax examination unit in each of its district offices.
Congress has also devoted considerable time and attention to this area of the
law recently.7' The government's costs, whatever they are, obviously reduce
the estate tax's effective yield.
In addition, tax avoidance incentives might lead to more significant losses.
Commentators have long noted the plethora of planning devices that have
made the estate tax "voluntary. '72 These induced transactions come with their
own revenue and normative costs. The economist Douglas Bernheim has
argued that the transactions generated by an awareness of the estate tax lose
more revenue for the government, in the form of forgone income tax receipts,
than the gift and estate tax regime raises. Bernheim's original model proceeded
under the greater rate-bracket discrepancies obtaining before 1986, although he
did update it to include the 1986 changes. The main conclusion of his model
is that charitable donations and gifts from high-bracket taxpayers to low-
bracket taxpayers, each motivated at least in part by the estate tax, cost the
government significant income tax revenues.73
Bernheim's story is complicated to prove, and his conclusions are in some
ways overstated. One must establish that the extra estate tax savings caused
private parties' saving in income taxes, which roughly would mean that own
consumption is preferred to other consumption by more than the income tax
margin but by less than the combined income and estate tax one.74 A variant
These numbers indicate that, while the yield of gift and estate taxes is no doubt below its historic high,
it has always been rather meager, and that looking only at the taxes as a percentage of revenue overstates
their magnitude. For an example of a commentator who focuses on the percent of revenue figure, see
Eisenstein, supra note 2. Because there is no indexing of the unified credit or rate brackets under the gift
and estate tax, the rates tend to trend upwards after reforms. For example, budget estimates for the years
1991 and 1992 predicted that the tax as a percentage of GDP would increase to 0.218 and 0.222,
respectively. See HISTORICAL TABLES, supra note 68, tbls. 1.1, 1.3, 2.5. In fact, the actual gift and estate
tax collections as a percentage of GDP for 1991, 1992, and 1993 were 0.196, 0.188, and 0.2, below the
estimates. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 1995: HISTORICAL TABLES, tbls. 1.2, 2.5 (1994).
70. See, e.g., Donaldson, supra note I, at 548-50 (discussing various costs of gift and estate tax);
Hudson, supra note 1, at 32 (discussing difficulty of measuring costs).
71. Donaldson, supra note I. at 548-49; see also Robinson, supra note 2, at 44 (suggesting that
legislative attention should shift away from estate taxes to other, more pressing, problems); cf. Janet
Novack. Taxation Without Representation, FORBES, Oct. 1, 1990, at 220 (discussing minor adjustments
in estate taxation of foreigners who invest in United States).
72. See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 2, at 12-63; see also infra part VI.A.
73. See Bernheim. supra note 2, at 135. Of course, the normative propriety of charitable
contributions is rather different from that of inter vivos transfers, as I discuss later. See infra part V.C.3.
74. In formal terms, this would mean that agents had marginal utility functions such that
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of this story would involve nonaltruistic, linked gifts: situations where
members of an older, wealthier generation transmit wealth downstream with
the explicit or implicit understanding that they can receive help later, if
needed.75 If the benefits generated by the combined income and estate tax
savings are greater than the transaction costs of making these arrangements.
standard microeconomic theory predicts that the deals will transpire.
Obviously, these matters are difficult to pin down, but Bernheim at least
concludes that the net revenue effect of the estate tax is apt to be small and
possibly even negative. 6 While this strong conclusion of a negative revenue
effect seems improbable, the estate tax clearly is not a significant source of
revenue, as even its most thoughtful advocates acknowledge. 7 Further,
Bernheim's story is a partial-equilibrium one, in the sense that he does not
consider the impact of diminished work or savings efforts under the estate tax.
In this regard it is likely that Bernheim's analysis strongly overestimates the
revenue gain from the estate tax; diminished productivity unequivocally costs
the government tax revenue.
MU,'(C(w - it))> MU:(C(w)). (1)
but
MU" (C(tw - it))< MUl,(C(tw - ct)), (2)
where MU (*) is the individual's marginal utility function, the subscript I represents Agent I', utility
(Agent I is the potential donor); the superscript I or 2 represents the person consuming (Agent 2 is the
potential beneficiary); C (*) is the consumption function; is is wseahh and it and et are the income and
estate taxes, respectively. Thus. equation (I) maintains that Agent I prefers her os.n utility of
consumption at the margin to that Agent 2. even where her wealth-but not the bneficary's-is reduced
by the income tax. (Think of it as the added income tax ossed by %trtue of the wealthier donor holding
the wealth). Equation (2) maintains that the same agent prefers other consumption more than her owkn
when the other's consumable wealth is reduced by the estate tax. In such a case. Agent I will transfer
enough wealth to Agent 2 to equate the marginal utilities. saving both income and estate taxes in the
process. This is Bernheim's basic story. See Bemheim. supra note 2. at 135-37
75. See, e.g., Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Avia Spivak. The Familh as an Incomplete Annuities Market.
89 J. POL. ECON. 372. 372 (1981).
76. Even without large rate disparities-Bemheim almost certainly exaggerates the extent to which
inter vivos gift recipients are or remain in the 15% bracket-the idea that estate-tax-moti,,atcd
transactions lose income tax revenue for the government is still plausible. The gift and estate tax regime
affects the choice of investment vehicles just as it does the timing of gifts. Downstream gifts are apt to
be placed in less income-generating assets. A paradigm case is insurance. For example, much evidence
indicates that the estate tax is a major part of the pitch employed by insurance agents to wealthy
taxpayers. See Karen Slater Damato. Isurance Agents Find Profit in Estate.Tax Fear. WALL ST J . May
21, 1993, at Cl. An insurance trust is, indeed, the ultimate tax-sheltered vehicle-forever immune from
both income and estate taxes when properly designed. See I.R.C. § 2042 (1994) (excluding income tax
proceeds from gross estate unless deceased retained "incidents of ownership"). id. § 101 (generally
excluding life insurance proceeds). Similar effects obtain from chantable gifts and the complex "split
interest" trusts that are a staple of sophisticated estate tax planning. For further discussion and some
planning techniques. see SCHOLES & WOLFSON. supra note 55. at 575-98 (describing planning
techniques). Both insurance and charitable strategies are widely advertised and promoted in vehicles
targeted to wealthy audiences. There is also something to the thought that taxpayers ssho are estate-tax-
wise are also income-tax-wise. Advisors who are consulted for estate planning purposes are apt to
recommend income-tax-minimizing strategies as well. See Bemheim. supra note 2. at 132-35
77. See Duff, supra note 2, at 7; Graetz. supra note 2. at 269-70. But cf. Ascher. supra note 2. at
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Whatever one thinks of the Bernheim analysis, two points are important.
First, the fact that the estate tax does not raise significant amounts of revenue
is an aspect of our actual practices that we ought to take seriously. The
relevance of this fact derives not merely from the estate tax's failure to raise
more revenue, but also from the deeper set of facts concerning why the tax is
such a limited revenue raiser, and why there is so little popular or political will
to extend it. This situation informs the interpretive case against the estate tax.
Second, the estate tax's "loopholes," exceptions, and exclusions work
alongside, and must be considered together with, parallel "loopholes" in the
general income tax. Regardless of whether Bernheim's strong hypothesis of net
revenue loss is ultimately sustainable, any attempt to shut down the estate tax's
gaps without simultaneously considering income tax gaps may generate
counterproductive results. We must think more comprehensively about all of
our various taxes, as I attempt to do in Part V.
C. Capital Stock Effects
Another part of the consequential aspects of estate taxation concerns the
tax's effects on the capital stock. By "capital stock," I am referring to the
aggregate level of social savings, measured in various ways.78 I want to make
clear from the outset, consistent with a liberal egalitarian focus, that I am not
arguing, as others might, for capital formation as the "trump",7 9-that is, the
decisive concern that tips the balance of arguments against estate taxation.
Rather, I discuss capital formation for two distinct reasons. First, I believe that
capital formation is relevant, even if not decisive, for all but the most purely
rights-oriented liberal egalitarians. Capital formation has important effects on
intra- as well as inter-generational well-being-a point that some liberal
egalitarians have often missed or misunderstood. Rawls' conditional acceptance
of inheritance suggests that he is aware of advantageous social effects from
inter-generational savings,8" for example, and he elsewhere directly
acknowledges the importance of capital for a liberal state. Perhaps most
important, citizens in a political liberal state may reasonably like capital and
what it provides. They might objectively decide that the accumulation of
private capital is worth its costs, especially if, as I shall argue below, an
appropriate tax policy can contain these costs by constraining the nominally
private possession of wealth. Second, the reasons why estate taxation affects
78. See generally Aaron & Munnell, supra note 6 (discussing various means of measuring aggregate
savings level currently in use); B. Douglas Bernheim & John Karl Scholz, Private Saving and Public
Policy, in 7 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 73 (James M. Poterba ed., 1993) (same).
79. The phrase derives from Graetz, supra note 2, at 278, who is both critical and skeptical of
capital formation arguments.




the capital stock are relevant to the liberal egalitarian case, even if we are not
concerned with capital formation per se. The behavioral responses suggested
by back-ended wealth taxation-inter vivos giving and increased leisure and
consumption-cast doubt on even the rights-oriented liberal egalitarian's case
for estate taxation.
The general subject of capital formation and its relationship to estate
taxation is controversial. While commentators have long noted the possibility
that a wealth transfer tax might adversely affect the capital stock, advocates of
wealth transfer taxation have responded with two sometimes intermingled lines
of attack. One is the categorical claim that the aggregate capital stock does not
matter, or alternatively that the stock is ample at any particular moment in
time. A second line of attack features skepticism about the empirical effects
of the tax on actual private decisions."'
The first response raises complex issues of inter-generational justice.
Economists since Keynes have noted that it is possible to oversave,' - and
political and moral philosophers similarly remain divided over questions of
optimal savings policy.83 Moreover, it is often difficult to determine where
a society stands relative to its optimal savings rate or its optimal capital
stock.' Still, there does seem to be a present consensus that the United
States' capital stock and savings rates are both too low at the moment."
Perhaps more important for the present project, both our current practices and
contemporary tax theory have been tilting toward a consumption tax model, in
part because of the consumption tax's greater inducement toward saving. If
liberal society simply wants more capital for reasonable political reasons, then
parts of our tax system may be operating at direct cross-purposes. We must
figure out whether and why we want more savings and analyze all aspects of
public finance more consistently on this score.'
81. See, e.g., Ascher, supra note 2. at 102-06; Graetz. supra note 2. at 279-83. Haslctt. supra note
3, at 145-48.
82. Keynes himself noted earlier economists who believed that oversaving was possible JolH'%
MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT. INTEREST. AND MON.EY 358-71 (1936).
see also Graetz, supra note 2. at 279 (questioning need for more savings); Tie U S Economs Ma
Dominate for Years, WALL ST. J.. Jan. 10. 1994. at A I ("Japan's expenence suggests a country can
invest too much.").
83. See. e.g., THEORY OF JUSTICE. supra note 19. at 286-90; Amartya Sen. On Optimastng the Rate
of Saving, 71 ECON. J. 479 (1961).
84. For classic discussions of the role of savings and optimal savings rates in furthenng grosth. see
generally WILLIAM H. BRANSON, MACROECONOMIC THEORY AND POLICY 561-640 (3d ed 1989).
Edmund S. Phelps, Second Essay on the Golden Rule of Accumulation. 55 Ami. Eco. REV 793 (1965).
Edmund S. Phelps, The New View of Investment: A Neoclassical Analysis. 76 QJ EcoN 548 (1962.
Sen, supra note 83; Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the 77Teory of Economic Growth. 70 QJ ECON
65 (1956). Professor Graetz. writing in 1983. noted the debates. Graetz. supra note 2. at 278-83
85. See, e.g.. BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, DAY OF RECKONING- TIlE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA'.
ECONOMIC POLICY (1989); STRENGTHENING OF AM. COMM'N. FIRST REPORT (1992). Harold T Gross
& Bernard L. Weinstein, The Past and Future of U.S. Private Saving. CIIAtLEINGE. July-Aug 1992. at
42. But cf. Richard Ruggles, Accounting for Saving and Capital Formation in the United States.
1947-1991, J. ECON PERSP., Spring 1993. at 3 (criticizing methods of accounting for savings and noting
that capital formation is more important than savings incentives).
86. To compare apples with apples, it may be sensible to view policies that change the estate tax
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There are other puzzling aspects about the how-much-savings question.
Whatever one thinks of the complicated social question of the optimal savings
rates and capital stock, more savings would help reduce the cost of capital and
increase productivity, ultimately resulting in higher wages.87 Since wages are
the key element of the tax base, and indeed the only element in the
increasingly important payroll tax system,88 capital enhancements should
increase the general tax base. More important, capital stock may improve intra-
generational opportunities. There is this enduring paradox in tax policy: On the
typical assumption that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor
is less than unity, increased capital stock decreases the return of capital and
increases the relative share of labor.89 The normative propriety of savings is
ambiguous. Capital itself may help all of society, perhaps especially the
working classes, even though it is apt to be concentrated in the hands of the
wealthy. At this point, the distinction between the use and possession of wealth
becomes relevant, even decisive. Liberal society ought to look for a way to
facilitate the private possession while minimizing the risk of the distortionary
in conjunction with other policies that keep the capital stock constant. This point is central in Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Notes on Estate Taxes, Redistribution, and the Concept of Balanced Growth Path Incidence, 86
J. POL. ECON. S137 (1978). In the case of increasing the estate tax, assuming that this does entail a
reduction in the capital stock, this means supplementing the policy with other inducements to savings,
such as tax benefits or a reduction in social security. Id. at S139. Studies that simply show a large net
benefit from eliminating the estate tax without making corresponding changes are doing little more than:
(a) predicting the behavioral responses to repeal of the estate tax (i.e., that savings will increase), and
(b) reflecting relatively conventional economic theory as to the effects of more savings. See, e.g., Richard
Wagner, Federal Transfer Taxation: A Study in Social Cost, in INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON THlE
ECONOMICS OF TAXATION, FISCAL ISSUES 8, at 17-19 (1993) (arguing that capital stock would now be
$398.6 billion higher if estate tax had been repealed in 1970, and that repeal in 1993 will increase capital
stock by $638.9 billion and GDP by $79.2 billion by the year 2000). If we assume instead that society
has determined an optimal savings level, and ask how this is to be maintained, a more precise answer
to the differential costs of the estate tax can emerge.
87. There is an important caveat about these effects in an open economy, however, where capital
can flow into other countries. In such a case, the productivity enhancements may take place abroad. See
Joel Slemrod, Effect of Taxation with International Capital Mobility, in UNEASY COMPROMISE:
PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 115 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter
UNEASY COMPROMISE]; see also Frank Levy & Richard J. Murname, U.S. Earnings Levels and Earnings
Inequality: A Review of Recent Trends and Proposed Explanations, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1333, 1372
(1992) (explaining that one effect of trade deficit is to reduce jobs in manufacturing). Of course, there
is an interesting but seldom-asked normative question of whether we should be concerned solely with
American prosperity. In an open economy, greater capital will help wage earners throughout the world.
88. On the increasing importance of social security and other payroll taxes, see generally MeCaffery,
Cognitive Theory, supra note 10.
89. As Stiglitz explains,
The reason that the estate tax may not increase the equality of income is the following: the
estate tax may reduce savings; the reduction in savings and capital accumulation will, in the
long run, lead to a lower capital labor ratio; and the lower capital labor ratio will, if the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is less than unity, lead to an increase in
the share of capital.
Stiglitz, supra note 86, at S138 (footnote omitted); see also Boskin, supra note 17, at 64; Lawrence H.
Summers, Capital Taxation and Accumulation in a Life Cycle Growth Model, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 533,
542 (1981). But cf A.B. Atkinson & A. Sandmo, Welfare Implications of the Taxation of Savings, 90
ECON. J. 529, 533, 542 (1980) (noting numerous complexities and empirical issues involved in estimating
welfare effects of taxing savings); Martin Feldstein, The Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation, 86
J. POL. ECON. S29. S39-42, S49-50 (1978) (same).
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private use of wealth. This is exactly what a progressive consumption-without-
estate tax aims to do, as I shall argue more fully in Part V.
I address the skeptical component of the second criticism, that the estate
tax is unlikely to affect savings in any event, in discussing issues of empirical
uncertainty later.9° As an aside, it is important to note a common mistake in
the tax policy literature. The fact that the wealth transfer tax system has a low
revenue yield does not by itself mean that its effects on behavior or the capital
stock are also small. We need to explore why the revenue yield is so low. If
the low yield results from behavioral adaption to the tax regime, we would
have both large behavioral effects and scant revenue-just as we might have,
for example, if we drastically raised the cigarette tax.9 ' In any event, the
estate tax might affect the capital stock for one of two different reasons. One
is the behavioral effect on the consumption-savings and work-leisure decisions
of the donor class, and on the timing and extent of inter vivos gifts. If, as I
argue in Part IV, these induced effects are themselves illiberal, then the capital
loss may be merely an insult added to the injury of inequality. The second
effect comes from the different employments of capital made by the parties
who receive the donor's wealth-that is, the government and private donees.
If these recipients are less likely to save, capital will be lost, even without
donor-level behavioral effects.
The question of these two empirical effects depends, in turn, on our
understanding of why people save and, relatedly, why they make gifts. A brief
foray into intellectual history reveals that ideas about wealth taxation have
always been linked to theories of savings. Although both Adam Smith and
David Ricardo opposed any form of wealth transfer tax, specifically on the
grounds that such taxes impair capital and therefore hurt social wealth,92 most
early discussions of such taxes in the literature, including Jeremy Bentham's
and John Stuart Mill's, were characterized by a naive sense of the motives for
saving. Bentham, Mill, and others assumed that bequests were made out of
fortuitous leftovers, so that levying the estate tax could not cause adverse
incentive effects at either generational level. Bentham and Mill accordingly
90. See infra part VI.B.
91. See Go On, Tax the Real Killer, ECONOMIST, Nov. 27. 1993. at 28. 29 (reporting Senator
Moynihan's proposal to tax handgun ammunition at rates ranging from 50% to 10.000%. in attempt to
raise revenue while simultaneously taxing the most dangerous bullets out of existence). Scott R,
Schmedel, Tax Report, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17. 1993, at A I (noting study by Council of State Governments
that found sin taxes no longer good sources of revenue); Rick Wartzman. Clnton's Proposal for "Sin
Taxes" May Stumble by Turning Too Many Americans into Saints. WALL ST. J.. Apr 14. 1993. at A16
(discussing tobacco and alcohol taxes and trade-off between behavior modification and revenue
production goals); see also Edward J. McCaffery. Taxation and the Famitly: A Fresh Look at Behavioral
Gender Biases in the Code. 40 UCLA L. REv. 983. 1044 n.229 (1993) (noting that former President
Gorbachev of Soviet Union lost money by overtaxing alcohol on moralistic grounds)
92. 2 ADAM SMITH. THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 391-92 (Edwin Cannan ed. 1976) (1776). DAVID
RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 94-97 (Ernest Rhys ed. Everyman's
Library 1911) (1817); see also Graetz. supra note 2. at 282-83 (citing MAX WEST. TrE INHERITANCE
TAX (2d ed. 1908)).
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viewed death taxes as the best possible tax.
This early sense of motives for saving received an intellectual boost from
the speculations of John Maynard Keynes and, later, from the work of Nobel
laureate Franco Modigliani. Keynes hypothecated a fixed savings-to-
consumption ratio: a rule of thumb that an individual consumer adopted and
then, rather inexplicably, followed for the rest of her life. Modigliani and
others advanced and developed this speculation into the "life-cycle" theory of
saving. Under this theory, individuals are concerned only with their own
generation's consumption. They save early in their lives, during periods of
peak earnings, solely to achieve a smooth consumption path throughout their
lifetimes; the life-cycle (or "permanent income"93) theory holds that
individuals annuitize their private wealth.
Life-cycle theory persisted as the dominant, indeed nearly exclusive, model
of savings until the early 1980's, and it continues to inform discussions of the
estate tax in the tax policy literature. 94 Beginning in the late 1970's, however,
further research into savings behavior, led by Laurence Kotlikoff and Lawrence
Summers, began to question the life-cycle hypothesis. Kotlikoff and Summers
found that not all of the data fit an exclusively life-cycle model: Individuals
were not completely annuitizing their wealth, even where they could, and many
who did save passed significant sums inter-generationally.95 The elderly
wealthy often continued to save, not dissave as the life cycle model had
predicted. The authors concluded that 50% to 80% of all national wealth
represented inter-generational savings. Although the debate over the motives
and determinants of savings is continuing, even neutral observers concede that
a high proportion-at least one-fourth-of national wealth is held as inter-
generational, or bequest, savings. 96
93. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, A THEORY OF THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION 20-31 (1957) (explaining
permanent income hypothesis); see also Franco Modigliani & Richard Brumberg, Utility Analysis and
the Consumption Function: An Interpretation of Cross-Section Data, in POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS
388, 388-436 (Kenneth K. Kurihara ed., 1954) (explaining life-cycle hypothesis).
94. Useful background on theories of savings can be found in THOMAS A. BARTHOLD & TAKATOSIII
ITO, BEQUEST TAXES AND ACCUMULATION OF HOUSEHOLD WEALTH: U.S.-JAPAN COMPARISON 1-3,
41-44 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3692, 1991); LAURENCE J.
KOTLIKOFF, WHAT DETERMINES SAVINGS? 1-35 (1989) [hereinafter KoTLiKOFF, WHAT DETERMINES
SAVINGS?]; Aaron & Munnell, supra note 6, at 130-32; Michael D. Hurd, Savings of the Elderly and
Desired Bequests, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 298 (1987); Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Intergenerational Transfers
and Savings, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 41 (1988) [hereinafter Kotlikoff, Intergenerational Transfers]; Paul L.
Menchik & Martin David, Income Distribution, Lifetime Savings, and Bequests, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 672
(1983).
95. See, e.g., KOTLIKOFF, WHAT DETERMINES SAVINGS?, supra note 94, at 41; Laurence J. Kotlikoff
& Lawrence H. Summers, The Role ofIntergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation,
89 J. POL. ECON. 706, 707 (1981); see also Hersh M. Shefrin & Richard H. Thaler, The Behavioral Life-
Cycle Hypothesis, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 609 (1988) (suggesting that data require modification of life-cycle
theory).
96. See, e.g., Aaron & Munnell, supra note 6, at 132 (finding that inherited wealth accounts for at
least 30% of national net worth); BARTHOLD & ITO, supra note 94, at 44 (finding that 25-40% of capital
stock in U.S. and Japan represents inter-generational transfer). But cf. Hurd, supra note 94, at 298,
306-07 (questioning existence of bequest motive, although finding significant midlife inter vivos
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This brief survey indicates that actual economic behavior is more rich and
complex than handy a priori explanations would suggest. There are
undoubtedly many diverse motives for saving, both across people and within
individuals. The important point for wealth taxation theory is that various
means of taxing wealth can have very different effects, depending on why
people save. For example, estate taxation poses no severe disincentives under
a life-cycle savings model, but disincentives can be severe under a bequest
savings one.97 Any change in our understanding of why people save should
thus change the way we think about the estate tax. In 1916, it might have
appeared that the estate tax could have given us our cake while allowing us to
eat it, too: We could have served the liberal egalitarian equal-opportunity ideal
and raised revenue, all with no significant adverse effects on behavior or
capital stock. The life-cycle model lent intellectual support to this neat package
of virtues (and on this account alone ought to have raised some skepticism).
The new and emerging theories on why people save have destroyed the happy
convergence.
A question related to why people save is why they make gifts or bequests.
The early, Mill-Bentham view, continued under the life-cycle hypothesis, was
that bequests were mere "accidents" owing to the uncertain timing of death and
the absence of perfect annuity markets. A second view, typically invoked by
Gary Becker and others in the neoclassical economic tradition, is that bequests
provide direct utility to the donor, because the utility of related parties (i.e.,
donees) enters into one's own utility function; this is an altruistic
transfers). Hurd also notes the absence of the very wealthy from the data. due to their reluctance to be
interviewed. Id. at 307.
97. "Ricardian equivalence" might seem to dictate that estate taxation would hase no net effect on
saving. Ricardian equivalence is the theory that the goermcnt's choice of debt or tax financing s
irrelevant. Altruistically linked generations simply save more if the govemnent chooses debt hnancing
to make up for the rationally anticipated future taxes required to pay down the debt See agenerall Robert
J. Barro, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?. 82 J. POL. ECo.". 1095 (1974) (articulating theor) that
debt/tax ratio is irrelevant). Although the theory may seem implausible on its face. aggregate macrodata
tend to support its general validity. See. eg.. John J Seater. Rtcardan Equi iaencr. 11 J E('o%
LITERATURE 142 (1993) (finding some econometric support for Ricardian equlalenceh. t] B Douglas
Berheim, Ricardian Equivalence: An Evaluation of Theor% and Evidence,. in NImM-Rotcoomic's
ANNUAL 263-91 (Stanley Fischer ed.. 1987) (finding some econometric support for Ricardian
equivalence, but concluding that it is unlikely). There are. however. some important difference, in the
case of estate taxation. First, the Ricardian effect may in fact be largel) due to intperfcct or rask.asers
life-cycle saving; individuals may anticipate or fear the increased tax burdens coming in their own
lifetimes. Second. since the estate tax does not raise enough revenue to hase an) meaningful effect on
general tax rates, there is no meaningful income effect at work. present disposable income would not
increase from the repeal of estate taxation, as it would from a choice of large-scale debt financing user
current income taxation. (Another way to see this idea is to understand Ricardian equi'.alence as a
constant consumption hypothesis: When debt substitutes for taxation. the rational consumer's
consumption is unaffected, so she simply saves the increased disposable income from the choice of
financing vehicle. If, however, consumption remains unaffected b) the choice of estate tax. so woil
savings, and equivalence will not hold.) Finally. it seems intuitisel imtplausible that Ricardian
equivalence would govern the behavior of the %cry rich taxpayer under the shadows of the estate tax
Indeed, if equivalence does hold at this level, it would seem to be a feature of consumption satiation.
as the prior point suggests.
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explanation.98 Attempts to fit the simple, apparently selfless act of gift-giving
into a narrow, self-interested theory have had predictable consequences. The
latest, emergent theory, borrowing from game theoretic ideas, is that gifts are
strategic; that is, they are made to further one's own, purely self-regarding
interests. There are two strands to this new view, not always properly
differentiated in the literature. One holds that a donor uses the allure of
bequests and the threat of their withholding to control the behavior of
others-to get children to be more attentive, for example.99 A second type of
strategic motive is more subtle: Family and other interrelated groups form an
informal annuity or insurance pool, to which donors make contributions with
the at least implicit understanding that the donees will care for them if the
donor's resources run out.
Like the life-cycle versus bequest-savings debate, these various motives are
not incompatible. All no doubt exist, not only across society but also within
individual donors. Once again, sorting through these motives may have
decisive consequences for predicting and evaluating the likely effects of a
changed tax regime. If, for example, family members use gifts to create
intrafamilial annuities, encouraging such gifts may not do much even to break
up concentrations of wealth; Bernheim's speculation about income tax savings
would also become more compelling. At a minimum, our more sophisticated
knowledge of why people save and make gifts should lead us to rethink basic
paradigms of estate taxation.
In any event, capital will likely decrease due to behavioral effects on work
and consumption decisions at the donor level; I discuss this issue more fully
in Part IV, but it is initially hard to believe that high tax rates do not have
disincentive effects, at least once we move beyond the life-cycle/fortuitous
leftover view of large bequests. There is still the further question of what the
government or the induced donees might do with the revenues generated. As
it turns out, this area is another one in which primitive views, again harking
back to Bentham and Mill, have impeded sophisticated normative analysis. The
early view was that as long as governments ran deficits, a tax on capital could
have no negative impact on total capital stock. As Mill explained, "the produce
of the tax, thus applied, still remains capital, and is merely transferred from the
tax-payer to the fundholder."' j
98. See GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 277-306 (enlarged ed. 1991) [hereinafter
BECKER, TREATISE ON THE FAMILY]; Gary S. Becker, Altruism in the Family and Selfishness in the
Market Place, 48 ECONOMICA I, 1-10 (1981); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, 82 J.
POL. ECON. 1063, 1074-83 (1974).
99. See generally B. Douglas Bernheim et al., The Strategic Bequest Motive, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1045
(1985) (discussing gifts as means of compensation for services rendered); Donald Cox, Motives for
Private Income Transfers, 95 J. POL. ECON. 508 (1987) (comparing altruistic and exchange models of
transfers and finding evidence supports latter).
100. MILL, supra note 48, at 822-24; see also Ascher, supra note 2, at 110-I1 (quoting Mill with
approval); Graetz, supra note 2. at 282-83 (citing MAX WEST, THE INHERITANCE TAX 209 (2d ed. 1908),
and describing West's comments on Mill).
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This theory, however, is surely too simplistic,' A capital tax
undoubtedly would affect individual savings incentives. No one could plausibly
argue that a confiscatory income tax would have no effect on capital so long
as its proceeds were used to pay down the national deficit. Moreover, it is far
from clear that the government would use all of the capital tax to reduce its
deficit. Indeed, it is rather unclear what such specific allocations or
"earmarkings" even mean.'02 Modern public choice scholarship has argued
forcefully about the effects on total government spending of new revenue
sources.0 3 It seems likely that the government, or the beneficiaries of the
government's redistributive program, will be less intensive savers than the very
wealthy whom the tax directly impacts. The economist Joseph Stiglitz relied
exclusively on this effect in surmising that the gift and estate tax regime is
costly in terms of the capital stock; he posits that the tax effects a transfer
from those with higher propensities to save to those with higher propensities
to consume.' ° Adam Smith made essentially the same point more than two
hundred years earlier.'0 5 If this Stiglitz-Smith conjecture is true, then total
national wealth decreases under any estate tax, even if the elasticity of capital
accumulation to the estate tax rate is zero. If the capital stock has elements of
a public good, the good may be enhanced by the nominally private ownership
of capital.
One might object that a negative effect on capital will obtain under any
effort to tax wealth or to redistribute resources generally, so that the capital
stock theme is simply an argument against "progressivity" or even against
distributive justice itself. Any redistributive attempt will diminish the
incentives of the most wealthy-without question a critically important class
101. If restated as a variant of the Ricardian hypothesis, the idea is harder to refute An extreme
version of the Ricardian hypothesis maintains that savings is completely independent of the means and
extent of government financing, thus mooting any question of the effect of taxation on capital But there
appears to be little support for such an extreme view. See Bermhtim. supra note 97 (finding reason to
support Ricardian hypothesis in the aggregate, despite questions on individual leselt. (f Seater. supra
note 97 (finding some econometric support for Ricardian equivalence). I belies that there is some reason
to be especially skeptical of the Ricardian hypothesis as applied to the estate tax See supra note 97 This
question calls for close empirical analysis, not easy a priori speculation
102. The technique of earmarking has been studied in connection with state-run lotteries in America,.
where it is often found that direct use of funds for a specified purpose is at least partially undermined
by indirect cuts in general appropriations toward the same cnd-the so-called "front dooriback door"
effect. See CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER & PHILIP J. COOK. SELLING HOPE: STATE LOTTERIES i AMERICA
227-28 (1989) ("[lIt is unlikely that lottery revenues have much effect on thd pattern of expenditures ")
This effect is related to the so-called "flypaper' effect, under which lump sum grants to certain
governmental agencies "stick" to their first recipient rather than being passed on to the ultimate, intended
beneficiaries. See Wallace E. Oates. On The Nature and Measurement of Fiscal Illusion A Surve%. in
TAXATION AND FISCAL FEDERALISM 65, 77-78 (Geoffrey Brennan et al- eds. 1988)
103. See. e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER. PUBLIC CHOICE 11268-71 (1989) (citing numerous sources and
discussing "Leviathan" theory of government).
104. See Stiglitz, supra note 86, at S138.
105. See 2 SMITH, supra note 92, at 391 (pointing out that wealth taxes shift capital fronm productive
private to unproductive public sector "'hey are all more or less unthnft) taxes that increasc the revenue
of the sovereign, which seldom maintains any but unproductive labourers; at the expnce of the capital
of the people, which maintains none but productive.").
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when it comes to capital accumulation-to work or save. All such
redistributions will also involve moving wealth in the direction of those with
lesser propensities to save. Therefore, the argument runs, a concern over
capital proves too much and is doomed to be "conservative" or illiberal.
I do not accept this. argument. It reflects a failure to think through the
normative distinction between the possession and use of wealth. If we
progressively tax the use of wealth, we will not necessarily chill its private
accumulation.'0 6 Nor will we necessarily move capital into the hands of those
with greater propensities to consume. As we shall see later, a progressive
consumption tax is a way of protecting a "frugal capitalist class" while
penalizing only the "self-indulgent aristocracy."'07 Indeed, taxing the use of
wealth changes the very meaning and dangers of private possession.'0 Under
a progressive consumption tax, Mr. Perot would have had to pay vast sums of
money in taxes on his presidential bid; under our current income-plus-estate
tax, the campaign saved the Perot family some $33 million in estate taxes.109
Compared to the current tax system, a progressive consumption-without-estate
tax will provide society with a better balance of what truly matters. I return to
these issues in Part V.
IV. THE (LIBERAL) FAILURES OF THE ESTATE TAX
Part III set out the details of the current estate tax and showed that they
might not be sensible in several immediate ways. The law is very complicated
and porous. It raises little revenue and may even cost the government money.
It almost certainly negatively affects the capital stock, both by inducing
important potential savers to save less and by putting money in the hands of
more spend-happy parties. Yet these suggestions, however troubling, do not
seriously undermine the strongest liberal case for wealth transfer taxation.
Rawls, after all, specifically advocated such taxes "not to raise revenue," but
106. See infra part V.C.2.
107. These terms are derived from Rawls. See THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 298-99
(arguing that society should allow wealth accumulation "only in special circumstances, including the
frugality of the capitalist class as opposed to the self-indulgence of the aristocracy"); see also infra note
232 and accompanying text.
108. See infra part V.C.3.
109. This figure assumes a $60 million campaign cost and a 55% estate tax rate; there is no reason
to adjust the figure to take into account the time value of money because the $60 million, and hence the
tax on it, would grow at the social discount rate. See George Skelton, Capitol Journal: Deep Pockets antd
a New Day for Voters, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1994, at A3.
Interestingly, as this Article was going to print, the Perot phenomenon was playing itself out, on
a slightly smaller scale, in the California Senate race. Republican challenger Michael Huffington, with
a net worth of about $70 million or more, was said to be spending $20 million or more of his own
money challenging the incumbent Democrat Dianne Feinstein, herself a wealthy woman. See id.; Dan
Balz, High Rolling in California: Anti-Government Challenger Pours Millions into Senate Race. WASH.
POST, Oct. 6, 1994, at Al; Kathy Kiely, Ex-Houstonian Pouring Gold into Them Thar Hills: Huffington
Challenges Feinstein in California, HOUS. POST, Oct. 6, 1994, at A I.
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to correct for the essentially political problems of wealth concentration.""
Further, even if our laws fail to live up fully to their ideals or are a bit
senseless in practice, where is the harm? What is there to suggest either that
the current regime is bad, or that the appropriate response to the law's actual,
practical failures is not to strengthen it, as the calls for confiscatory wealth
transfer taxation explicitly seek to do?
This Part shows that the current estate tax is misguided on purely liberal
grounds-the first argument against estate taxation from Part Il-and begins
pressing the second argument, namely that any stronger or confiscatory
alternative is likewise ill advised. This Part moves into a dynamic or
behavioral focus, looking at the underlying, individual psychic reasons why the
effects of the prior Part obtain. Section A examines two critical sets of
behavioral incentives, involving inter vivos giving and work-leisure and
consumption-savings decisions, and Section B discusses distributive
consequences generally. The central theme of this Part is that any scheme of
wealth transfer taxation encourages an earlier-in-life transmission of wealth
and/or induces increased consumption and diminished work and savings by the
wealthy, and that these effects can be decidedly illiberal.
A. Behavioral Incentives
The conclusion that taxes affect behavior is typically assumed in the
general case of income taxes."' It should not surprise us that the very
wealthy, who are among the most sophisticated and elastic taxpayers, react
strongly to the gift and estate tax laws. The evidence is overwhelming that
they do. The wealthy spend a good deal of legal and other resources on
avoiding the estate tax or mitigating its effects. An informal estimate by a pair
of prominent public economists is that the private expenditure on estate tax
advice may amount to a sizable percentage of revenue generated."- Seminars
on developments in the estate tax are extremely common, and a number of
professional publications are devoted exclusively or significantly to the subject
of estate tax avoidance. Even the popular press often writes about techniques
for minimizing or avoiding estate taxes. There is documented evidence that
estate tax changes have led, directly and quickly, to changes in the patterns of
interspousal transfers. ' 3 There is also the somewhat curious fact of the high
and increasing amounts of gift taxes paid---evidence of complex, savvy gift
110. THEORY OF JUSTICE. supra note 19. at 277
111. But cf Joel Slemrod, Do Taxes Matter' Lessons fran: the 1980"s. 82 At ECo RE 250.
251-53 (1992) (noting that behavioral reactions to large tax changes i 1981 and 1986 failed to match
extent of predictions, but indicating that difficult-to-detect responses might explain sonic %anance) See
generally Do TAXES MATTER? (Joel Slemrod cd.. 1990) (examining multtplhctt% of tax-reform effects)
112. Aaron & Munnell, supra note 6. at 138.
113. Bernheim, supra note 2. at 121-24.
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and estate tax planning. Any lawyer with experience planning estates for
moderately to very wealthy families knows that such clients do, indeed, take
advantage of the various means of making gifts to get out of the shadows of
the estate tax.
Such tax avoidance efforts hold significance for the liberal egalitarian. This
Section examines two such sets of behavioral effects that are decidedly
illiberal: (1) inter vivos gifts, and (2) consumption-savings and work-leisure
decisions.
1. Inter Vivos Giving
The gift and estate tax system encourages frequent, early, and large giving
among the very wealthy for three primary reasons. First, the annual exclusion
has an automatic use-it-or-lose-it feature that induces wealthy individuals to
take advantage of it every year (and early in the year, at that). The effect can
be substantial. At a conservative 6% rate of return, a child of the Perots, say,
who receives $20,000 a year from her parents, will amass a personal net worth
of over $735,000 by the time she turns twenty years old. By the age of forty,
her fortune will have grown to well over $3 million." 4 At a more aggressive
but hardly ridiculous 10% rate of return, these nominal values are $1.1 and
$8.8 million, respectively. These numbers double if the Perot child is married
and if the Perots feel comfortable bringing their in-law into the wealth
transmission process, and the numbers quadruple if the other set of parents (the
parents-in-law) are so inclined. Moreover, the receipt of these gifts is free from
all income and social security taxation. Married couples who receive $80,000
from their two sets of parents on January 1 of each year have as many after
tax dollars for the entire year as someone earning approximately $130,000 in
annual wages."t 5 This earnings level is solidly upper class. Medical and
educational expenditures are an entirely separate class of exceptions from the
gift tax base that can add significantly to the total wealth transmission." 6
114. Throughout this Article, the hypothetical examples assume that there is no spending out of
principal or income and no taxes on the yield, and the examples do not discount figures to take account
of inflation. The first two assumptions are not especially severe; as noted throughout, the current hybrid
income-consumption tax allows for numerous ways of avoiding current taxation on the yield to capital,
and many trusts are indeed designed to limit spending out of principal or income. (In addition, even if
wealth is consumed, the figure gives an accurate sense of the value.of the consumption stream.) While
the absence of any inflation adjustment does indeed create a "fiscal illusion" effect, the conservative 6%
figure in fact reflects the long-term return on equity investments above the inflation rate. See ROGER 0.
IBBOTSON & REX A. SINQUEFIELD, STOCKS, BONDS, BILLS AND INFLATION 81-87 (1989).
115. The $80,000 figure results from each of the four parents giving $10,000 to each of the two
spouses. The $130,000 figure is derived using a 31% federal income tax rate plus a 7.65% social security
payroll tax. Taxes would be higher if state taxes were included or if the employer's share of payroll taxes
were imputed to the employee. Note that the funds given by the parents are not necessarily after-tax
amounts. For example, the parents could have borrowed against their currently untaxed appreciation to
make the gift. I discuss further this type of intra-generational arbitrage between income and consumption
in Part V.C.
116. See generally John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth
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Second, the law encourages early use of the $1.2 million unified credit,
since not only the gift but all subsequent appreciation of it will be out of the
estate. This technique is the distilled essence of the popular estate "freeze"
maneuver."7 The law even allows these first two inducements, toward
frequent use of annual exclusions and early use of the exemption amount, to
skip over generations, because the complex generation-skipping tax (GST) has
even more generous exceptions." 8 Thus, a grandmother can make just
moderately large gifts to a grandchild, and such gifts will likely be seventy
years away from a wealth tax at the grandchild's level. To put some
perspective on this effect, a gift of $100,000 will grow to over $6.6 million in
seventy years at a 6% rate of return, and to over $106 million at a 10% return.
A gift of the full $1.2 million, passed tax-free, would grow to just under $1.3
billion in seventy years, at a 10% return. It is possible to set up a trust for a
child that remains intact for the grandchildren as well, while skipping any
wealth transfer tax at the child's generation. Indeed, it is possible to play this
game as long as the rule against perpetuities allows. The complex GST is
designed to limit abuse, but it also has its own generous exemption levels,
including a basic exemption of $1 million per donor ($2 million for a married
couple)." 9
Finally, the push toward early gifts is exacerbated by the fact that the gift
tax is a tax-exclusive tax-the tax is levied on a base that does not include the
gift. Thus, to give $100,000 under a 50% gift tax, a donor must have a
combined $150,000; $100,000 goes to the donee and $50,000, or 50% of the
net gift, goes to the government. The estate tax, in contrast, is, like the federal
income tax, a tax-inclusive tax-the tax itself is part of the base. To bequeath
$100,000 under a 50% estate tax, a donor must have a combined $200,000;
$100,000, or 50% of the aggregate estate, goes to the government, and the
Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722 (1988) (discussing primacy of midlhfc transfer's of wealth to fund
human capital accumulation in 20th century).
117. See generally SCHOLES & WOLFSON, supra note 55. at 584-98 (describing planning techniques.
including paradigmatic estate freezing); Aaron & Munnell. supra note 6. at 134-37 tsame). Anderson
& Howard, supra note 55 (same); Edward J. McCaffery. The Iceman Comth Again Return of the Estate
Freeze?, 46 TAX NOTES 1327 (1990) Ihereinafter McCaffery. Estate Freezel tdescribing w~ealthy
taxpayers' attempts to minimize their gift and estate tax). The unified credit is not indexed for inflation.
explaining part of the effect; fear of losing the exemption may be important here. too See Kathy M
Kristof, For Your Heirs' Sake, Put Assets in a Living Trust. L.A. TIMES. June 13. 1993. at D4 0IMlany
Americans ... have shifted into high gear in an effort to take advantage of current estate planning rule-
before they're made substantially less generous, tax experts say."),
118. The GST law is set out in I.R.C. §§ 2601-2663 (1994). For exemption%. see § 2611 (b) (listing
excluded transfers, including payment of medical and educational expenses). § 2612(c)(11 (defining
"direct skip" as taxable transfer under chapter I I or 12, thereby effectively exempting annual exclusion
gifts); § 2631 (creating SI million GST exemption). The "Gallo" amendment. which accompanied the
GST in 1986, represents an interesting bit of political history. This amendment established a transitional
rule allowing direct skips of up to S2 million per grandchild to be exempt from the GST for a limited
period of time. See Edward J. McCaffery. The Holy Grail of Tax Simphification. 1990 Wis L REv 1267.
1285 n.88. The fact that there was lobbying pressure for such a provision indicates the degree of interest
in making large bequests.
119. I.R.C. § 2631.
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residual $100,000 is left for the heir. In reality, the gift tax simply has a lower
rate structure than the estate tax, although the two systems are nominally
unified. This feature creates a further inducement in favor of gifts over
bequests.12
0
The incentive toward early and frequent inter vivos gifts among the very
wealthy is not merely speculative. Although data on the gifts, bequests, and
even consumption patterns of the very wealthy are notoriously difficult to
acquire, behavior is undoubtedly sensitive to the tax regime. The law has
developed to accommodate early transfers by approving of devices, such as the
popular Crummey Trust, 2' that effectively circumvent the requirement that
the annual exclusion be of a present interest. 122 By immunizing the wealth
from an offspring's imprudent consumption choices, such techniques allow the
donor to give away wealth without parting with effective control. Such
techniques thus serve as ideal vehicles for the type of "strategic" gift discussed
above. 123 Every year, between two-and-a-half and three times as many gift
tax as estate tax returns are filed, and these estate tax returns indicate that
many decedents have used up some or all of their lifetime credit before death.
24
120. Cutting in the other direction is the fact that gifts take a carry-over basis, under § 1015,
whereas bequests receive a fully stepped-up basis that eliminates any built-in capital gain for income tax
purposes, under § 1014. Id. §§ 1014-1015. Even this apparent problem is rather easily avoided, however,
by the careful selection of assets, borrowing against appreciated assets and giving cash, or the skillful
use of recapitalization or intrafamily installment sales, and so on. See generally COOPER, supra note 2
(explaining how estate planning can be used to avoid estate taxes). One easy suggestion to deal with the
rate preference is to make the tax on gifts tax-inclusive, like the estate tax. See 2 U.S. DEP'T OF
TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTII 377-78 (1984);
Donaldson, supra note 1, at 553. Since few people actually pay gift taxes, however, and since gifts are
in any event favored under the current system, there is little reason to believe that this adjustment would
make a substantial difference.
121. See JOSEPH M. DODGE, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATE PLANNING 629-31 (1988) (discussing
Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968)).
122. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (limiting annual exclusion to present interests in property).
123. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
124. In 1990, 123,500 gift tax returns were filed, compared to 55,800 estate tax returns. INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 26 tbl. 12 (1992). In 1991, the numbers were 147,700 and
60,800. Id. at 24 tbl. 1I. No gift tax return has to be filed for annual exclusion or medical or educational
gifts (except in rare circumstances, such as the splitting of a gift made by one spouse between both
spouses), so the gift tax returns indicate significant giving. The IRS makes no systematic study of gift
tax returns, however, even where gift taxes are paid. In 1991, 4048 of the 24,767 taxable estate tax
returns (16.3 %) indicated that the decedent had made taxable lifetime gifts; the average lifetime giving
was just over $361,000. But, once again, the figures rose dramatically with wealth, as Table 3 shows:
Size of Estate % Showing Average
Taxable Lifetime
Lifetime Giving Taxable Giving
$5-10 million 43.4% $481,155
$10-20 million 55.8% $910,602
over $20 million 71.7% $2,095,095
TABLE 3. Patterns of Lifetime Giving Among Taxable Estates, 1991
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Another intriguing piece of data is the significant percentage of the gift
and estate tax revenue that the gift tax produces every year. In 1990, taxpayers
paid over $2 billion in gift taxes.'2-' At an average tax-exclusive rate of, say,
40%, this $2 billion tax figure translates into $5 billion of net gifts, for a total
of $7 billion in transferred wealth. What is most striking about these numbers
is that a taxpayer cannot even pay a gift tax until she has used up her
$600,000 lifetime credit. 2 6 Thus, taxpayers are making large transfers
beyond the substantial gifts allowed by the unified credit and the annual,
medical, and educational exclusions. Almost by definition, such transferors are
passing on significant sums of wealth in an efficient manner, given the gift and
estate tax regime. Bernheim estimates that in 1983 alone, taxpayers transferred
inter vivos as much as $20 billion (in 1983 dollars)-an amount that roughly
equals three-and-a-half times the gift and estate tax revenues, and $40 billion
in 1993 dollars-because of the estate tax.'2 ' These large transfers represent
a far cry from the image of bequests as fortuitous leftovers.
There are other data to support the effects. Some evidence, for example,
suggests that charitable contributions are sensitive to the estate tax rate. This
fact is not at all intuitively obvious or predictable.'2 Gift and estate taxes
See Johnson, supra note 56, at 91 tbl. I. The table indicates that the ,er) 'ealths estates ,,ere actually
going well beyond the unified credit amounts. Causality in these matters is difficult, if not impossible.
to make out; one might expect gifts to increase in magnitude and frequency along %kith vealth. escn
without wealth transfer taxation. Taxable gifts, however, are clearl much more common and extensive
in taxable estates. Nontaxable estates, most of which are nontaxable because of the marital deduction.
have much smaller numbers, as Table 4 illustrates:
Size of Estate % Shosing Average
Taxable Lifetime
Lifetime Giving Taxable Giving
S5-10 million 30% S264.702
$10-20 million 37% $310.179
over $20 million 40% S486.167
TABLE 4. Patterns of Lifetitme Givig Aniong NontaxLable Estates. 1991
Id. These figures differ dramatically from those shown in Table 3. indicating that those persons who face
an imminent estate tax, say following the death of their spouse. are much more likely to make sizable
gifts. This behavior is, to some extent, also to be expected, although I believe it reflects some of the
incentives toward inter v'vos giving generated by the gift and estate tat.
125. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.. supra note 124. at 15 tbl I
126. See Rev. Rul. 79-398. 1979-2 C.B. 338. It is necessary to require this result because some
donors would prefer to pay a gift rather than an estate tax. due to the former's tax exclusivity
127. Bernheim, supra note 2. at 126-27. 1 adjusted for inflation by doubling the amounts. Cf. David
Altig & Steven J. Davis, The Timing of Intergenerational Transfers, Tar Pohcv. and Aggregate Savings.
82 AM. ECON. REV. 1199. 1200-01 (1992) (noting prevalence and magnitude of inter svos inter-
generational transfers); Wolff, supra note 6. at 557 (suggesting that large rnter rt os gifts are major
factor in wealth inequality).
128. Bernheim, supra note 2. at 131-32. This fact is not necessarily intuitive because an individual
generally needs a charitable inclination to make a contribution, since she rarely makes money by giving
Of course, the tax rate could affect the relative weighing of charitable motives As the tax goes up. a
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have had a consistently low yield, almost irrespective of the generosity of the
exceptions and exclusions, which the government has periodically tightened or
loosened through the course of the present century. While some scholars have
interpreted this low yield as evidence of the porousness of the legal
regime, 129 an equally plausible inference is that taxpayer behavior is adapting
to the gift and estate tax's varying incentives. In fact, every year taxpayers
transmit more than one-and-a-half times as much wealth by inter vivos gifts
as by bequests, and this disparity does not reflect the hard-to-value, but highly
important, transmission of intellectual capital and opportunities.
30
No doubt, the statistics here could be both more and better, and causality
is difficult to establish. I strongly suspect that the estate tax causes much inter
vivos activity, although certainly some of this activity takes place for reasons
unrelated to tax. But putting aside for now these empirical issues, three
conclusions arise from this discussion of the incentives for inter vivos gifts.
First, the incentives for tax avoidance can lead to income tax losses that
swallow up at least part of the estate tax gain. This is Bernheim's point,
although it is not especially important to my argument. Second, these
incentives are of dubious normative propriety; the social costs of the early
transmission of wealth may outweigh whatever social benefits flow from
breaking up large concentrations of wealth. Indeed, the estate tax will not even
necessarily break up wealth concentrations if strategic gifts are involved, such
as those facilitated by Crummey-type devices. Third, the problem underscores
the unpopularity and impracticability of gift and estate taxation, and thus points
to a tension between such taxation and liberal egalitarian theory. The problems
highlight the necessity of a search for alternatives, which I attempt in Part V.
2. Consumption-Savings and Work-Leisure Decisions
The relationship, or lack thereof, between the traditional tax policy views
of estate and income taxation is rather odd. The literature on income taxation
has long questioned the wisdom, efficacy, and fairness of levying taxes on
capital. 3 ' Increasingly, the literature has questioned the wisdom of upwardly
graduated marginal rates, even as a means for furthering the goals of
progressivity, noting that there are ways to make the tax system redistributive
without such a rate structure. 32 The literature has reached a rough consensus
potential contributor is comparing an undiminished charitable contribution to a diminished bequest to
others. See discussion infra part V.C.3.
129. See, e.g., Aaron & Munnell, supra note 6, at 132-39.
130. See generally Langbein, supra note 116 (discussing transmission of intellectual capital to young
children as 20th-century revolution in wealth transmission).
131. MILL, supra note 48, at 165-66, 173-74, 178; see also SMITH, supra note 92, at 809-15;
Summers, supra note 89, at 542. But cf. Atkinson & Sandmo, supra note 89, at 546 (concluding that
"there is no strong reason to suppose that the exemption of saving is desirable on efficiency grounds");
Feldstein, supra note 89 (noting complexities in measuring welfare costs of tax on capital).
132. See generally Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A
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on the perils of high marginal rates, and this consensus has taken practical
shape, at least for now, in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.113 Rates have come
down, and a special sensitivity toward the effective rate on capital appears
most recently in the 1993 Tax Act's holding the line at a 28% capital gains
rate. 134
In contrast to this debate and the parallel developments in the income tax
arena, the estate tax remains a steeply progressive tax that is levied only on
capital, and there is even periodic talk of raising it. Liberal egalitarianism, with
its potentially sharp distinction between intra-generational use and inter-
generational transmission of wealth, might explain the apparent tension. So,
too, might the early, naive theories on why people save. It seems implausible,
however, that the incentive effects so dreaded in the general comprehensive tax
area could be wholly absent from the estate tax field, especially given our
richer understanding of savings behavior. The estate tax may be exerting
adverse incentive effects on the consumption-savings and work-leisure
decisions of the very wealthy, an extremely important class for purposes of
both capital accumulation and prior liberal principles. Once again, this raises
problems on specifically liberal grounds.
Consumption-savings and work-leisure effects stand in some type of trade-
off with the inter vivos gift incentives discussed above. To the extent that we
allow escape valves from the wealth transfer tax regime, we do not necessarily
chill taxpayers who are motivated by a desire to leave bequests. Nor do we
deter even those purely self-regarding taxpayers making strategic inter vivos
gifts. We may not want these escape valves, however, because of their
normative and economic costs. But if we somehow close the loopholes and
make it impossible for a taxpayer to pass on her wealth to her heirs, we face
another problem: We will impact consumption-savings and work-leisure
decisions. Stiglitz argues that the best that we can hope for when implementing
a tightened estate tax along with other changes designed to keep the capital
stock constant is a greater equality of wealth and income purchased at the cost
of a greater inequality of consumption.3 This trade-off raises a difficult
"equality of what" question, to which I presently turn." '
New Look at Progressive Taxation. 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905 (1987) (discussing. inter alha. means of
achieving progressive taxation without progressive marginal rates, through use of a lump-sum transfer
or "demogrant").
133. See Joel Slemrod, Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Ss'stems. 4 J. EcON. PERSP 157, 166-68
(1990) (noting how contemporary U.S. tax reforms implement general teaching of optimal tax literature),
But cf. Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S. McChesney. On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing
Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987) (viewing tax reform as product of contractual
relationships between legislators and private interests and therefore questioning stability of 1986 Act).
134. See I.R.C. § (h) (1994) (setting top capital gains rate); Carl T. Hall. Capital Gains Tax
Remains At 28%, SAN DiEGO UNION-TRIB.. Aug. 16. 1993. at C3 (discussing policy behind 1993 Act
and suggesting strategies for taxpayers).
135. Stiglitz, supra note 86. at S137. S146-49.
136. The "equality of what" question has been a central theme in the work of Amanya Sen See
AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 12-30 (1992); see also G.A. Cohen. Equalt of What7 On
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For the very wealthy, the economic effects of any estate tax regime favor
consumption over savings, and leisure (which can be considered the
consumption of nonwork) over work. Many tax policy commentators,
especially those who argue for more progressive estate taxation, presume that
the very wealthy accumulate wealth for its own sake; that is, that they are
wholly inelastic to any tax rate.1 37 An equally compelling story, however, is
that the very wealthy are negatively elastic, as suggested by the behavioral
responsiveness evident in large-scale inter vivos giving. One senses that the
idea of complete inelasticity, reminiscent of the naive Mill position on savings
behavior, would no longer have any place in income tax discussions. We have
had experience with top marginal rates above 90% in the United States, and
on a worldwide basis we appear to have learned our lesson: Overly high rates
are inefficient and ultimately wasteful, precisely because high earners are
highly elastic. 138 Yet the present 55% estate tax rate, together with a
combined federal and state income and payroll tax rate of approximately 50%,
means that a taxpayer such as Mr. Perot faces an effective tax rate of 77.5%
on earned income that he bequeaths to his heirs.
39
Furthermore, the antiwork and antisavings incentives may extend down to
the donee level. By encouraging inter vivos gifts, the wealthy young receive
their wealth, or become certain of its ultimate receipt, early in life. This wealth
may undercut their incentives to work and save. Indeed, this phenomenon may
be one reason why earnings revert to the mean-that is, why the children of
the wealthy are apt to earn less than their parents. 40 One study has shown,
contrary to the prediction of the fully rational expectations model under which
heirs correctly anticipate their ultimate bequests, that the receipt of sizable
inheritances does indeed undermine work effort.'4' Assuming that there is a
Welfare, Goods, & Capabilities, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 9 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds.,
1993).
137. See, e.g., Ascher, supra note 2, at 100-01. In Professor Ascher's view, "[tihe incentives of
status and social power inherent in commanding a large fortune suggest that restricting the ability to pass
one's fortune at death would have little effect on the work ethic." Id. at 101; see also MILL, supra note
48, at 174.
138. See Slemrod, supra note 133, at 166 ("[A] key message of the optimal progressivity literature,
that high marginal rates may not be appropriate even for egalitarian social welfare functions, has
apparently won the day.").
139. The inter vivos rate reflects a top marginal federal income tax rate of 39.6%, along with other
payments such as state and local taxes, social security taxes, and medicare contributions. The 77% figure
is derived as follows: The lifetime tax reduces wealth by 50%, and the estate tax reduces that wealth by
55%, leaving 50%(45%) = 22.5%, for a tax rate of 77.5%. There is no need for present value
discounting, because the real tax burden remains constant across time.
140. See generally Gary Solon, Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United States, 82 AM.
ECON. REV. 393 (1992) (questioning earlier studies by Gary Becker and others that found correlation of
children's earnings to parents' to be 0.2 or less and finding more accurate figure to be 0.4); David J.
Zimmerman, Regression Toward Mediocrity in Economic Stature, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 409 (1992)
(same). There are, of course, several possible explanations for this phenomenon: Children of the able are
likely to be less able than their parents; children of the rich become lazy and underproductive; children
of the rich are able to develop talents and capacities not necessarily rewarded in the marketplace.
141. See DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN ET AL., THE CARNEGIE CONJECTURE: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
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bequest motive, the heirs will receive their wealth in any event. Nevertheless,
it may be better for them to receive their wealth later in life, say when they are
fifty-five years old, than for them to receive it earlier, when their work
incentives will be more affected and when their propensity to consume is
greater.
On the other hand, a complete and efficacious shutting down of wealth
transfers may increase work and savings incentives at the lower generations,
with possibly beneficial effects on capital. Such a complete confiscation,
however, would surely impact incentives at the donor level. Mr. Perot would
now be comparing $3 billion spent on himself with nothing given to his heirs:
in this situation, he might decide to run an even more expensive campaign for
President. As I develop more fully in Part V, there are very sound, objective
political reasons why liberal society may especially fear such large-scale use
by the rich-reasons that sound in prior liberal principles, as of the fair
equality of opportunity. A separate and distinct argument against the loophole-
shutting approach is based on pragmatic skepticism: Improved wealth transfer
systems appear to be wildly unrealistic. It is worth noting that most supporters
of estate taxation concede that generous exemptions will continue." 2 We
have never, for example, taxed gifts under the present income tax, and the gift
and estate tax regime has always had fairly generous exemptions for annual
exclusion, medical, educational, interspousal, and other gifts. Less visible
matters, such as the transmission of business opportunities, pose another set of
problems. There is convincing evidence, discussed below, that tighter transfer
taxes are not popular, and that there is little political support for moving in the
direction that most liberal theorists suggest. This raises the question of why the
many might be opposed to a tax on only the privileged few. Envy and greed
cannot provide an answer. Perhaps wealth transfer taxes get our objective
social judgments wrong. Society actually likes work and savings, and only or
at least especially dislikes excessive private use; the estate tax gets this all
backwards. I return to this theme in Part V.
18-19 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4118. 1992); see also Antl B
Deolalikar & R.P. Singh, The Impact of Bequests on Lifetime Wealth Accumulation. An Econometric
Study of Two Generations of Rural Households tn India. 36 REV. INCOME & W'EALn 353 (1990)
(finding results that suggest adverse impact of bequest receipts on wealth accumulation of recipients)
This effect may be perfectly rational. Even if an individual correctly anticipates receipt of a large
inheritance, she may be unable to act presently on this anticipation for fear that the parent, upon seeing
the behavior, will change the bequest. This result is akin to Gary Becker's "'rotten kid" pnnciple. sshich
holds that even a truly bad child will have to hide his badness while his parents are alive See BECKER.
TREATISE ON THE FAMILY. supra note 98, at 287-96. But cf. James M. Buchanan. Rent Seeking.
Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession. 26 J.L, & ECON. 71. 83 (1983) (arguing that
potential heirs engage in inefficient rent seeking to extract bequests from their parents)
142. See, e.g., Ascher, supra note 2. at 121-49; Duff. supra note 2. at 7-8; Graetz. supra note 2.
at 269-70; Haslett, supra note 3. at 137-40.
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B. Distributive Effects
Perhaps the estate tax does not raise money, even in a cash-flow sense.
Perhaps it negatively impacts the aggregate capital stock. Perhaps it encourages
large inter vivos gifts and discourages work and savings among the wealthy.
We may still want it. Liberal egalitarian theory, especially in its most rights-
oriented incarnations, is often unmoved by these types of practical concerns.
Other commonly stated justifications for estate taxation also reflect an
indifference to capital and revenue effects. For example, some commentators
have argued that the estate tax is concerned with "breaking up large
concentrations of wealth."' 143 A twist on this goal is an antihoarding position
that has the arguable virtue of embracing existing loopholes: The estate tax is
designed to discourage senior generations from storing up private wealth, even
if this means encouraging its early, gratuitous transfer. (I know of no
commentator, however, who explicitly adheres to this latter theory, which is
in tension with more traditional liberal egalitarian concerns over wealth
inequities extending to subsequent generations.) A common thread running
through these diverse ideas is that the estate tax is primarily about questions
of distribution rather than allocation, efficiency, or government revenue.
There are two distinct types of problems with such distributive concerns.
One set is practical, the other more theoretical. The practical problem with
most liberal egalitarian discussions is that they assume first-best taxation: Once
we have figured out the right level to bar wealth transfers, we can effectively
do so, damning whatever material consequences might follow. A nagging
practical question, however, is whether we can truly bar the transmission of
wealth. If we cannot, a gift and estate tax regime may not make sense. We
have seen that the present regime encourages frequent, early, and aggressive
gift giving as a way to beat the estate tax. This fact of induced tax avoidance
undercuts the equal-opportunity goal, and possibly even the concerns about
wealth concentration.'" The law may have a perverse, prodynasty effect, all
the while diverting our attention from more productive avenues of reform.
The second, theoretical set of difficulties with distributive concerns
143. See, e.g., Bernheim, supra note 2, at 113; cf. Boskin, supra note 17, at 65 (arguing that estate
and gift taxation should be less concerned with reducing inequality in distribution of wealth and more
concerned with "preventing extreme concentrations of wealth from being passed from generation to
generation"). But cf Graetz, supra note 2, at 271 ("in fact, however, the estate tax has done very little
to dilute the greatest concentrations of wealth."). Professor Graetz, however, considers only the
concentration of wealth, and not the possibility of inter-generational turnover in the identity of the
wealthy themselves. See Solon, supra note 140, at 393-97, 403-05; cf. Alan S. Blinder, Inequality and
Mobility in the Distribution of Wealth, 29 KYKLOS 607, 619 (1976) [hereinafter Blinder, Inequality and
Mobility] ("A doubling of the tax rate, which must be considered as barely (if at all) within the realm
of political feasibility, reduces both the average level and inequality of inherited wealth-but by very
modest amounts. Even the ridiculous 60% tax rate has effects which are far from revolutionary. The
reformer eyeing the estate tax as a means to reduce inequality had best look elsewhere.").
144. Professor Wolff suggests that inter vivos transmissions are the primary cause of wealth
inequalities. Wolff, supra note 6, at 557.
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involves both the space in which we measure equality and the interplay
between egalitarian and aggregative concerns.' 5 If we tighten the gift and
estate tax by closing the loopholes, we run the risk of harming capital
accumulation, which itself will have adverse distributive effects. If we take
steps to protect the capital stock, the combined policy may increase inequality
of consumption. We have not necessarily achieved a better, fairer society if the
ownership of assets is more equal, but the use of wealth is less so. This
outcome is especially difficult to accept under consumption tax norms, as I
discuss at some length in Part V. Estate tax theory has typically focused on
possession, but there are good reasons to think that unequal use is of greater
moral and ethical concern for liberalism. Liberal society may reasonably
conclude that the equality it seeks is most compelling when it comes to the
private use of resources, where the urgency of wants has its clearest meaning.
Unequal use might also correlate positively with less aggregate wealth. In any
event, a properly calibrated monitoring of private use changes the nature and
dangers of private possession insofar as there are distinct liberal concerns over
ownership alone. The case for the estate tax on strictly liberal, progressive
grounds is thus far from clear under either nonideal or ideal conditions. Indeed,
the liberal economists Joseph Stiglitz and Alan Blinder, who together
represented two-thirds of President Clinton's initial Council of Economic
Advisors, each, independently, questioned the wisdom of gift and estate taxes
some twenty years ago. 46
Whatever one might think of these theoretical and design-based arguments,
there is solid evidence that the gift and estate tax regime is not effectively
fostering a better overall distribution of wealth.' 7 In the United States,
wealth concentration generally has been constant throughout this century,
despite the presence of a nominally steep gift and estate tax regime.' The
level of wealth concentration is remarkably similar across most advanced
Western societies, regardless of the details of their wealth transfer regime, and
also regardless of whether they even have one.' 9 Most commentators have
interpreted this data to mean that we should tighten the gift and estate tax
system. 50 It is of course possible to argue that a stronger wealth transfer tax
145. See SEN, supra note 136, at 12-16. 136-38.
146. See Blinder, Inequality and Mobility, supra note 143. at 618-19; Blinder. Inherited Wealth.
supra note 2, at 608-09; Stiglitz. supra note 86, at S 137: see also Berheim. supra note 2. at 135. Their
arguments undermine the skepticism evident in Professor Graetz's remark that '[Illiberal economists will
likely find little or no impact [on economic incentives from the estate tax]. conservative economists will
probably discover serious deleterious effects." Graetz. supra note 2. at 283. As of the final writing.
Blinder had moved over to serve on the Federal Reserve Board.
147. See generally Donaldson. supra note I. at 541-42 (presenting evidence that gift and estate tax
does not foster more equal distribution of wealth).
148. See Aaron & Munnell. supra note 6. at 122-27 (discussing wealth concentration in 20th-
century United States); Wolff, supra note 6, at 552 (same); see also Graetz, supra note 2. at 271 (stating
that concentration of wealth has remained stable).
149. See Aaron & Munnell. supra note 6. at 127-28. Australia. Canada. and Israel have effectively
eliminated their wealth transfer regimes. See infra note 168.
150. See, e.g., Aaron & Munnell, supra note 6. at 139; Eisenstcm. supra note 2. at 255-59. But cf
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system would not have led to the current state of affairs, or that a weaker
system would have left things worse. Yet it is not clear that we can improve
the gift and estate tax system, and it is not implausible that the current system
actually causes some of the real problems of maldistribution, at least by
constraining the evolution of better, more liberal tax systems.
The current tax regime may be helping to break up very large
concentrations of wealth; it may be somewhat effective at the very rich end,
as noted above in Table i.'' But the connection between breaking up large
wealth concentrations and equal opportunity, or the Rawlsian "fair equality of
opportunity" norm, is not all that clear. Even if we agree with Rawls and
concede that some sense of equal opportunity is lexically prior to the
consequentialist concerns of the difference principle, 152 the dissolution of
high concentrations of wealth via wealth transfer taxation occurs at least at the
partial expense of perpetuating a very wealthy elite, because of the induced
inter vivos gifts. It may not be better for society to have one thousand
millionaires, many of them quite young, than a single billionaire.' 53 Even this
claim is undercut by the possibility of strategic gifts and bequests, which
effectively keep the donor's power intact. There are also some reasons to
believe that such wealth would dissipate, even without the tax. 54 Finally,
there is the even more troubling possibility that the current estate tax, or any
confiscatory cousin, might induce the kind of large-scale personal use of
wealth exemplified in the Perot presidential bid. We might be effecting the
dissolution of large concentrations of wealth by inducing citizens to spend vast
sums of money, perhaps by running for elected office. Such excessive personal
consumption surely implicates the Rawlsian concern with "power detrimental
to the fair value of political liberty and the fair equality of opportunity."'55
Yet under a back-ended wealth tax, far from checking Perot's bid, the fisc
served as a de facto partner in his campaign. It is high time to consider better
alternatives.
COOPER, supra note 2, at 90-111 (suggesting more comprehensive reforms beyond improved enforcement
of existing gift and estate tax regime); MeNulty, supra note 28, at 94 ("Much could be said in favor of
repealing transfer taxes altogether and enacting nothing to replace them.").
151. See Boskin, supra note 17, at 65-66.
152. See THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 89, 300-01; see also KYMLICKA, supra note 22, at
53-54 (noting schemes of lexical priority within A Theory of Justice).
153. On a trivial level, most wealth transfers are equality enhancing, because the parent-transferors
are wealthier than the children-transferees. See Stiglitz, supra note 86, at S147-48. Such transfers
nonetheless raise hard questions, because they create intra-generational disparities at the transferee level.
154. See Boskin, supra note 17, at 65-66 ("While multiple heirs, regression toward the mean, and
other forces tend to make voluntary bequests a force for equality-not inequality-in our society, perhaps
reducing the tax incentives to trust formation would speed up somewhat the dissipation of large
fortunes."); Solon, supra note 140, at 393-94 (finding tendency to revert to mean, though weaker than
previous authors had found); Zimmerman, supra note 140, at 409-10 (same). Kotlikoff suggests that
altruistic linkages across extended family networks may be quite significant. KOTLIKOFF, WHAT
DETERMINES SAVINGS?, supra note 94, at 41-42.
155. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 277.
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V. LOOKING FOR ALTERNATIVES: TOWARD A POLITICAL THEORY OF TAX
Part III argued that the estate tax is complicated and porous, may lose
money, and almost certainly negatively affects the capital stock. Part IV argued
further that the behavioral incentives toward inter vivos gifts and consumption,
and away from work and saving, call into question the liberalism of the tax
regime. There is little evidence or hope that an improved distribution of
resources justifies the tax. Nor is there much practical or theoretical support
for responding to problems by strengthening the tax. Dilemma8 abound; if we
tighten the tax, we increase the incentives to consume while causing a decrease
in the capital stock. This Part turns to a search for better alternatives. In
particular, I argue for comprehensive reform, featuring a progressive
consumption-without-estate tax.
Recalling the five liberal arguments against wealth transfer taxation set
forth in Part II, this Part assumes that the first argument has been
established-that is, that the current estate tax is ineffective at best and
counterproductive at worst. This Part completes the second argument, implicit
throughout Parts III and IV, that a confiscatory or strengthened alternative is
neither popular nor practical. This Part then presses the related third and fourth
arguments, namely that any form of wealth transfer tax is inappropriate as a
matter of both nonideal and ideal liberal theory, while constructing the fifth
argument, that a progressive consumption-without-estate tax is the best political
liberal tax system.
A word on semantics and organization is in order. Although I believe that
there is nothing magic in the labels of "income" or "'consumption," and my
preferred alternative intentionally blurs the distinctions, framing the subsequent
discussion in these familiar terms will facilitate connections with both classical
and contemporary tax policy theory. Section A discusses the role of wealth
transfer taxes under a traditional income-plus-estate tax. It argues that small or
incremental changes to the status quo, such as raising rates or tightening one
or both taxes, are apt to fail. Section B discusses the possible roles of wealth
transfer taxation under a broad-based consumption tax. While emphasizing that
many of the norms of consumption tax theory are both independently attractive
and already implicit in our practices, I argue that these norms require a
departure from the traditional liberal case for flat-rate consumption taxation,
as seen in Mill and Rawls, and also call into question the practical wisdom of
any wealth transfer tax. These consumption tax norms counsel for a consistent
and objective focus on the use of wealth, as opposed to its mere possession.
Finally, in Section C, I explicitly consider the reform proposal that best
comports with the underlying norms of consumption tax theory and our
observed practices: a progressive consumption-without-estate tax. This proposal
brings together all of the themes of the preceding discussions and seeks to
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unify the ideals of liberal theory with the often-inchoate spirit of our actual
settled practices. It also reemphasizes that the best and most feasible tax
system on liberal grounds is one that does not include any wealth transfer tax
at all.
A. An Income-plus-Estate Tax
The most commonly touted liberal tax system is a progressive income-
plus-estate tax, which is what we already have, at least in name. But problems
with the income tax exist on both a theoretical and a practical level. In theory,
an income tax is based on one's "ability to pay." Income, however, is a poor
proxy for ability, even in theory, and this incongruence might partly explain
why liberal egalitarian philosophers from Mill to Rawls have tended to favor
a consumption tax. In practice, we have never come very close to a true
income ideal. The realization doctrine, pension taxation, the rules for owner-
occupied homes, human capital, insurance provisions, and many other deeply
embedded aspects of the law, including the entire payroll tax system, have
moved us squarely toward a consumption tax model. Society seems to have
accepted much of the logic of the consumption tax, though we remain troubled
by wealth and its unequal distribution. Thus, we have an "income" tax that is
actually a complex hybrid of income and consumption taxes, supplemented by
an estate tax.
156
It is clear, however, that a motivating factor behind any advocacy of an
income ideal is the thought that the mere possession of wealth matters." 7 If
use alone were the concern, then consumption tax theory would suffice.'58
Similarly, if efficiency were the primary concern, then the consumption tax
would seem to prevail under a technical analysis involving elasticities, general
equilibrium, and so on. 59 Thus, we may evaluate the income-plus-estate tax
vis-a-vis my preferred progressive consumption-without-estate tax, or vis-a-vis
any other alternative, based on its relative ability to attack privately held but
unspent wealth.
156. Andrews has emphasized the hybrid nature of the income tax. See Andrews, supra note 61, at
1117, 1120-21. See generally UNEASY COMPROMISE, supra note 87; McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 5.
157. See Graetz, supra note 2, at 271-73; Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and a Consumption-Type
or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931, 943 (1975) [hereinafter Warren, Fairnessf;
Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1122-24
(1980) [hereinafter Warren, Consumption Tax].
158. The same point can be understood with reference to the accounting identity that gives form to
the Haig-Simons definition of income: Income equals consumption plus savings. See HENRY C. SIMONS,
PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938). The income base differs from the consumption one solely in
its inclusion of unspent, or "unused" wealth.
159. See generally Alan J. Auerbach et al., The Efficiency Gains from Dynamic Tax Reform, 24
INT'L ECON. REV. 81 (1983) (suggesting large welfare gains from not taxing capital); Don Fullerton et
al., Replacing the U.S. Income Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax, 20 J. PuB. ECON. 3 (1983)




It is therefore a significant problem that the present income-plus-estate tax
seems not to be curtailing the private possession of wealth in practice or in
theory. Even advocates of the current regime concede that the system is doing
little if anything to lessen the unequal distribution of wealth.'I The flawed
income tax allows large amounts of wealth to build up intra-generationally.
Very few individuals or families pay any gift or estate tax at all, and, as I have
noted repeatedly, the total yield of the gift and estate taxes is quite low. Such
taxes may succeed in preventing an excessive concentration of wealth, but only
by pushing people to give to their descendants inter vivos, to give to charity,
to consume, or simply not to earn wealth in the first place. In any event, the
relative distribution of wealth in society seems to be rather constant across
time and throughout various advanced Western cultures; it matters little, either
temporally or cross-culturally, whether any form of wealth transfer taxation is
in place.' 6'
Given these problems with existing methods of attacking private wealth,
some change would appear to be needed on liberal grounds. Suppose, first, that
we tried to tighten the estate tax, keeping the present income tax in place.
Higher estate tax rates would further discourage work and saving and
encourage conspicuous or large-scale consumption. At the same time, the gift
and estate tax system has, and likely will continue to have, holes of such
magnitude that it will continue to encourage the inter vivos transmission of
significant amounts of wealth. Any such move to tighten estate taxation would
also face significant political and practical difficulties. Estate and inheritance
taxes are not especially popular, here or in other cultures, now or ever.'62
The present income tax has never included gifts or bequests within the tax
base. "'63 A popular uproar of opposition greeted George McGovern's proposal
for a radical tightening of the wealth transfer taxation regime." After
160. See. e.g., Aaron & Munnell. supra note 6. at 119. Graetz. supra note 2. at 271 C"ln fact.
however, the estate tax has done very little to dilute the greatest concentration% of calth ") For other
views that criticize the current regime and question the estate tax's effects on %callh distribution. see
Blinder, supra note 143, at 618-19; Boskin. supra note 17. at 63-64: John K McNulty. Public Policv
and Private Charity: A Tax Policy Perspective. 3 VA. TAX REv. 229. 252 (1984)
161. Aaron & Munnell. supra note 6. at 127-28.
162. See. e.g., Aaron & Munnell. supra note 6. at 132-39; Gractz. supra note 2. at 284-85. lHaslett.
supra note 3, at 142 ("[Tlhe simple truth is that Americans are solidly against labolishing
inheritances]."). One commentator who favored estate taxes mused about shy they are not used more
extensively: "A possible explanation is that equalization of the distribution of %'.ealth by taxation is not
yet accepted in the United States." PECHMAN. supra note I. at 236.
163. In contrast, the income tax of 1894 explicitly provided for the inclusion of "money and the
value of all personal property acquired by gift or inheritance." Act of Aug. 27. 1894. ch 34. § 27. 28
Stat. 509, 553. The Supreme Court invalidated the law in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 157
U.S. 429, 607-08. aff'd on reh'g. 158 U.S. 601 (1895). Commentators frequently point out that the
present income tax-as it has existed since 1916-has never taxed gifts or bequests See, e V . William
A. Klein, An Enigma in the Federal Income Tax: The Meaning of the Word -Gift'. 48 .M'l% L REV
215, 215 (1963); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutonal Meaning of Incime and the Income
Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. I. 1-2 (1992); see also Joseph Nt Dodge. Bewond Estate and Gift
Tax Reform: Including Gifts and Bequests in Income. 91 HARv. L, REV 1177. 1180-88 11978)
164. McGovern: "Jobs Are the Cornerstone of MY Pohtc1". WASHI POST. Aug 30. 1972. at Al2
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Congress drastically reduced gift and estate taxes in 1981, a poll revealed that
57% of Americans favored the change. 65 In 1982, fully 64% of Californians
voted to repeal the inheritance tax, which applied potentially to only 5% of
them. 166 More recently, 49% of the respondents to another poll said that an
increase in gift and estate taxes was an "unacceptable" way to pay for national
health insurance, while only 14% said that it was a "good" way to do so.67
Australia, Canada, and Israel, all Western democracies where liberal egalitarian
ideals may be said to have some sway, have recently eliminated their wealth
transfer tax systems. 168 A recent House of Representatives resolution,
cosponsored by 162 legislators, opposed any increase in the effective rate of
estate taxation, in part "because such measures contradict the fundamental goal
of the United States Government of encouraging long-term private saving."'' 69
While there are various potential interpretations for the unpopularity of wealth
transfer taxes-my preferred interpretation, of course, is that the people are
right on strictly liberal grounds-I mean to emphasize here only that the fact
of popular opposition poses problems for a potential reformer.70
(text of McGovern's remarks); see also THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1972,
at 118-19 (1973); Graetz, supra note 2, at 285.
165. Support Erodes for the Business Tax Cuts, BUS. WK., Apr. 12, 1982, at 18.
166. California legislators abolished the gift and inheritance tax, leaving only a "pickup tax," a
device for returning some of the federal estate tax to the state fisc. See CAL. REV. & TAX. COD1t
§§ 13301-13304 (West 1994).
167. Telephone Poll by Peter D. Hart Research Associates (Apr. 20-23, 1992) (polling 1004
registered voters). Thirty-one percent indicated that an increase in estate and gift taxes was "acceptable
if necessary." Among other potential methods of financing that the poll mentioned, the respondents
considered only two taxes more "unacceptable" than the increased estate and gift tax: an increase in the
tax on gasoline (60% said "unacceptable") and an increase in the tax on Social Security benefits that the
high-income elderly pay (63%). The respondents considered all other methods of financing to be less
"unacceptable" than estate and gift taxes: an increase in liquor and cigarette taxes (23% said
unacceptable), an oil import fee (40%), an increase in payroll taxes for employers (46%), a national sales
tax (44%), an increase in payroll taxes for employees (47%), an increase in personal income taxes for
households earning more than $50,000 a year (24%), and an increase in personal income taxes for
households earning more than $20,000 a year (48%). Id.
168. See INTERNATIONAL TAX SUMMARIES: A GUIDE FOR PLANNING AND DECISIONS at A-47, C-9,
1-73 (George J. Yost III ed., 1993) (Australia, Canada, and Israel, respectively). In Australia, the
government abolished estate and gift duties in 1978, despite the fact that the Labor Party had argued for
the taxes "to combat undue concentration of inherited wealth, to promote equality of opportunity, and
to provide needed revenue ...." Willard H. Pedrick, Oh, To Die Down Under! Abolition of Death and
Gift Duties in Australia, 35 TAX LAW. 113, 116 (1981).
In Canada, the federal government abandoned estate taxes in 1971. Richard M. Bird, The Case for
Taxing Personal Wealth, in REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-THIRD TAX CONFERENCE.
1971, at 6 (1972). One reason that Canada abolished the federal estate tax was that "the revenues were
small and the aggravation enormous." Douglas G. Hartle, Some Analytical, Political and Normative
Lessons from Carter, in THE QUEST FOR TAX REFORM 397, 418 (W. Neil Brooks ed., 1988). Although
many provinces continued to tax wealth transfers on death for a while, they have all since abandoned
such taxes. Id. On the Canadian experience with wealth transfer taxes, see generally ROGER S. SMITII,
PERSONAL WEALTH TAXATION: CANADIAN TAX POLICY IN A HISTORICAL AND AN INTERNATIONAL
SETrING (Canadian Tax Paper No. 97, 1993).
In Israel, the government eliminated inheritance taxes in 1981 as part of a supply-side program that
included tax cuts and savings incentives. Harry Anderson, Israel's Supply-Sider, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 6,
1981, at 70; Jeff Braide, Inheritance No Longer Liable to Taxation, JERUSALEM POST, June 7, 1990, at
8.
169. H.R. Con. Res. 6, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
170. See Duff, supra note 2 (noting and discussing problems generated by unpopularity of taxes).
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Beyond this political opposition, there are practical problems. Attempting
to tax small gifts, whether under the income tax (to the donee) or under the
gift and estate tax regime (to the donor), poses significant problems of
valuation and administration. Much wealth transmission takes place in the form
of hard-to-police opportunities and the passing on of knowledge. It is almost
certain that some provisions-for example, for gift exclusions of some amount
and for transfers for education and medical needs-would survive any reform.
It is noteworthy, though not surprising, given the above, that virtually every
advocate of a tightened estate tax, including those who argue openly for
"confiscatory" taxes, concedes that rather large exemptions will survive. 7
Many of the changes advocated in the existing tax literature, such as a
tightening of "estate freezes" or GSTs, have indeed been enacted, but in a form
that preserves many planning opportunities. These changes may even aggravate
existing problems by establishing a clear means for minimizing the tax.il -
The net effect of any tightening that left some exemptions in place, especially
The common explanation for popular opposition to gift and estate taxes ts that the ordinary citizen
believes that she might one day inherit a large sum of money or come into a large sum that site will want
to pass on. See Ascher, supra note 2. at 119-21 (quoting presidential candidate George McGovem's press
spokesperson explaining public reaction to McGovem's proposal to seserel% limt inheritance 't would
wipe out the dream factor-every slob in the street thinks that if he hits the lotteiy big. he ma) be able
to leave half a million to his family .... ") (alteration in original). GractZ. supra note 2. at 285 t"h
only convincing explanation lof estate taxatton's unpopulant) I that has occurred to me lies in the
optimism of the American people."); Kirchheimer. supra note 3. at 1233 (noting that "George Cooper.
a former tax law professor at Columbia University. said the onl) satisfactory explanation for the outer)
against estate taxes is the 'lottery mentality' of the American public." and that Canadian economist
Richard Bird attributed opposition to Canadian estate taxes to "'a lot of mytholog)." because "[mlost
people were afraid of a tax they never would have been exposed to'). Quite a different explanation. of
course, is that people do not like the estate tax for man% of the same reasons w li) economists do not like
it-for example, because it penalizes thrift and virtue People'% intuitions ma) well fasor the careful
bequest saver over the conspicuous spender, and they may feel that inheritance is a natural and salutary
process, at least within very wide ranges. The estate tax's unpopulant> casts doubt on an ensy
explanation, unless the particularly strong envy of a relatiely small number of indi'iduals can explain
the presence and persistence of the tax. See discussion infra note 259
171. Professor Ascher, for example. sets the hmit at $250.000 and x ould seem to allow educational
and medical transfers, along with a S5000 annual gift exclusion Ascher. supra note 2. at 126-35 A one-
time transfer of $250,000 would grow to over $266 million ouser a 7 0.)ear life at a 10% rate of return.
an annual gift of $5000 would grow to over $2.2 million oer a 40-)ear period at a 1017c rate ot return
For a 70-year period, which is what grandparents and parents might be able to sustain. S5000 a )ear at
a 10% rate of return would grow to over $39 million Once again. se double the numbers if both parents
are involved.
172. Commentators have long advocated restrictions on generation-skipping gifts See, e i'. COOPR.
supra note 2, at 94; Max Gutierrez, Jr.. Taxatrn of Wealth Transmission Problems and Reforms. in
DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY. supra note 2. at 71. 76-78 The result sas the promulgation of
the GST in 1986, see I.R.C. §§ 2601-2663 (1994), which has numerous holes that I hase alread)
mentioned. Similarly, discussion of estate freezing has increased in recent )ears. see, e g . Dodge. supra
note 2, at 309-16; McCaffery, Estate Freeze. supra note 117. resulting in the passage of a nes Chapter
14 in 1990, I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704. Practitioners have quickl> deseloped %anous deices-most
prominently GRITs (grantor retained income trusts) and GRATs (grantor retained annuity trusts-to deal
with these laws. See. e.g., Thomas W. Abendroth. Grantor Trusts Are Nou Useul Planning Tools. 20
TAX'N FOR LAW. 81 (1991); Benton C. Strauss & James K. Shaw. Final Chapter 14 Regs Clarlip
GRATs, Business Planning, 19 EsT. PLAN. 259 (1992). Donaldson discusses some of the reform proposals
that have not yet been enacted; he, like me, is skeptical of how much impro ement they would in fact
generate. Donaldson, supra note 1. at 552-57.
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with continued high marginal rates, would be to put an even greater premium
on taking advantage of all such escape valves. Unproductive planning costs
might rise. Lurking around the comer from any tightening may just be
increased consumption and decreased work effort and capital.
The type of practical, administrative concerns mentioned in the preceding
paragraphs may seem out of keeping with the sometimes symbolic focus of the
present law or of ideal liberal theory. To draw a contrast, however, many of
the consumption tax advocates discussed in the next Section, including
Nicholas Kaldor and William Andrews in particular, favor the consumption tax
largely because of the unattainability of a pure income tax ideal, and because
of the distortions that flow from an only partial embrace of income
taxation.173 Yet such authors and many others are quick to tack on a gift and
estate tax, with barely a word on the practical difficulties of such taxes, or on
the distortions that imperfect, real-world wealth transfer taxes produce.
Practical problems are relevant and possibly decisive as a matter of nonideal
theory, and, under an interpretive turn, are also relevant for ideal theory. There
comes a time when policy ought to learn from practice, as it did in the move
from income tax toward consumption tax theory. In the case of the gift and
estate tax, we might learn something from both its deep unpopularity and its
many exceptions, here and in other countries, now and for a long time past,
most of which are deeply grounded in settled intuitions and practices. Popular
opposition and practical constraints, often popularly compelled, have vitiated
the effectiveness of wealth transfer taxation. There is little reason now to have
confidence in even tightening the regime; it is time to look for new and
different answers to old problems.
Problems would also arise on the income tax side of any income-plus-
tightened-estate tax scheme. Contrary to its apparent underlying ideal, the
present income tax actually tolerates significant inequities of wealth. Rates
today are not terribly high by historical standards.'74 Indeed, a large practical
and political problem with our fidelity to an ostensible income tax has gone
all but unnoticed in the literature, perhaps obscured by the conceptual link
between consumption and flat-rate taxes: The adverse effects on work and
savings incentives constrain the income tax rate structure, whereas it is
primarily the adverse effect on consumption incentives that constrains rates
under a consumption tax. 75 A consumption tax can therefore tolerate higher
173. See Nicholas Kaldor, Comments, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE?
151-57 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1980); William D. Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Inconte Tax:
A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARV. L. REv. 947, 947 (1975) [hereinafter Andrews, Fairnessi. Of
course, it seems a little odd that supporting the consumption tax on second-best grounds should lead to
an insistence on a "pure" consumption tax, although support has not led to such insistence by Andrews,
who advocates progressive rates. Id. at 956; see also infra part V.B.
174. The current top marginal income tax rate is 39.6%. I.R.C. § [(a)(]). This figure is low by
historical standards. See PECHMAN, supra note 1, at 313-14 tbl. A-I (showing historical top bracket
rates); Slemrod, supra note 133, at 166.
175. This point depends to some extent on the absence of adverse incentive effects under the
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rates on higher dollar levels, as I discuss below. Income tax theory gets
tangled up in the same paradox that plagues the gift and estate tax: Short-run
distributive goals may be in tension with macroeconomic and independent
normative goals that have their own long-term, liberal distributive benefits.
Indeed, we can now see the basic outlines of a dynamic of political
counterproductivity. If tax is in the end all politics, as I am arguing, we would
expect at least the broad features of our tax system to reflect objective social
values. But there is tension if the experts hand down to the people institutional
tax systems that themselves conflict with sound liberal judgments. The people
cannot be overly "progressive" under an income-plus-estate tax, because this
regime punishes behavior that a liberal society reasonably condones (work,
savings, and bequests), and it induces behavior that a liberal society reasonably
suspects (leisure, consumption, and large inter vivos transfers).
Somewhat ironically, liberal advocates of both income and estate taxation
sometimes cite "progressivity" as a reason to support these taxes.'76 The
reasoning is elementary: Since only the wealthy pay estate taxes, such taxes
appear to add to the overall system's progressivity."' But there are at least
three severe and related problems with this reliance on progressivity. First,
progressivity is not obviously an end in itself, particularly if we rule out envy
as a legitimate concern.' 78 Rather, progressivity must play whatever role it
is to have as a component of a larger theory of justice. Rawls himself opposes
excessive reliance on progressivity, believing instead that progressive rates are
best limited to wealth transfer taxes, without even invoking the difference
principle: "It may be better, therefore, to use progressive rates only when they
are necessary to preserve the justice of the basic structure with respect to the
first principle of justice and fair equality of opportunity ... 179
Second, progressivity is hard to measure. The argument that estate taxes
are "progressive" is a decidedly static one. The ostensible burden of the
progressive consumption tax. See discussion infra part VC.2. Note that Professor Graetz. an open
advocate of more progressive tax systems, favors tightening the estate tax over raiing income tax rates.
see Graetz, supra note 2, at 270-78, 284, because of the adverse incentive effects of the latter Id at 273
("High income tax rates both create marginal disincentives to productivity and stimulate legal and illegal
noncompliance."). Later, I suggest that we can escape from this particular dilemma under a progressic
consumption tax.
176. E.g., Graetz, supra note 2. at 273; Gutman. supra note 2. at 1188. See generallA Donaldson.
supra note I, at 543-45 (discussing progressivity as rationale for estate tax)
177. Graetz. supra note 2, at 271.
178. See THEORY OF JUSTICE. supra note 19. at 530-41 . See generally Robert Young. Egahtarianism
and Envy, 52 PHIL. STUD. 261 (1987). For an excellent example of an attempt to ground progressiv.ity
on clear and independent normative foundations and to illustrate varying means of implementing
progressive norms (including, paradigmatically, through a non-progresstve marginal rate structure). sc
generally Bankman & Griffith. supra note 132.
179. THEORY OF JUsTICE, supra note 13. at 279 (emphasis added) Later on the same page. however.
Rawls notes that "even steeply progressive income taxes' may be appropriate "'gten the injustice of
existing institutions." Id. Rawls' use of the word "'even" underscores the extent to which he consider-
a progressive income tax to be far removed from ideal theory. To dnve the point home, Rawls adds
explicitly that "Itlwo wrongs can make a fight." Id.
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income tax, for example, fails to reflect the imputed and psychic income from
leisure. Looking at the estate tax is even more problematic, because its visible
burdens do not reflect the increased consumption, leisure, and inter vivos
giving of its putative targets. The very rich who spend all of their wealth on
themselves do not add to the static progressivity figures, and yet these parties
may be the ones of greatest concern to the liberal. If Mr. Perot were to spend
all of his $3 billion running for office, say, we would get no part of our
"progressive" result from him.
A third and related problem is that even if we want progressivity as an end
and are prepared to accept some real-world measurement as a suitable proxy
for what really counts, it matters where we get it. Use of the estate tax to
provide progressivity burdens those manifestly few individuals who want to
leave bequests but do not plan well for it; at the same time, it ignores and even
encourages greater lifetime consumption and inter vivos gifts among those who
do plan. An estate tax may not be the most effective way to achieve whatever
progressivity we do desire in the tax structure. It may be better, as I argue
below, to levy the burden of progressivity on the act of private, preclusive use
within an essentially consumption tax structure. This option acts on what the
people and our evolved practices are trying to tell us in resisting any real,
effective estate tax, in moving toward a consumption base, and in maintaining
at least moderate progressivity.
In any event, the (relatively) low rates of the present income tax, combined
with the numerous ways of escaping taxation on the yield to savings, allow for
significant private accumulations of wealth over the course of a lifetime. The
H. Ross Perots, the Michael Milkens, the Bill Gateses, and countless other
first-generation, highly wealthy individuals of this world are at least anecdotal
testimony to the ability of individuals to amass private fortunes under the
current tax regime. Combining the present income tax system with a tightened
estate tax runs the risk of significantly accentuating conspicuous or large-scale
private consumption. Arbitrage between the consumption and income models
is a simple matter within a lifetime. The Perots or the Milkens are free, under
the income tax, to build up large stores of private wealth, using, say,
appreciating property. If the estate tax were our only "backstop" to the holes
that the income tax generates, these individuals could spend down their wealth,
perhaps by borrowing against it, without triggering any income tax
consequences. 8 Our current tax plan promotes large lifetime accumulation
of wealth along with its rapid dissipation during that lifetime, all the while
180. In fact, the wealthiest estates are far more likely to have debt-and to have much larger
average debt-than those closer to the taxable threshold. See Johnson, supra note 56, at 92-95 tbl. 2.
Over 62% of the wealthiest estates (gross estates over $20 million) had debt, while less than 26% of
estates in the lowest category (under SI million) had debt. In fact, this percentage rises monotonically
with wealth brackets. Id. There are, of course, several possible explanations for this effect, including the
self-selection for risk preference and the importance of debt in accumulating wealth.
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discouraging any form of long-term, inter-generational savings. Such an
incentive structure hardly seems sensible. The Perot presidential run, for
example, seems squarely to implicate Rawls' concern with "concentrations of
power detrimental to the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of
opportunity,"'181 and yet the current tax system levies no tax on that
act-indeed, it encourages it. Likewise, an income-plus-estate tax places no
constraint whatsoever on the use of wealth by heirs.
The current tax system makes treacherous any arguments about leveling
the playing field or promoting equal opportunity. Interestingly, the very ideal
of income taxation calls into question the liberal egalitarian's willingness to
accept varying intra-generational outcomes as fair, as reflected in Mill's and
Rawls' calls for a proportionate consumption tax. In moving away from this
acceptance of intra-generational divergences, the income tax advocate
implicitly calls into question any radical distinction between intra- and inter-
generational outcomes. But then all inequality becomes suspect, whether or not
traceable to individual lifetime efforts, and we ought to be asking more openly
consequentialist (or at least different) questions about how to curb inequality.
Once again, we can ground this inquiry in nonideal or ideal theory. Nonideal
theory may lead us away from any meritocratic view of earnings: conversely,
ideal theory may suggest that the income tax's focus on earnings, even if
earnings are indeed "fairly" come by, is misplaced. The ethical and political
logic of progressivity under an income tax-at least within a liberal as opposed
to a utilitarian conception-shows no logical stopping point. While some have
concluded that this lack of a stopping point makes the case for progressivity
"uneasy,"' 182 I conclude to the contrary that it means the case is political.S'
But if all tax is political, we need to look even more closely at our practices;
the metaphysics of earnings do not afford us an easy way out. Ironically,
perhaps, or at least counter-intuitively, an invigorated estate tax does not
necessarily move us in any normatively attractive direction.
Rather than changing the estate tax, therefore, we might attack the
possession of wealth through a tightened income tax. I believe that there are
good reasons, once again grounded in liberalism and sound objective judgment,
to reject a tighter income tax. These reasons have checked any real, practical
implementation of the income ideal, much as a parallel set of reasons has
blocked any meaningful estate tax; once again, interpretive and independent
181. THEORY OF JUSTICE. supra note 19. at 277.
182. The leading statement of the uneasiness of the case for progressi'vity is found in WALTER J
BLUM & HARRY KALVEN. THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953). to wshich the title
of this Article pays tribute. See also Bankman & Griffith. supra note 132 (criticizing Blum and Kalven
and advancing utilitarian or welfarist defense of progressivity. along optimal taxation lines)
183. Arthur Ripstein takes a similar view about the political status of arguments for luck and
responsibility evident in our ton system. See generally Arthur Rtpstem. Equahty back. and
Responsibility, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1994) (arguing that concept of responsibility has been employed
for liberal ends in ton law).
1994]
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normative reasoning converge. But let us imagine, to flesh out this one point,
that we did have a purer income tax."8 How would the estate tax fit under
this ideal income tax regime? The answer is problematic. As the income-
versus-consumption debate highlighted, an ideal income tax burdens deferred
consumption relative to present consumption by penalizing work and savings,
and pushing toward leisure and use. Any estate tax burdens bequests even
further, doubling the push toward consumption and away from work and
savings for the richest citizens, an important group when it comes to savings
and consumption decisions. If a true income tax "doubly" taxes savings, as
Mill alleged, 185 an income-plus-estate tax triply taxes bequest savings.
Since the ideal income tax hits hard at wealth, there may be little need for
the estate tax as a "backstop." In point of fact, the estate tax as a backstop to
the current income tax works in two directions. At the donor's level, the estate
tax compensates ex post for the failure of the income tax to have addressed
wealth concerns. At the donee's level, it compensates ex ante for the failure
of the income tax to get at the subsequent appreciation of the bequest. An ideal
income tax solves these two problems and thus diminishes the appeal of, or
need for, a tightened estate tax. More appealing is an ideal income tax without
an estate tax. The ideal income tax provides for continuous taxation of the
yield to capital; eliminating the estate tax simply moves toward putting
bequests on the same footing as all other future consumption.
In sum, even if we are concerned about the possession of wealth, the
present flawed income-plus-estate tax seems ineffective both in theory and in
practice. Fixing or tightening the income tax seems to be a better way of
addressing concerns over wealth than tightening the estate tax, because many
of the problems of inequality are intra-generational ones; the estate tax is apt
to be porous at best; and a flawed income-plus-tightened-estate tax runs the
risk of encouraging large-scale consumption and early, frequent inter vivos
transfers. If we instead tighten the income tax, then we weaken the reasons for
having any estate tax at all. Including an estate tax with a tightened income tax
184. Any improved income tax would almost certainly have to overcome the barriers to the ideal
posed by the realization requirement, first set forth in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). See
generally Andrews, Consumption-Type, supra note 61 (tracing tax system's major deficiencies to
imperfect taxation of savings or accumulation). Indeed, an increasingly sophisticated literature has been
giving us means to do so. See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM.
ECON. REV. 167 (1991); Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, How To Tax the House that Jack
Built, 43 TAX L. REV. 447 (1988); Mary Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax Deferral, 88
MICH. L. REV. 722 (1990); David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual
Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. I11 I (1986); Jeff Stmad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and
Implementation, 99 YALE L.J. 1817 (1990). See generally Karla W. Simon, Revenue or Religion? Issues
and Answers on Tax Deferral, 68 TAXEs 1015 (1990) (providing broad overview of attempts to overcome
the realization requirement).
185. MILL, supra note 48, at 816-17. Commentators asserting that the double tax argument takes
an ex ante perspective have strongly contested this claim. See Warren, Consumption Tax, supra note 157,
at 1099-1101. It is beyond dispute, however, that an income tax hits savings harder than a consumption
tax-that is the point of the distinction between an income and consumption tax.
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undermines incentives to work and save for taxpayers with any bequest motive,
and pushes, once again, toward excessive consumption and the earlier
transmission of wealth. Since our accumulated practical wisdom lends little
support to a stronger income tax regime in any event, all of this analysis
mainly just serves to reaffirm the need for a continued, broader, and more
imaginative search for alternatives that are more consonant with our ideals.
B. A Consumption-plus-Estate Tax
There has been increasing talk recently of moving toward a broad-based
consumption tax system.'86 Indeed, this is more than just talk; our
comprehensive "income" tax is already more-or-less equipoised between an
income and a consumption tax model. I8 7 If we take into account the
increasingly significant payroll tax system, essentially a proportionate
consumption tax, the turn toward consumption taxation appears even more
pronounced. This Section presents what is attractive in a consumption ideal
while emphasizing that the inchoate spirit of our practices and the best reading
of liberalism are both in tension with the typical consumption tax plan that
liberal theorists have advocated.
As it turns out, a common recommendation for a comprehensive tax
system is a broad-based consumption tax supplemented by a wealth transfer
tax. Mill, Kaldor, Rawls, and Andrews have put forth variants of this
proposal.' 89 The analysis of Part IV, in emphasizing that an estate tax
encourages consumption, casts some doubt on this combination. As Alvin
Warren noted in partial response to Andrews' proposal, an estate tax is a tax
on at least one form of savings and is thus in some tension with the
consumption ideal.'" I explore and deepen this criticism, moving it in a
different direction than Warren himself intended. 9'
A difficulty with the consumption-plus-estate tax system is that the estate
tax turns out to be in tension with many, and possibly all, of the underlying
norms of consumption tax theory. As an aside, and to clarify terminology, I
note that I am not interested in the question of whether gifts and bequests are,
186. See. e.g., STRENGTHENING AM. COMM'N. supra note 85. at 91-93
187. McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 5, at 1152-54.
188. For the comparability of a wage or payroll tax to a consumption or expenditure tax. see
RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 224-25
(5th ed. 1989) and Warren, Fairness. supra note 157. at 938-41. For a wage or payroll tax to be truly
equivalent to a consumption or expenditure tax. there must be no net consumption out of bequests or
inheritances, and the tax rate must be constant. If there is no net consumption out of these other sources,
then all consumption must be ultimately traceable to earnings.
189. MILL, supra note 48; NICHOLAS KALDOR. AN EXPENDmTURE TAX (1955). THEORY OF JUSTICE,
supra note 19; Andrews. Consumption-Type. supra note 61. at 1172. Andrews. Fairness. supra note 173.
at 957.
190. See Warren, Fairness, supra note 157, at 942.
191. Warren is primarily in favor of an income tax and uses his criticism to deflate the perc ivcd
logic of Andrews' case for a consumption tax. See id.
19941
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in some sense, "consumption" by the donor. Tax policy analysis has often
bogged down in questions such as whether gifts constitute "income," or
whether giving constitutes "consumption."' 192 Gifts are not consumptive in
the technical sense of constituting a private, preclusive, and final use of
resources, and yet a donor clearly receives some real, psychic benefit from
making gifts, which we are free to call "consumption" if we want. But all of
the norms supporting the consumption tax can, and I believe should, be
divorced from merely semantic labels. If the consumption tax is attractive on
the grounds of efficiency, fairness, or some other reasonable liberal value, then
these norms, and not an appeal to prior definitions, ought to inform the debate.
Unfortunately, many of these norms remain inchoate, particularly as they relate
to fairness. 93 Nevertheless, three classes of justifications emerge, each of
which sits uneasily with an estate tax.
First, supporters of consumption taxation argue that the consumption tax
is more "efficient" than the income tax. This efficiency claim, actually more
of a utilitarian idea,'94 consists of two separate strands. The major efficiency
claim is that the consumption tax is efficient because it does not distort the
savings-consumption decision. More technically, this claim reduces to the
argument that there is less total deadweight loss under the consumption tax
than under the income tax or any alternative tax regime. Within the welfarist
or utilitarian tradition of optimal tax theory, this claim depends more
particularly on the compensated elasticity of savings to the tax rate, and also
on the general equilibrium effects of the move to a consumption tax on, say,
the labor-leisure trade-off. 95 In performing this delicate analysis, it is
important to bear in mind that savings, just as consumption generally, is not
a monolithic category.' 96 If bequest savings of the rich have an especially
high compensated elasticity, then taxing such savings is especially
distortionary. General equilibrium studies have shown large potential welfare
gains from a shift to a consumption tax model.' 97 Combining these two
points indicates that an estate tax may be a particularly inefficient levy.
Contrary to Bentham's and Mill's early intuitions, bequest savings may be the
very worst form of savings to tax, at least from a utilitarian, efficiency-
192. See, e.g., SIMONS, supra note 158, at 56-58, 134-36; Aaron & Galper, supra note 16, at
109-12; Aaron & Munnell, supra note 6, at 119-21.
193. This point is clearly illustrated in Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44
STAN. L. REV. 961, 961-67 (1992).
194. I discuss the distinctions in Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender
Discrimination, Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595, 636-43 (1993) [hereinafter
McCaffery, Slouching].
195. McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 5. at 1166, 1170-71.
196. See id. at 1175-79.
197. See, e.g., Fullerton et al., supra note 159, at 4, 22; cf. Auerbach et al., supra note 159, at 98
("A transition to a consumption tax is considerably more efficient than a transition to a wage tax; the
first generates a large efficiency gain while the second induces an equally large efficiency loss."). But
see Feldstein, supra note 89 (suggesting possibility of welfare losses from moving to consumption tax).
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oriented, or welfarist perspective.
The minor efficiency claim is that there is market failure leading to an
overly low savings rate. While commentators sometimes make this claim as a
purely paternalistic point-that consumers are saving too little for their own
good, whatever they may think' 9 -it fits more easily as an efficiency claim
when made as a market failure argument. According to this argument, some
cognitive error, such as an inability to make or understand the complex
calculations needed to determine an optimal savings strategy, impedes
individuals" attempts to act in their own interests." Social responses, such
as the mandatory social security system, are then designed to respond to the
particular error or failure. This second type of efficiency claim does not bear
especially on estate taxation, since almost all such claims refer to life-cycle or
precautionary savings and typically involve the lower or middle classes.
Nevertheless. the point does underscore the inherent difficulties and costs of
looking to any but the wealthy to increase private savings.
A second and distinct argument is that the consumption tax will increase
the aggregate level of savings. This argument is not technically an efficiency
claim because it does not look to some function of individual preferences.I " '
Rather, this second claim is more in the nature of a macroeconomic, merit-
good argument: More savings will benefit society regardless of individual
preferences at any moment in time.20 ' Consumption tax proponents often
make this argument with an eye toward future generations, which are, at least
arguably, inadequately cared for under a typically individualistic efficiency
norm. But greater amounts of capital affect intra-generational matters as well,
as discussed above. More capital would, for example. increase the returns to
labor. Most important under a political and interpretive theory of tax, a desire
to increase the capital stock appears to be a reasonable, liberal position, which
is in fact fueling the movement toward consumption taxation. ' 2
198. See Joseph Bankman. Tax Polic and Retirecent Inc ome Are Penusion Plan Anti
Discrimination Provisions Desirable?. 55 U Ci. L RE% 790. 814-21 tl988). Deborah M Weiss.
Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economc Thetor%. 58 L' Ciii L Rt % 1275.
1275, 1297-1300 (1991). But cf. KOTLIKOFF. WHAT DITERMNI.S SAVINGS"*. supra note 94. at 1 '9
(finding little evidence of insufficient retirement savings by elderly Americans)
199. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler. Psychology and Savings Policies. 84 Am E(cO\ RI.% 186. 189
(1994).
200. To be an efficiency point under the common Kaldor-l-hicks formula. the gain% to the "'%nner-"
must be sufficient to compensate the losses of the "loser'" and still leave all partics better off See
McCaffery, Slouching, supra note 194. at 636-37 (defining and describing Kaldor-Ilick' efficien ) To
pursue Kaldor-Hicks efficiency in any situation involving future generations. hosteser. sse uould nac
to specify an appropriate discount rate and address the crucial question of %%hose discount rate should
apply. See generally Sen, supra note 83 (discussing difficulties of getting optimal rate of sa% ings under
traditional welfarist or democratic principles).
201. McCaffery. Hybrid. supra note 5. at 1159-63
202. See STRENGTHENING AMI. COIM'N. supra note 85. at 83-86. 96-102. see also It R Con Res
6, supra note 169 (opposing any increase in effective rate of estate tax specaficall) on grounds that tax.
harms long-term private savings), William G. Gale & Robert E. Litan. Saving Our Wlas Out of the Deficit
Dilemma, BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1993. at 6 (discussing various ways to mcrease national sasingsj
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A concern with the aggregate capital stock would look to the total, or
uncompensated, elasticity of savings. Such total elasticities of bequest savings,
however, may also be high. Thus follows an estimate that a confiscatory estate
tax could decrease America's aggregate savings by one-half.203 Further, recall
that the estate tax may affect the capital stock by distorting ex ante incentive
effects and effecting a transfer from wealthy people to poorer persons and the
government, both of which have higher propensities to consume.2" Bequest
savings may once again be the best vehicle to look toward, and the worst to
tax, in any effort to increase aggregate capital. Indeed, Stiglitz has recently
suggested that it might be optimal to subsidize bequests.20 5
A third set of arguments involves fairness claims, always the most
controversial and least articulated in the tax policy lexicon. Perhaps the
strongest moral argument for the consumption tax is the one that dates back
to Thomas Hobbes, who argued that a consumption tax charges a levy on what
a taxpayer removes from the public "pool" for her own, private, preclusive use:
"For what reason is there that he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits
of his labour, consumeth little, should be more charged than he that liveth
idlely, getteth little, and spendeth all he gets . . . ?,206 This statement has a
certain cryptic quality,207 but the Hobbesian sentiment does seem to capture
a commonly held set of beliefs about wealth and consumption. The Hobbesian
position is consistent with a general aversion to excessive private consumption,
found elsewhere in Hobbes' writings and throughout Western (and other)
religious traditions,20 8 and picked up, centuries later, by Thorstein Veblen in
his classic work, The Theory of the Leisure Class.20 9 The idea also resonates
with liberal egalitarian, intra-generational norms. Rawls seems to have accepted
its logic in A Theory of Justice, when he notes that a "proportional expenditure
203. See KOTLIKOFF, WHAT DETERMINES SAVINGS?, supra note 94, at 41.
204. See Stiglitz, supra note 86, at S138-45.
205. Stiglitz's reasoning here is based more on the nature of the social welfare function. See Joseph
E. Stiglitz, Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New Welfare Economics, in 2 HANDBOOK Oi
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 991, 1035 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1985 & 1987) ("Since giving
increases the utility both of the giver and the receiver, it is doubly blessed in our social welfare function,
and the government will seek to encourage it, through a bequest subsidy.") (emphasis removed).
206. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 238-39 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651).
The quote paradoxically continues: "seeing the one has no more protection from the Common-wealth,
Ithan] the other?", indicating that Hobbes was thinking of a benefits principle of taxation. Id.; see
Richard Musgrave, A Brief History of Fiscal Doctrine, in I HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS I, supra
note 205, at 16-18. Hobbes may even have been thinking of a lump-sum, head tax. I believe that the
normative position attributed to Hobbes is appealing, whether or not it is in fact consistent with Hobbes'
own thoughts on the subject.
207. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 193. at 962-63 (criticizing Hobbesian or "foundational argument"
in favor of consumption taxation).
208. See R.H. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 248 (Peter Smith cd., 1962);
McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 5, at 1162-63 (citing numerous sources). See generally MAX WEBER, TIlE
PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1958) (discussing connection between capital
accumulation and Protestantism).
209. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (B.W. Huebsch cd., 1918) (1899).
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tax may be part of the best tax scheme. '21" Rawls continues:
For one thing, it is preferable to an income tax (of any kind) at the
level of common sense precepts of justice, since it imposes a levy
according to how much a person takes out of the common store of
goods and not according to how much he contributes (assuming here
that income is fairly earned).'
Rawls cites Kaldor, not Hobbes, in support of this proposition. ' - Kaldor
himself thought that "spending power" was a more meaningful measure of
normative taxability than income, for many of the same reasons, although he
elsewhere notes problems stemming from wealth possession alone.2 '" But if
liberals ought to look to private consumption, the estate tax's inducement of
greater consumption, specifically by the rich, may be illiberal.
There is indeed a strong appeal to the position that use is a more important
liberal concern than possession, which I take up again shortly. For now, my
more limited claim is that if a concern about monitoring consumption indeed
underlies the moral appeal of the broad-based consumption tax, tacking on an
estate tax undercuts and counteracts that concern. If we have some moral or
political reason for disliking private, preclusive consumption, perhaps
particularly the excessive, conspicuous consumption of the very wealthy, it
seems odd to be encouraging such consumption with an estate tax. The estate
tax may increase inequality of consumption, presumably the precise social
space of most concern to consumption tax advocates, while decreasing the
productive contributions of work and savings.
Of course, it is possible that even the conspicuous, extravagant
consumption of those whom we view as having earned their wealth is less
offensive than any consumption of unearned wealth among their heirs; this idea
reflects the liberal egalitarian's sharp separation of intra- from inter-
generational concerns. This argument, however, is a more difficult road to
travel than it at first might appear, since it depends, among other things, on the
normative propriety of market outcomes. Recall Rawls' proviso in A Theory
210. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 19. at 278 (citng KALDOR. supra note 189)
211. Id.
212. Id. at 278 n.17. Interestingly. Rawls gives Hobbes credit for this point in his later manuscript-
[I]ncome taxation might be avoided altogether and a proportional expenditure tax adopted
instead, that is, a tax on consumption at a constant marginal rate. People would be taxed
according to how much they use of the goods and services produced and not according to
how much they contribute (an idea that goes back to Hobbes).
Justice as Fairness, supra note 29, at 130-31. Rawls appears to have an ambivalent view of his work's
relation to Hobbes, who also adhered, broadly speaking. to a liberal contractanan tradition For an
interesting discussion of Hobbes and Rawls and some matters in between. see Dasid Gauthier. Be ruen
Hobbes and Rawls, in RATIONALITY, JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAl. CONrRAcr. TitI.tES FROM, MORALS BY
AGREEMENT 24 (David Gauthier & Robert Sugdcn eds.. 1993)
213. Cf. Duff, supra note 2. at 15-16 & n.67 (noting Kaldor's view that mere possession of wealth
confers special ability to pay tax, but arguing that such taxable capacity does not justify inheritance tax)
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of Justice, qualifying his support for a proportionate consumption tax on the
fact that income be "fairly earned."2 I If lifetime income is not fairly
earned-if, for example, market outcomes are suspect-then there are intra-
generational inequalities that are not necessarily caused by inter-generational
transmissions. As the third liberal argument in Part II suggested, this change
in assumptions from ideal theory puts a good many issues on the table,
including the effects of wealth transfer taxation on productivity, the capital
stock, and intra-generational consumption. It now becomes possible that
inequality in use is more offensive, even to prior liberal values such as the fair
equality of opportunity, than is inequality in possession, as I discuss below.
To press an even stronger argument, earnings may be the wrong variable
on which to focus. As stated in the fourth argument from Part II, even under
ideal of just conditions, a consumption-without-estate tax may still be the best
liberal tax scheme because it consistently looks to use, not earnings. Rawls
believes it ethically appropriate to tax use, not "contributions," by which latter
term we ought to include, as Rawls' language clearly does, both work and
savings. (Commentators often seem to infer that "contributions to the common
store" refer only to savings, but there can be no savings without antecedent
work.)2 1 5 Hobbes' language echoes the thought: Hobbes means to reward (or
not to punish) the industrious and the thrifty. These ideas suggest that use is
a more compelling concern than earnings. We can go even further and make
yet a stronger point. Under just transactional systems, earnings represent the
preferences of autonomous others. Thus, a liberal political society wants Mr.
Perot or Michael Milken or Madonna to earn their millions, because they are
doing what society wants them to do; social preferences are setting their
salaries. To meet any liberal concerns with unfair earnings, we set up social
rules over transactional systems: for example, laws against monopoly,
discrimination, fraud, or coercion. Earnings would then be fair precisely
because they would respond fairly to individual preferences. If we then create
incentives leading away from work, such as via the estate tax, we deny third
214. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 278 (parenthetical proviso that income be "fairly
earned"); see also Joel Feinberg, Rawls and Intuitionism, in READING RAWLS 108, 116-24 (Norman
Daniels ed., 1975) (discussing problems of "non-ideal theory" vis-A-vis Rawlsian theory); cf. DWORKIN,
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 20. at 205-10 (questioning fairness of market outcomes); Graetz,
supra note 2, at 275-78 (questioning propriety of market outcomes, using example of Olivia Newton-
John). Note that I am not making the argument, rightly criticized in Haslett, supra note 3, at 141-42, that
because some inequalities will persist, none should be attacked. Rather, my argument is a more particular
one, suggesting the need for a more comprehensive focus on the intra-generational use of resources.
215. Fried refers to this "common pool" argument as the Hobbesian or "foundational" one and puts
it aside to concentrate her critique on what I am calling the subjectivist, or individualistic grounds of the
consumption tax's fairness claims. Fried, supra note 193, at 962-63. Fried does specify two criticisms
of the foundational argument: its ignorance of the psychic yield of possession and the power that
investment decisions bring. Id. I refer to these as possession qua actual or potential use, and believe that
a properly devised tax system can respond to them. Fried also notes that "[tlhe argument raises a number
of other problems as well, and an adequate treatment of it has yet to be undertaken." Id. at 963. On one
level, I intend this Article to take a step in that direction.
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parties a benefit for which they are willing to pay. Meanwhile, the putative
millionaire can simply substitute leisure of equivalent psychic value for
productive work effort.
Use presents a different, indeed opposite, paradigm from work or earnings
alone. It is use that takes away from others-from third parties or from the
"common store"-and diverts resources to private preferences. Use represents
an imposition by the individual on the collective. Those who do not want to
interfere with earnings under just systems may indeed care about use and be
willing to interfere with it. At least up to the point where envy becomes an
issue,2 the political liberal state may reasonably cede to this concern. In
T.M. Scanlon's terms, society may take an objective stance vis-ji-vis use, at
least at certain high quanta of expenditure, under which we can (and do) make
moral judgments as to the urgency of \vants.?7 Thus, liberal society may
well be glad that Mr. Perot did whatever he did to earn his billions (assuming
again with Rawls that income is fairly earned), but still consider his ability to
make rapid use of his fortune both relatively unimportant or nonurgent, and
even dangerous to prior liberties. In both cases-approving earnings and
disapproving excessive use-society is being objective and political, through
and through.
Of course, there are questions and problems. If parties capable of high
earnings insist on spending all of their earnings, society faces a choice between
the good of work effort and the bad of excessive private, preclusive use;
society must draw lines. All practical tax systems come down to some more
or less arbitrary choices. But if an individual is willing to work and save and
consume her high earnings prudently over many years., or even pass them on
to her heirs, then society can avoid passing judgment on her earnings per se.
We can, in short, minimize and alter the class of people as to whom we must
make a trade-off between productivity (a social good) and inequality (a social
bad); we can burden only the decadent consumers or spendthrifts among the
most productive. Those productive parties not spending their wealth
irresponsibly are serving the public good and need not be overly taxed.
The basic argument runs as follows: Once we abandon theories of merit
or desert and adopt instead a more nuanced. political, and objective theory of
distributive justice-one that systematically incorporates questions of incentive
effects and social mores-then the simple mandate for steep wealth transfer tax
systems, specifically on the grounds that inherited wealth is not '*earned,"
wanes or even disappears. We can arrive at this point through two different,
though interestingly convergent, routes. First. we can conclude that "earnings"
are not prima facie just in a nonideal, imperfect world. Second. we can
216. See. e.g., THEORY OF JUSTICE. supra note 19. at 530-41 (discu%,nig ell% on .a liberal %tate .
Young., supra note 178 (discussing envy tn a just liberal tate)
217. Scanlon, supra note 14. at 660-61.
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conclude that it does not matter whether "earnings" are just as a matter of ideal
theory; the justice of earnings is not relevant to the justice of use. Even if
earnings are fairly secured, liberal society has objective, political reasons to
like earnings while disliking at least large-scale use.
There are fairness arguments for the consumption tax other than the
various "common store" arguments. Perhaps the most common is the
horizontal equity point that compares the saver to the consumer and asks why
the former should be "double taxed." z 8 As Warren noted, however, tacking
on the estate tax only adds another point of comparison: We are "penalizing"
the bequest saver relative to both the lifetime saver and consumer. 9 It is far
from clear that this choice is sensible. Whereas Warren intended his comments
as a critique of Andrews' reasoning in support of the consumption tax, we can
and shall take the comments the other way: as a critique of Andrews', and by
extension of consumption tax theory's, embrace of a transfer tax.
Looking at the donor, as Warren's analysis does, can help us to focus on
some interesting aspects of the wealth transfer tax puzzle. Consider two
individuals, Mr. Spendthrift and Ms. Thrifty.20 Suppose Mr. Spendthrift
receives a small fortune of $2 million early in his career, when he is twenty-
five years old, and imagine that he acquired it through one of the following
scenarios: by earning it in the labor market; by making it in the financial
market; by winning the lottery; or by inheriting it. Mr. Spendthrift spends most
of his remaining days traveling around the world, eating at the best restaurants
and drinking the finest wines. At some point he even purchases a private
annuity and spends every cent from each year's payment, so that he
deliberately leaves nothing to his children.
Now suppose that Ms. Thrifty also receives $2 million at age twenty-five.
To test intuitions, imagine that she receives it on account of the same reason
Mr. Spendthrift acquired his. (The point of this mental exercise is to show that
the justice of earnings is logically and ethically distinct from the justice of
use.) Ms. Thrifty invests her money wisely and continues to work and earn and
save more money throughout her life. She lives simply but well, teaching her
children the importance of saving for the future, of working for its own sake
and for what work can provide to others, and of not living ostentatiously.
When she dies, she bequeaths sizable sums to her children, who are then well
into the middle stages of their lives, established in their careers, and deeply
engaged in raising their own children with the same simple virtues learned
218. See, e.g., MILL, supra note 48, at 815-16; Andrews, Consumption-Type, supra note 61, at
1167-68. But cf. KALOOR, supra note 189, at 79-91 (discussing and criticizing Mill's "double tax"
criticism); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 161-63 (1959) (same).
219. See Warren, Fairness, supra note 157, at 942.
220. The next few paragraphs borrow from a work in progress, The Political Liberal Case Against





The current estate tax applies only to Ms. Thrifty and her family. And it
is a harsh tax, taking away up to half of the Thriftys' wealth. Mr. Spendthrift
and Ms. Thrifty are equal in some morally compelling sense, since the) each
face, ex ante, the same opportunity set (and, by hypothesis, each earned their
wealth in the same way). Mr. Spendthrift, however, chooses a maximum
consumption and leisure route, while Ms. Thrift), does not. In choosing to tax
only Ms. Thrifty, the tax system seems to have adopted an ex post perspective:
It is looking backwards from the grave. Yet unlike other situations where such
an after-the-fact perspective seems morally appropriate-for example, in
compensating accident victims even if they had an ex ante opportunity to
insure but did not-the differing ex post statuses of Ms. Thrifty and Mr.
Spendthrift do not, in any compelling sense, turn on "luck." The different
statuses result from conscious choices and come to pass, again unlike the
accident or some other windfall setting, without ever changing the equivalence
of the opportunity sets that both individuals face. We have posited that,
throughout their lives, Ms. Thrifty and Mr. Spendthrift faced exactly the same
choices, so that, in an important and meaningful sense, the value of Mr.
Spendthrift's consumption equals the value of Ms. Thrifty's savings and
consumption combined.
Of course, Ms. Thrifty's children have an advantage, in terms of their ex
ante opportunities, over Mr. Spendthrift's children. Herein lies one of the
puzzles of estate taxation: One person's "luck" in receiving inherited wealth
typically relates to another person's, the benefactor's, conscious, non-lucky
decisions regarding work, saving, and so forth. 't By a natural process of
backward induction, the decision to confiscate the donee's seemingly lucky
windfall will affect the lifetime choices of the donor. We get a very different
look at issues of estate taxation depending solely on our choice of analytical
framework. That is, our view depends on whether we look at the estate tax
from the donor's or the donee's perspective, ex ante or ex post. Analogously,
our thoughts may change depending on the range of alternatives that we have
221. See generally Ripstein, supra note 183 Ripstein's excellent essjia drasss attention to the
irreducibly political nature of our concepts of "-luck' and "responsibiht% " Ripstein tends to locus on bud
luck, asking where the onus of such luck should reside He hou, that the question ot Irante or
perspective is vital. If an accident has occurred-a hammer I .m using falls on >our head. sj, -it matters
on whom we focus. To say that it is not my fault is to say that it is %our bad luck. to .i,, that I (or
society at large) should pay is to say that it is my (or soclet%'s) bad luck. nut Nours It we. %ici the estate
tax as implicating the question of good luck. we then have a parallel set of concern, It ,%e locus on the
donee. we may see an unacceptable appropriation of good luck But to den% that goo d luck to the donee
is to put it somewhere. Like bad luck. good luck cannot just disappear As it is. %c do little under the
current inefficacious estate tax to divert the good luck at all I ami arguing further that. under a trusi
confiscatory tax. much of the good luck is apt to inure backwards to the putantte donor In contrast, the
progressive consumption-without-estate tax solutton is an attempt to allos the donee to hold her good
luck in a fiduciary capacity for the body polttic and thus, in effect, to shate it Once again, perhaps
paradoxically, a more thoroughgoing skepticism about market outcomes, and a concotitanth, more
political treatment of wealth, might lead against, not in fasor ol. estate taxation
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in mind, which is a central theme of this Part. There are ways to address the
advantages to Ms. Thrifty's children, for example, without unduly burdening
Ms. Thrifty herself.
The estate tax works like the opposite of "sin" taxes on goods such as
alcohol and cigarettes, which are (also) not designed to raise revenue, but to
control behavior or to curtail certain vices. The estate tax is quite possibly an
anti-sin tax, or, equivalently, a virtue tax. The estate tax is a tax on work and
savings, on thrift, and on altruism. Now, the type of horizontal equity analysis
embedded in the Thrifty-Spendthrift discussion is not necessarily decisive;
indeed, this discussion is precisely the type of "metaphysics" that a political
liberal theory of tax aims to avoid. 2 The more important question of why
savers and spenders ought to be considered horizontal equals vel non collapses
back into the previously discussed concerns about liberal values: efficiency,
distributive justice, virtue, and so on. But like other pair-wise comparisons, the
Thrifty-Spendthrift example is best used to prod our moral intuitions. Here, the
example illustrates once again that society may want to take an objective
ethical stance in favor of thrift over consumption, or, more accurately, a stance
against disfavoring thrift.
The bottom line of these discussions is that, while a consumption tax is
attractive on liberal grounds and is supported by our practices' shift toward it,
adding any transfer tax is highly questionable under the three broad sets of
claims supporting the consumption tax model. The first two economic
arguments clearly seem to counsel against tacking on an estate tax. Various
fairness claims also counsel against the tax. A wealth transfer tax induces or
rewards behavior that the consumption tax is intended to discourage:
consumption, leisure, and inter vivos giving. It is thus hard to get to the
consumption-plus-estate tax position from a consideration of consumption tax
norms alone.
Perhaps for this reason, liberal advocates of a consumption plus-transfer-
tax model generally proceed from a different direction. They accept the
consumption tax, for one or another of the above reasons, despite what they
perceive as its major vice: its tolerance of large stores of private, unevenly
distributed wealth. The estate tax is intended to be an antidote to the
consumption tax, since it supposedly reaches the lifetime accumulations of
wealth that the consumption tax explicitly condones. Under this view, the
estate tax is a means of "leveling the playing field" to preserve meaningful and
prior notions of equality, quite apart from concerns about efficiency or wealth
maximization. Rawls, Kaldor, Andrews, and Mill call for some type of wealth
transfer taxation to respond to real or perceived criticisms of their consumption
222. See generally Louis Kaplow. Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT't.
TAX J. 139 (1989) (criticizing horizontal equity as unnecessary and even counterproductive normative





There are, however, problems with this particular compromise. The
consumption-plus-estate tax model becomes deeply schizophrenic, even
oxymoronic; we are "saving" the consumption tax model from its critics by
undermining exactly those reasons why we should have supported it in the first
place. Under a political and interpretive theory of tax, the real-world fact that
we do not seem to want any truly effective wealth transfer tax is also relevant.
The more we move away from individualistic, subjective, and even
metaphysical notions of earnings, entitlements, and desert, the more we begin
to see the necessity or wisdom of taking objective stands, which favor work
and savings and disfavor only, or at least especially, the excessive private
preclusive use of resources. This reasoning suggests that progressivity, and not
transfer taxation, is the most compelling answer to the liberal's sense of unease
with wealth accumulation under a consumption ideal. A progressive
consumption-without-estate tax-my ultimate proposal, to which I now
turn-not incidentally changes the very meaning, and hence the risks and
dangers, of the private possession of wealth. Getting there via strictly political
arguments also helps to inform the precise shape of the preferred liberal tax
system.
C. A Progressive Consumption-Withiout-Estate Tax
We have made our way, finally, to a practical proposal that addresses
liberal egalitarian concerns without including any estate tax at all. We have
seen that the status quo. with its flawed income-plus-estate tax, is not working
in theory or in practice. We have seen that there is much that is popular and
normatively attractive in consumption tax theory, but that what is most
appealing in this alternative tax scheme is in tension with any wealth transfer
tax. We have seen that our practices have in fact resisted any meaningful estate
tax. Finally, we have seen that an objective, political, liberal perspective
approves of work and savings, while only or at least especially questioning
excessive private use. All of these ideas lead to my fifth and linal liberal
argument against an estate tax: the desirability of a progressive consumption-
without-estate tax.
The plan derives in part from economic thinking, which has shown us that
any real-world scheme of wealth transfer taxation is apt to encourage inter
vivos gifts, or to discourage work effort and capital accumulation among the
wealthy, or to do both. The answer also draws in part from an exploration of
the intuitions lying behind advocacy of the consumption tax model. I presume
223. See THEORY OF JUSTICE. supra note 19. at 277. KAt XR. 5upra note 189. at 100-01. Andrc%,,,
Consumpiton-Type, supra note 61. at 1172. Andrc%,. Fatrniss. ij upra note 173. at 957. 5it . suprit note
48, at 811-12.
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that a basic intuition, from Hobbes on down, has been that the use of wealth,
and not its mere possession, is what really concerns liberal society. This
position is the core of what I am taking to be the consumption tax's principal
fairness claim.224 Indeed, if possession alone were a concern, there would be
little reason to prefer a consumption over an income tax, as we have seen
above. It is time to explore more deeply the reasons for being more concerned
with the use of wealth than with its possession, to see if this inchoate idea is
reasonable.
On the one hand, use of wealth represents the type of charge against
common resources that angered Hobbes and concerned Rawls. Use can also be
conspicuous, in Veblen's sense, inciting envy (or worse). It reflects spending
power, in Kaldor's sense. It can corrupt political processes, as in the Perot
example, and thereby interfere with the exercise of prior liberties. Excessive
use can normatively distort the price system, an effect that can be especially
important: It appears, for example, that certain basic commodities are more
expensive in richer countries, both absolutely and relatively, because price
levels reflect the consumption of the wealthy, whose expenditure decisions
draw resources toward certain luxurious goods. 225 A related reason why
poverty can exist or even flourish in developed countries is the increased costs
of simply keeping up with the consumption of one's neighbor-of "appearing
in public without shame," as Adam Smith once put it.226 It is also interesting
to note that, left more or less on their own, people seem to reach a
consumption satiation level, as evidenced by the fact that the elderly apparently
continue to save, not dissave, beyond life-cycle needs.227 This fact of
satiation indicates that taxing excessive consumption may not run counter to
ordinary behavior as much as taxing bequests.
On the other hand, private savings have some distinct virtues. Private
224. See, e.g., KALDOR, supra note 189, at 24-37; Andrews, Consumptiori-Type, supra note 61, at
1114-17. But cf. Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal"
Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 833-35 (1979)
(arguing that use is irrelevant to tax law).
225. See SEN, supra note 136, at 114-16 & n.34. Frances Williams argues that because it is
financially unattractive to service the needs of those who consume relatively little, the goods and services
that the poor purchase are more expensive in an absolute sense. See Frances Williams, Conclusion to
WHY THE POOR PAY MORE 235, 235 (Frances Williams ed., 1977).
226. See SEN, supra note 136, at 115 (discussing 2 SMITH, supra note 92, at 399). Peter Townsend
has observed that "[ploverty can be defined objectively and applied consistently only in terms of the
concept of relative deprivation." PETER TOWNSEND, POVERTY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 31 (1979); see
also id. at 50 ("Needs arise by virtue of the kind of society to which individuals belong. Society imposes
expectations, through its occupational, educational, economic and other systems, and it also creates
wants, through its organization and customs."). See generally Richard H. McAdams, Relative
Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1 (1992) (discussing problems of negative relative preferences such as
competitive consumption).
227. See KOTLIKOFF, WHAT DETERMINES SAVINGS?, supra note 94, at 23; Kotlikoff,
Intergenerational Transfers, supra note 94, at 48-5 I. But see Hurd, supra note 94, at 298, 306
(concluding from empirical data that, contrary to most cross-section studies, the elderly dissave after
retirement, so that there is no evidence of bequest motive).
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savings result from possession without use, which in turn implies productive
work effort. As Keynes long ago noted, private wealth can undergird social,
macroeconomic progress.-- Private wealth can also counterbalance
government power, and private investment decisions are typically more
efficient than public ones. Interestingly, in discussing the relative priority of
the difference principle as compared to the fair-equality-of-opportunity
principle (recall that the latter is lexically prior), Rawls looks directly at the
Keynesian argument in A Theory of Justice.22' Keynes had argued that the
frugality of turn-of-the-century British capitalists was critical to England's
social advances. Rawls seems to agree that capital per se inures largely to the
benefit of the working classes, although he continues to imply that questions
of savings are largely inter-generational ones. -' But Rawls next notes that
"there are more efficient and just ways of raising the level of well-being and
culture than that Keynes describes." 2 11 without specifying what these ways
are. Rawls concludes his discussion of Keynes by asserting that "lilt is only
in special circumstances, including the frugality of the capitalist class as
opposed to the self-indulgence of the aristocracy, that a society should obtain
investment funds by endowing the rich with more than they feel they can
decently spend on themselves. 23 -
To be blunt, Rawls may be wrong here. Repealing the estate tax may in
fact be one of the most efficient and even just ways to increase capital, as I
have argued throughout this Article. The very presence of the estate tax
induces certain unjust behavior, such as large inter vivos gifts and large-scale
consumption by the rich. More to the point, what Rawls fails to see in the
quoted passage is precisely the possibility that we can use the tax system to
ensure, or at least to regulate, the "frugality of the capitalist class." The state
can do what individuals otherwise might not, of their own accord: guarantee
that only the frugal get to keep their large amounts of private wealth. Rawls'
blind spot here no doubt has something to do with the fact that he already
advanced, twenty pages prior, his own proportionate consumption-plus-transfer
tax proposal, following in the footsteps of Hobbes, Mill, and Kaldor. Rawls
also seems to believe that the point of the basic general tax system is solely
to raise revenues,- -thereby ignoring the large and inevitable behavioral
distortions of modern tax systems and, as important, missing the unique
possibility provided by tax systems to implement objective social values over
the urgency of wants. In any event, the curtailment of self-indulgence without
228. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQV LNCS OF Tutl PACE 18-22 1920)
229. THEORY OF JUSTICE. supra note 19. at 298-301
230. Id. at 287-88.
231. Id. at 299.
232. Id. (emphasis added).
233. Id. at 278 (The second part of the distibution branch is a chcrmc of taxation to raise the
revenues that justice requires.").
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a general burden on frugality or accumulation is, of course, exactly what the
progressive consumption-without-estate tax aims to do. It aims to reward, to
encourage, or at least not to deter the frugality of the capitalist class, and only
to penalize or discourage the self-indulgence of the aristocracy. A progressive
consumption-without-estate tax reverses the effect of current law: It penalizes
Mr. Spendthrift, and not Ms. Thrifty. Separating consumption from possession
is the essence of this move.
Recall the Stiglitz-Smith conjecture that the estate tax effects a transfer
from those with a greater propensity to save to those with a greater propensity
to consume, thereby lowering the capital stock.23 An initial instinct may be
that this loss is an unavoidable feature of all redistribution; all ethically
appropriate redistributions take from the rich and give to the poor. But this
thinking is not true once we distinguish between use and possession. Taxing
the use of wealth is a way of allowing the most efficient savers to hold on to
their capital, while at the same time serving many, if not all, liberal egalitarian
ends. Private savings may be the most efficient way to increase the capital
stock, as Keynes saw clearly enough, and an increased capital stock will have
progressive effects, intra- as well as inter-generationally. Moving toward a
progressive consumption-without-estate tax may be the "best" way-the most
fair and efficient-to increase private savings while still monitoring private
use. In any event, under a political-interpretive theory of tax, it is not
necessary to prove, decisively, the optimality of a practical program. Rather,
it is sufficient to show that the program is at least implicit in our practices and
reasonable from a liberal point of view. The progressive consumption-without-
estate tax satisfies both prongs of this test.
To be sure, two rather large sets of problems remain. First, there appear
to be equitable and political issues involving the concentration of power
accompanying private wealth and investment decisions, and some benefits flow
from possession alone.235 Second, as the liberal egalitarian case reminds us,
the use of wealth by those deemed to have "earned" it may not be as offensive
as any use of such wealth made by subsequent generations, although
skepticism over the relevance or meaning of "earnings" weakens this point,
perhaps fatally. These objections are common and well founded; the key
response is that we do not need an estate tax to deal with either issue.
As to the first point, a combination of progressive rates and investment
regulation under a nominal "consumption" tax can check the liberal dangers
of possession alone. A progressive consumption tax changes the very meaning
and hence the risks and dangers of private "possession." Many, and maybe all,
of the normative problems with the private possession of wealth turn out to
relate to possession qua actual or potential use. The Perot example is once
234. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
235. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 193, at 962 n.7 & 963 n.8 and citations therein.
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again helpful. The actual use, or even the mere threat of use, of Mr. Perot's
billions poses a vivid example of what Rawls refers to as "-power detrimental
to the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of opportunity."' A
progressive consumption-without-estate tax, however, checks precisely this
kind of use, and even the threat of it. It restrains Mr. Perot from being able to
spend his billions quickly or in large units. without necessarily discouraging
Mr. Perot from earning ab initio. On the other hand, one might consume or
exercise power directly through investment; this is possession qua use. Think,
for example. of William Randolph Hearst buying up newspapers. But we can
readily enough deal with that problem by compelling the private saver to save
in certain forms-a blind trust is a limiting example, but any qualified form
of savings accounts will do-in order to get the benefits of the nontaxation of
savings ,237 Such vehicles can preserve the efficiency of decentralized
decisions while checking abuse, much as the loose form of government
oversight of the current pension and charitable activity sectors now does. In
both of these responses, the progressive consumption-without-estate tax plan
aims to make literal the common pool metaphor of Hobbes and Rawls.
Possession is no longer narrowly "private."
As to the second problem, of inheritance and inequality, we can deal with
the issue of use by later generations through modifications in the consumption
tax's rate structure. Society may actually have a greater concern with the
inequities of inherited wealth. I have not denied that there might be such a
concern; I have simply emphasized that a crude attempt to choke off inter-
generational transfers may: (I) interfere with important intra-generational
norms, in part by its dependence on a naive division between intra- and inter-
generational spheres of activity; and (2) clash with settled and normatively
appropriate practices and beliefs evincing more of a concern with the use than
with the mere possession of wealth. Indeed, we can see that the use-possession
distinction extends down through the generations. While society no doubt has
some concerns over the possession of unearned wealth by later generations,
and such concerns may be greater than those over possession alone at the
earlier generation, the concern vis-A-vis the later generation may once again be
even greater when it comes to use. Society may have some worry over
imprudent investment decisions by heirs, say, but we can again deal with this
point by regulating the favorable consumption tax treatment. Moreover, it is
not clear that the alternative uses of that capital-now understood to be either
236. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 19. at 277.
237. See, e.g., William A. Klein. Timing in Personal Taation. 6 J. LtLGAL STD 461. 480 (1977)
("Since the government has forgone current taxation of income it seems plain that the government
has a direct financial interest in how such funds are managed . "). The current retirement system in
Chile works along illustrative lines; individuals are compelled to sa'e from among a menu of
government-approved accounts. See James Brooke. Quiet Revolution tn Latin Pensions. N Y TImEs. Sept
10, 1994, § I, at 37 (Late Edition).
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investment decisions by the government or increased consumption by the prior
generation-are any better. In contrast, society may have a much heightened
concern with the decadent use of wealth by the later generation, and here may
decisively prefer the alternatives of any other use. Yet under current law,
society places no burden on the act of consumption by an heir; we exert no
control whatsoever over how or when heirs spend their wealth. Under a
progressive consumption-without-estate tax, this hands-off attitude would
change, and we can change it even more fundamentally with a separate rate
schedule on spending out of inherited wealth.
Details as to the precise rate schedule will of course need to be worked
out, and they may require difficult and ultimately somewhat arbitrary decisions.
For now, I seek mainly to illustrate where a consistent liberal egalitarian focus
on use, implicit in consumption tax theory, might naturally lead: to a
progressive consumption-without-estate tax. Such a structure responds to
concerns over possession alone by changing our conception of what
"possession" means. This tax plan is also what our practices seem to be
suggesting; we can go a long way toward resolving many problems by making
the inchoate themes more conscious and deliberate. Let us take now a closer
look at some specifics.
1. A Modest Proposal
The above discussion has led to a specific comprehensive tax reform
proposal: a progressive consumption-without-estate tax, possibly supplemented
by a separate and higher rate structure on spending out of gifts or bequests,
and a regulatory regime loosely monitoring nominally private investment
decisions. This Subsection fleshes out a few details. I begin by clarifying a
semantic point: This tax proposal is actually a step toward.the wealth-based
norms of the income tax; it is a hybrid tax, situated between an income and a
consumption model. Typical consumption tax theory has rested on a
subjectivist or individualistic basis, explaining the invocation of concepts such
as "earnings," horizontal equity comparisons between savers and spenders, and
so forth. A political liberal proposal, in contrast, rejects this logic, either
because of its inapplicability in a nonideal setting or on ideal but objective
ethical grounds. The tax proposal follows consistently from the idea that liberal
society likes work and savings, but has liberal suspicions over excessive
consumption.
To see the point that a progressive consumption tax is not really a pure
consumption tax, it helps to review a few doctrinal features of the income
versus consumption tax debate. Typical consumption tax theory, as advanced
by Mill, Rawls, and others, calls for flat-rate taxes. 238 The reason is that
238. See MILL, supra note 48, at 806-08; THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 278-79; Warren,
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otherwise, money saved in a low tax rate period may be taxed later at higher
rates, thereby penalizing the saver vis- -vis the consumer: an outcome
precisely opposite to a central individualistic theme in consumption tax theory.
To assure that the income from capital bears no tax, therefore, consumption tax
advocates could adopt the "'prepayment," or yield-exempt, model of the
consumption tax: Tax wages as earned, and thereafter ignore all capital and its
earnings. 239 This form of consumption taxation would leave any burden of
progressivity to fall exclusively on wages. ' "t Such a progressive prepayment
model, however, would also violate some of the consumption tax's underlying
individualistic intuitions, because it would penalize those taxpayers with
incomes spread unevenly throughout their lifetimes. Consider, for example, the
case of a law student who sacrifices earnings potential in her youth in part to
earn high wages over a concentrated period later in life. A progressive
prepayment model penalizes this individual, and so implicates patterns of
human capital accumulation and risk taking that do not necessarily differ in
any normatively compelling manner from more traditional forms of
savings. 2 4 These objections might lead to income averaging,-' - but at some
Fairness, supra note 157. at 944-46. But cf. Andrew%. Con3unpon-Tsp. supra note 61. at 1175-77.
Andrews, Fairness, supra note 173. at 954-56 (arguing for progressise consumption tax). Warren.
Consumption Tax, supra note 157. at 1083 ("Personal progression is a crucial aspect of the case for such
an expenditure tax .... "). See generally BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX Ru-URM 122-25 (Dastd F
Bradford et a]. eds., 2d ed. rev. 1984) Ihereinafter BL EPI''ITS (discussing progressis it) of cash flow
consumption tax); Fullerton et al.. supra note 197 (modeling effects of progressive consumption tax)
Indeed, the general form of the proposal put forth in the text-for a progressie consumption-without-
estate tax-seems to be in accord with the primary consumption tax model adsanced in Blueprints The
basic Blueprints model is for a cash flow tax vith progressi e marginal rates and with "transfers
deductible to the donor and included in the tax base of ihe recipient." Id- at 125 Blueprints only
mentions this non-transfer tax aspect briefly, however. and quickl[ follows up on it with the possibility
of retaining "the estate and gift tax as the principal instrument for alering the distribution of vealth
Id. For reasons chronicled at length in the text. I beliee thai this qualification would swalloy% up the
normative impetus leading to it. Nonetheless. the strong sinilarities between the Blueprints proposal and
my own, derived independently, are a positive indication of the attractiseness of the general approach
239. The literature has long noted the substantial equivalence of iwo means of implementing a
consumption-type tax. One is the prepayment or yield-exempt method, which taxes wealth as earned and
thereafter ignores the yield: consider the case of buying a conumner durable. such as a house or car The
second is the qualified account or cash flow' method, which postpones the single moment of tax until the
time of conversion of wealth into consumption, think of the way qualified pension plans work These
methods are equivalent if: (a) the tax rate remains constant, and (b) the exttence of inframarginal
investment returns-windfalls-is proportional to the net nominal amounts insested. See Michael J
Graetz. Expenditure Tax Design. in WHAT SIOULD BE TAXL- ICOME OR EXPE.NDM. RE 161. 172-75
(Joseph A. Pechman ed.. 1980); McCaffery. Hybrid. supra note 5. at 1151 n.24. Jeff Simad. Taxation
of Income fron Capital: A Theoretical Reappraisal. 37 STA, L. Rtv 1023. 1035-38. 1068-72 (1985)
240. See Warren. Fairness. supra note 157. at 940 ("ITIhe consumption ideal thus effectlely
exempts all property income from taxation while including all inconte from personal scr'ices "
241. That is. the law student who takes time off from her career path and spends tuition money on
schooling is "saving" in an important sense: She is% m esting the tuition money and the forgone earnings
in herself. The "asset" that this savings generates is increased human capital, and the monetized worth
of that capital is manifested in a higher level of earnings after the education Taxing these earnings at
a higher rate, under a progressive tax system, penaltzes the person who has made the insestment in
human capital vis-a-vis the steady. lower-level earer All of these concerns are different from the
observation, which is also true, that the present income tax tends to treat human capital under a cash
flow, consumption model, in contrast to the Haig-Simons income ideal. See supra note 5
242. See generally William Vickrey. Ta.x Sim plficaton Through Cumulative Averaging. 34 LAw
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point the practicalities simply call for a relatively flat-rate schedule. This
position is, in fact, precisely the conclusion that Mill and Rawls reached.243
This flat-rate, prepayment consumption tax model, however, might be in
direct conflict with our better-considered objective, political normative
judgments. There is nothing magic or sacred about a pure consumption tax;
what is important are the underlying norms. There is no a priori reason why
these norms would cut in the same direction, across all types or quanta of
savings, for example. Indeed, it would be surprising if theoretical ideals
translated perfectly into policies consistent with simple labels. We might,
contrary to the above model, develop a consumption tax system featuring
progressive rates, possibly even quite steeply progressive rates, and levy the
tax on the "cash flow," or qualified account, model-that is, as money was
spent.2" This plan would place the tax burden squarely at the time and place
of private consumption, which is precisely what society may want to do on
objective moral grounds.
Similarly, there is no conclusive a priori reason to tax all sources or uses
of wealth under the same rate schedule.245 As suggested above, we could
modify the progressive consumption-without-estate tax plan by having separate
rate schedules on earned income and inherited wealth. The earned income
schedule might feature lower rates to be solicitous to labor-leisure trade-offs,
and to isolate out the burden of higher rates for consumption out of capital, or
noncurrent period earnings. The schedule on inherited wealth would feature
steeper rates to discourage consumption out of this source and to serve liberal
egalitarian goals of equality of opportunity.246 Of course, we would need
practical details such as tracing rules. I envision a simple scheme:
Consumption is deemed to come out of current period earnings, savings
attributable to prior period earnings, and inheritance, in that order. But I mean
to leave precise details to another day. A basic idea is that a separate and
higher rate schedule on spending out of inherited capital will actually move the
proposal toward the logic of an accessions tax, i.e., one that taxes donees, not
donors. In this sense, we can think of the proposal as a type of consumption-
model accessions tax. Unlike an accessions tax, however, the tax is not levied
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 736 (1969) (discussing plan for systematic income averaging).
243. As noted above, Rawls qualifies his advocacy by noting that things might come out differently
under nonideal theory. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 279, Hobbes essentially supported a
proportionate consumption tax, with some equivocation about how to treat people who controlled the
labor of others. See C.B. Macpherson, Introduction to THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 9, 59-60 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) (1651).
244. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 238, at 122-25; KALDOR, supra note 189, at 49-53; Andrews,
Consumption-Type, supra note 61, at 1120-21, 1126; McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 5, at 1151.
245. Cf. Deborah M. Weiss, Can Capital Tax Policy Be Fair? Stimulating Savings Through
Differentiated Tax Rates, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 206, 208, 217-29 (1993) (discussing role that
differentiated rates on capital might play).




on the act or at the time of transfer; instead, the tax is postponed, deliberately,
until the time of ultimate consumption, consistent with an ethical focus on use.
Another way to understand or justify this latter aspect of my proposal is
to see that it carries down the possession-use distinction to a later generation.
Liberalism is more concerned with use than with the mere possession of
wealth; its concerns with possession may be largely about possession qua
actual or potential use, although there also may be a greater concern about a
later generation's inheriting wealth. The concern with the later generation's
use, however, may be greater than the concern with that generation's mere
possession, especially since the "possession" of wealth is an essentially legal
concept whose very meaning, and hence dangers, can change with the regime
in place. Thus, we place a higher rate schedule on spending out of inheritance.
But the inheritance itself-that is, the actual transfer of wealth-may in fact
be the proper response to our objective concerns a generation earlier. We may
actively want Mr. Perot (assuming again that income is fairly earned) to work
and save, because we value whatever he does to produce that wealth and we
appreciate his accumulation of capital, but we nevertheless may be afraid of
his spending his billions personally and quickly. If we are concerned about
curtailing his extravagant consumption, however, then we have to let him pass
on the wealth. We cannot concede Mr. Perot his earnings while at the same
time checking both his consumption and his savings: Something has to give.
Under the progressive consumption-without-estate tax with a higher rate
schedule on spending out of inheritance, we do not burden Mr. Perot's
earnings or savings or wealth transfers per se. Instead, we monitor the use of
the wealth, both at Mr. Perot's and later generation's levels, to make sure that
such use is not decadent or offensive, without pushing Mr. Perot to consume
it himself. This approach may be the best real-world balancing of competing
values that we can achieve; it is also a thoroughly political liberal answer.
The effects of this progressive consumption-without-estate tax model
should be the exact opposite of the current incentives for large inter vivos gifts
and conspicuous consumption that the flawed income-plus-estate tax model
generates. The proposal thus comports with liberal society's objective, political
admiration of work and savings and its suspicion of extravagant personal use.
This analysis shows, in the process, that wealth transfer taxation need not be
an indispensable ally of equity.
2. Rational Saving Under a Progressive Consumption Tax
A few questions remain. For example, one might ask why any rational
person would save in the first place, or not consume, knowing that a
progressive consumption tax would constrain any future consumption by
herself or her heirs. That is, why is not the chilling effect on capital
accumulation or work effort equally strong under the progressive consumption-
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without-estate tax (especially with a higher rate schedule on spending out of
inheritance) as it is under the more commonly recommended consumption-
plus-estate tax, or even under the income-plus-estate tax system? There are at
least five possible answers to this question, all of which help to illustrate the
appeal of the progressive consumption-without-estate tax proposal.
First, the rate structure would encourage dispersion among bequests, as
donors saw the lower rates that were available to a wider range of donees. This
aspect of the system would thus serve independent normative purposes: It
would serve one of the goals of an accessions tax without all of its problems.
As mentioned above, a separate and steeper rate schedule on consumption out
of transferred wealth can be seen as a consumption-tax variant of an accessions
tax. Second, and related, there is much evidence to support a general tendency
for earnings to revert to the mean, inter-generationally. For whatever
reason-and there are several possible reasons--exceptionally productive
parents are not likely to have high-earning children.247 The rational saver
might thus expect her child to be in a lower consumption tax bracket than she
is in herself.
Third, the revised law could have provisions for the deductibility of certain
expenses, such as medical and educational expenses, for oneself or for another.
The rational donor (saver) would rest assured that these uses, which she might
favor in any event, would both be more likely and less taxed. The law could
thus create a sort of spendthrift trust, discouraging only wanton consumption
among transferees. Indeed, this structure might even make inter-generational
transmissions more attractive, by facilitating thrift among descendants of the
thrifty. (The very existence and legal sanctioning of spendthrift trusts lend
interpretive support to the proposal.) Differentiation among the uses of wealth
is of course fully consistent with the political, objective, ethical focus that I
have argued society can and should embrace in considering matters of taxation;
certain uses are simply viewed as more urgent than others.248 Of course, it
is not obvious that unlimited exclusions for medical or educational uses are
consistent with the best reading of liberalism; where and how to draw the
requisite lines will once again be a matter for sound and reasonable political
judgment.
Fourth, there might be "fiscal illusions," or benefits to a putative donor
from being able to bequeath a large amount of money in nominal terms, that
counterbalance the discounting of the ultimate consumption flow suggested by
the tax system. This effect may not be wholly rational, but it fits with a mass
of evidence from cognitive decision theory that people value wealth that they
247. See generally Solon, supra note 140 (discussing evidence of mean reversion); Zimmerman,
supra note 140 (same). There are at least three possible explanations of varying normative statuses:
(I) able parents may have less able children for normal statistical reasons; (2) wealth corrupts earnings
abilities; and (3) wealth enables a non-materialist flourishing to transpire.
248. See Scanlon, supra note 14.
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think they own more highly than wealth that they think they do not own. "
Cognitive theorists have also found that people are less willing to spend money
out of what they think of as capital than out of earnings or cash flow. '
Fifth, a rational potential donor may even expect that tax rates might someday
go down, as they might indeed if the law attained some of its goals, such as
a greater capital stock. The donor thus anticipates a lower tax burden in the
future. Saving under such expectations makes sense.
In addition, it is worth noting that individuals who save for life-cycle
reasons, or simply out of some entrepreneurial, dynasty-building urge, need not
be deterred by the progressive consumption-without-estate tax, although such
parties are not necessarily deterred by the presence of an estate tax, either. The
progressive consumption-without-estate tax will not encourage early inter vivos
gifts, at least above and beyond what present consumption needs might
suggest, or other complex manipulations to avoid its sting. Unproductive
planning costs should thus fall. The incentive structure might also increase
savings because the most committed savers could hold onto their wealth
longer, and younger generations would not have the receipt of early wealth to
skew their own incentives to work and save.
To be sure, the progressive consumption-without-estate tax will generate
disincentives. Any real-world tax will. But the progressive consumption-
without-estate tax will only deter those individuals who are working or saving
primarily so that they can one day engage in rapid, large-scale consumption.
Liberalism, however, has to put its foot down somewhere, and this place seems
more reasonable than one that burdens all savers, and lets big spenders off the
hook. Rawls and other liberals evince a consistent fear of the large-scale
distortionary use of wealth; this is what leads to exercises of power detrimental
to prior liberties. A progressive consumption-without-estate tax punishes only
those individuals or families who insist on doing just that. If Mr. Perot had
been planning to run for President all along, the tax would have hit him hard.
But such tough taxation might be exactly the correct liberal result. The
progressive consumption-without-estate tax clamps down only on the "self-
indulgent aristocracy" while enabling a "frugal capitalist class" to flourish,
again using Rawls' language. The tax precisely reverses the effects of the
current law by punishing Mr. Spendthrift and not Ms. Thrifty.
Of course, there are some lingering questions. Under the progressive
consumption-without-estate tax, nominal wealth would rise, and this greater
wealth would probably change elasticities (such as the elasticity of bequests
to wealth). The rate structure might be complex, and its precise contours
undoubtedly would be difficult to work out; society would have to decide at
249. See Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer. Willingness To Pay vs Willingness To Accept
Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASI. U. L.Q. 59 (1993).
250. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER, MentalAccounting and Consumer Choice. in QLASI RATIONAL
ECONOMICS 25, 27 (1991).
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what point and to what degree consumption becomes excessive.?-5 Setting
different schedules for earned and inherited wealth would also be difficult, as
would carving out medical expense and other deductions or modifications.
Transitional concerns cannot be avoided. 2 These details, however, do not
challenge the basic point of these speculations: An awareness of the incentive
structure generated by current law, and even by the consumption-plus-estate
tax ideal, indicates that we might have our policy recommendations exactly
backwards relative to our better-informed normative judgments. We should be
looking at the use, and not the mere possession, of resources.
3. Charitable Contributions
Finally, a particular concern with the progressive consumption-without-
estate tax may be that it undermines an important incentive to give to charity.
Charitable contributions do indeed stand on a different normative footing than
the inter vivos incentives discussed above. Charitable deductions under the
estate tax are also large: $6.2 billion in 1991, compared to the $9.1 billion
yield of the estate tax itself.253 Although the reform proposal will undeniably
remove the tax incentive to give to charity upon death, two responses to the
potential problem are in order.
First, there are reasons to be skeptical about the magnitude of the shortfall.
Under present tax laws, one needs a genuinely charitable motivation to give
to charity, putting aside questions as to whether there are nontax instrumental
advantages, such as publicity, from such gifts. Under a 55% estate tax, a
person giving $10,000 to charity forgoes the right to make a $4500 bequest.
The fact of this sacrifice indicates that tax incentives alone do not lead to the
charitable contribution, even on death. Indeed, in 1989, only 19% of decedents
in taxable estates made any charitable bequests at all, although the amounts
given were substantial-' 4  Nonetheless, evidence has indicated that
contributions by the wealthy are somewhat sensitive to both income and estate
tax rates, 5 and there are rational reasons why a potential donor might be
somewhat, though not completely, philanthropic. 6 Moreover, there are
251. This problem, which might seem severe, is actually not conceptually different from deciding
when levels of income should be subject to higher rates, and what the rates should be, under a traditional
income tax.
252. See generally Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. I..
REV. 1575 (1979) (concluding that practical implementation difficulties militate against adopting
consumption-based tax). Among other effects, there might be a large, one-time wealth transfer to those
who had been anticipating an estate tax. Mitigating this effect is the fact that many parties facing such
a tax have taken steps to avoid it, and that the progressive consumption-without-estate tax, especially
with a higher rate schedule on inherited wealth, would continue to tax much of this wealth.
253. Johnson, supra note 56, at 90-91.
254. Id. at 78.
255. See, e.g., Michael J. Boskin, Estate Taxation and Charitable Bequests, 5 J. PUB. ECON. 27, 29
(1976) (discussing data suggesting that charitable bequests are highly sensitive to estate tax rate); see
also Bernheim, supra note 2, at 121-32.
256. Two basic ideas come to mind. One is that the donor may value her heir's consumption at
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circumstances where even non-charitably-inclined taxpayers can benefit from
the use of certain split-interest transfers.25' On the other hand. the generally
higher tax rates and capital accumulation levels made possible by the
progressive consumption-without-estate tax, combined perhaps with the fiscal
illusions generated by the cash flow method, may lead to earlier and higher
life-cycle charitable gifts. These questions are empirical ones that need to be
studied.
Second, and more fundamental, there is no a priori reason why the tax
laws must be limited to an exclusion vel non for charitable giving. We could
imagine, for example, a negative tax rate; that is, a bonus for contributions
above a certain threshold. If charitable contributions are a good-I leave this
complex question aside25-there is no reason why we cannot develop an
incentive structure for encouraging them within any general system of tax.2 ",
It matters not whether charitable contributions fit within neat analytic
more than a charity's, but at some quantum the reduction in sscalth that can be translerred to the heir
makes the charitable contribution more attractive. A donor might, for example, prefer leaing $7' to her
heir than S100 to a charity, under a 25% transfer tax rate. But at a 50"7 transfer tax rate. the same donor
might prefer to give the S100 to the charity than to gise $50 to the heir (' supra note 74 and
accompanying text. Second. and related, there might be %%hat Sen has called the "isolation" paradox A
potential donor needs the assurance of other contribuions that the deductibilit of the pa)sient in part
provides. Under a 50% tax rate. the government is essentially "'tmatching" the priate donor's gift See
Sen, supra note 83. at 487-88.
257. See SCHOLES & WOLFSON. supra note 55. at 577-83 "The IRS does not maintain statistics
indicating the form of charitable deduction taken, so there is no ssaN to ascertain the prc.alcncc of split
interest gifts that may have strategic, noncharitable motises
258. See, e.g., Villiam D. Andrews. Personal Deduittons in an Ideal Income fitj. 80 |IR, t.
REV. 309, 344-75 (1972) (supporting charitable contribution deduction). Mark P Gergen. The ('Case Jor
a Charitable Contributions Deduction. 74 VA. L. RI-\ 1393 (1988) (discussing arguntents,. Kelman.
supra note 224, at 835-58 (questioning the deduction). McNuh. supra note 160 (dicussing arguments P
259. 1 also leave open the complex questions of %ihether a repeal of the gilt and estate tax ssould
in fact be supplemented with some countervailing pro\ ision fa\ oring charities. and. it not. %sheiher the
status quo might be preferable. I am. howe\er, somewshat skeptical of the at leasi implicit idea that '%e
need to favor public charities by retaining the gift and estate tax Aiding chant.e seems like a small
benefit for the potentially large costs of gift and estate taxation In an% esent. the luestion aris, as to
why solicitude for charities and the public charity lobb\ could be strong enough to help keep the gilt and
estate tax in place, but not to help generate a replacement for its charitable contribution deduction it %%e
were to repeal the estate tax.
This discussion relates to the interesting question of \%h> %%e do. in fact. hase a gilt and estate tax.
if (as I am arguing) all of its traditional justifications fail One set o reasons niai indeed be poltc.al-
economic: Actors who benefit from the existence of the tax agitate for its retention Large public charities
and the specialized gift and estate tax bar and other financial professtonals come to ind More
attenuated, but still possible, is the thought that Congress itself likes the tax. siince periodic threats to
raise its rates create favorable rent-seeking opportunities. Ser generall Doernerg & \lc('hesne,. 5upra
note 133 (discussing rent-seeking model of tax legislation)
I am inclined to think that all of these factors play some role. and I am gratelul to Michael Vachter
for stimulating my thinking on these scores. But I belee that much of the puuling prsistencc of ssealth
transfer taxation is due to inertia, to the seemingly unto%%ard snibolism of repealing the tax. and to the
failure to think systematically through both the problems \sith the present tax regitie and the possibilities
for a better liberal taxing plan. I do not think that en\s is a \cr good explanation lor the pcrsistence
of the estate tax in practice, nor is it necessarily a good explanation in theor,. for the simple reason that
the estate tax is not, in fact, popular. See THEORY of Jit s-1t'l.. supra note 19. at 530-1 idicu.sng
problems of envy and of envy and equality); Young. supra note 178 (same). supra notes 162-70 and
accompanying text.
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definitions of "income" or "consumption." What matters is the extent to which
such contributions are attractive, and the efficacy of various means to induce
them. Freed from debates over prior definitions, we can do much to improve
the law. Questions of tax are political all the way down.
VI. THE CASE AGAINST DOING NOTHING
The above analysis has had two primary aims: first, to point out the rather
severe problems with wealth transfer taxation, in theory and certainly in
practice; second, to use a detailed consideration of wealth transfer taxation as
a springboard to consider comprehensive tax reform along political liberal
lines. On a much broader plane, the analysis has suggested the need to think
through some basic questions about the dictates and practices of liberal theory
in our real, imperfect world, especially, if not exclusively, vis-at-vis tax. At the
end of the day, though, one of the greatest temptations, as always, will be to
do nothing at all. This Part addresses two particular arguments for leaving the
status quo in place: one, that the estate tax is a harmless "voluntary" tax, or
even a positive symbol of liberal egalitarian values; two, that the case for
change turns on empirical support that we do not yet have.
A. What's Wrong with a Voluntary Tax?
One argument for doing nothing at all is that the current estate tax, with
all of its flaws, is in fact a sensible balance of competing goals. This argument
is of a type that a thoroughgoing interpretivism, which takes our actual
practices seriously, might be thought to generate. It is a social, evolutionary
argument against any kind of conscious change. It is indeed a rather curious
paradox that, given the many escape valves that have effectively made the
actual, imperfect estate tax a "voluntary" one, the regime might have backed
its way into being an efficient tax, at least in terms of the capital stock. Those
parties who care about making bequests find ways to do so, so that the only
parties paying the estate tax are those who are inelastic-that is, those who
amass capital with complete indifference about whether to pass it on inter-
generationally.26 ° If this story were true, then the tax might not have adverse
effects on productive work effort or capital formation, or on unproductive
consumption. The current, apparently flawed estate tax may in fact be a good
system.
I do not accept this story, for several reasons. First, even those parties who
have stressed the avoidability of the estate tax have noted its binding effect on
260. COOPER, supra note 2, at 4-7; Kirchheimer, supra note 3, at 1233 (."lThe estate taxi tends to
be a tax, to some extent, on the unwary and the ill-advised, but that's not necessarily a bad thing."')
(quoting Canadian economist Richard Bird).
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the very rich.26' This class is small but highly important, at least as far as
aggregate capital stock goes."262 It is too simplistic to say that the estate tax
has no disincentive effects on those who pay it. The "voluntary" label or the
low overall revenue yield of the estate tax often lulls commentators into
maintaining that the likely incentive effects are apt to be small.2" This
conclusion, however, confuses average with marginal effects. To the ultra-rich
facing the estate tax, the disincentives at the margin are hardly trivial, as the
numbers in Table I suggested, and as I have argued throughout this
Article.26
Second, there are costs from the means by which bequest-motivated
taxpayers avoid the tax. Voluntary taxes are not always efficient. All real-
world taxes, including the income tax itself, are in some sense voluntary: In
the case of the income tax, taxability depends on the volitional act of earning
income. In the case of wealth transfer taxation, the induced behavior may have
adverse effects on the capital stock. These effects, however, are not the only
or even the most important ones. If capital is diminishing because of increased
consumption, increased inter vivos giving, and decreased work effort, then we
ought to consider these effects on political liberal grounds as well. Effects may
also derive from the incentives at the younger generation's level. Getting
wealth early in life may deter heirs from working and saving. " The gift and
estate tax regime may encourage both early gifts and diminished work and
savings. As it now stands, taxpayers can both pass on wealth and avoid taxes;
the former is in fact a means to the latter.
Third, taxing the presumably inelastic savers who in fact pay estate taxes
is not necessarily efficient, even relative to the question of the aggregate
261. COOPER, supra note 2, at 79-82.
262. See, e.g., Aaron & Munnell, supra note 6. at 126-32 (discussing data on %%calth concentration)
Recall Keynes' emphasis on the importance to England's hintoncal dce%,lopment of the existence of a
small class of highly efficient, aristocratic savers. KEYNES. supra note 228. at 19 t'Trhe immense
accumulations of fixed capital which, to the great benefit of mankind. %cre built up during the half
century before the war, could never have come about in a Societ sshere %kealth %%as disiaded equitably -)
263. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 2. at 279 ("The estate tax is such a %mall resenue source that its
effects on savings and investment are no doubt dwarfed by the impact of other taxe, and b) fiscal and
monetary policies."); Robinson, supra note 2. at 38 (More than niet-ninc percent of the country'.,
estates will escape wealth transfer taxation entirely ISuch] taxes %ktll therefore likel, hase onl a
limited effect on the macro- or micro- management of the nation'% capital ssealth *. id at 44 (-If the
wealth transfer taxes only touch one percent of the estates in the country %%c should simpl, forget
the wealth transfer taxes and concentrate on the more important problems facing the countrN "). see alm)
Ascher, supra note 2, at 106.
264. Mr. and Mrs. Perot. for example. are facing an estate tax of approximatel, SI 65 billion See
supra note 59. Every 1% rise in the estate tax rate costs the Perot fanily S30 million There is no reason
to adjust any of these numbers for the uncertainty of death, because their present % alues hold regardless
of the date of death.
265. This effect is somewhat mitigated if. as is usually the case, the form of the inter % io5 transfer
restricts the beneficiary's present use of the wealth-as sith the popular Crunitnes trusts, for example
Even here, however, the placement of the wealth in trust remoses an important element of uncertainty
regarding the ultimate receipt of the funds. See DOUGLAs l-IoL/-EAKt% ET" At.. supra note 141. at 18-19
(concluding from empirical evidence that work effort falls after receipt of substantial inheritance), see
also discussion of related issues supra part V.C.
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capital stock alone. The capital stock effect is also a function of the
government's and inheritors' relative propensities to consume. Assuming
arguendo that we are concerned with aggregate savings, we have to ask if
savings would increase from allowing even taxpayers who are more or less
indifferent to leaving bequests to pass on wealth to their designated heirs, as
opposed to ceding much of it to the government. More data is needed, but the
Stiglitz-Smith conjecture about relative propensities to consume points to an
affirmative answer to this latter question.
A fourth and final problem with the notion that the voluntary tax can in
fact be a pragmatic ideal may be the most important concern, at least within
a political liberal framework. A voluntary estate tax is a limited tool for
furthering equal opportunity and redistribution, both in theory and in practice.
The estate tax's very low revenue yield and the continuing inequality of the
distribution of wealth suggest that the estate tax is doing little, if anything, to
level playing fields. 266 A voluntary estate tax means that wealthy individuals
who are unconcerned with, or even opposed to, bestowing large material
advantages on their heirs will pay the tax, but all others will find ways to pass
on sizable inheritances or to consume wealth themselves. Is this a better
world? It is not difficult to mount a strong normative argument that a world
with fewer but still many well-endowed heirs, many of them quite young; less
aggregate production and capital; and more large-scale consumption by the
very rich is not an improvement. The relative advantage of those whose
benefactors have opted out of the tax regime is greater, and the lesser capital
and distortionary spending of the rich hurt all persons, perhaps especially the
working classes. Further, it is not clear that those who pay the tax would have
given their entire wealth to their heirs, anyway. It is at least possible that the
tax represents their choice of charity.
Perhaps the estate tax is mostly symbolic, a nod in the direction of liberal
egalitarian ideals. In that case, perhaps its voluntary nature is perfectly
acceptable. There may be little reason for symbols to have real effects. The
estate tax becomes a "non-problem problem": something too trivial to worry
about.2 67 There are difficulties, however, with this thought. Sometimes,
symbolic or ineffectual laws represent legitimate, important social responses
to deep, intractable problems. 68 Other times such laws obscure important
266. See Donaldson, supra note I, at 541 (discussing low revenue yield); G.P. Verbit. Do Estate
and Gift Taxes Affect Wealth Distribution?, 117 TR. & EST. 598. 602-07 (1978); see also Wolff, supra
note 6 (discussing empirical findings on wealth inequality).
267. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 2, at 28 (suggesting that wealth transfer "taxes are simply not
worth worrying about in light of other pressing national needs").
268. This idea is a general theme in GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978);
see also ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX, 1861-1913 (1993) (arguing that progressivity of earlier income tax was largely illusory
and was intended to prevent more fundamental change); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money:
American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the U.S. Income Tax, 28 IND. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994)
(discussing, inter alia, rhetorical effects of tax law).
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questions and obstruct meaningful change. Still other times, symbolic laws
make things worse by having counterproductive effects. Sorting out these very
different cases is a critical task of policy analysis.
The failure of the estate tax to be anything other than an empty symbol
may be telling us something important about what we should be doing in its
stead. Indeed, the puzzle of ineffective and unpopular wealth transfer taxation
demands some answer. One answer is that the people have been duped. A
different and far more respectful answer is that the people and our implicit
practices are right. Dealt an inefficient and unattractive institutional answer by
well-intentioned liberals, our actual practices-showing, in this regard, the
same goals as the liberal theorists-have all but gutted the estate tax. It is time
for political liberals to listen to what these practices are trying to say.
B. Living with Uncertainty
A final set of questions to address briefly is what to do in the face of
empirical uncertainty, and perhaps even indeterminacy, of many key
consequential variables. These questions are not decisively important for my
enterprise, which is why I can place this discussion here, at the end of the day.
What we plausibly know, coupled with an enriched sense of policy options, is
enough to confirm that the present estate tax is not a good idea in our
imperfect world, and that alternatives are worth considering. In moving toward
stronger conclusions, however, such as a full acceptance of the progressive
consumption-without-estate tax ideal, some perspective on empirical
uncertainty becomes important. It is possible, for example, that the present
estate tax loses revenue, constricts capital accumulation, diminishes work
effort, and induces conspicuous or large-scale consumption. If true, such facts
should give pause to all but the most obstinate supporter of estate taxation on
symbolic grounds.
The problem, as anyone who has attempted to grapple with the literature
on these questions knows all too well, is that what is "true" about such
questions is difficult and perhaps impossible to ascertain:2" We have seen
that Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, left the details of tax and other economic
institutions in part to "plain hunch."-2 7' By the time he wrote Political
Liberalism, Rawls had grown even more tentative about institutional issues
turning on "complicated inferences and intuitive judgments that require us to
assess complex social and economic information about topics poorly
understood. 27' Dworkin similarly saw that "any practical program"
mediating the sometimes opposing goals of ensuring equal opportunity and
269. See, e.g., Ascher, supra note 2. at 92; Graetz. supra note 2. at 279-80
270. THEORY OF JUSTICE. supra note 19. at 278.
271. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8. at 229
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respecting diverse choices and outcomes "will work imperfectly and will
inevitably involve speculation, compromise, and arbitrary lines in the face of
ignorance. 2 12 In the particular case of wealth transfer taxation, many of the
important economic variables, such as the relevant elasticities, are difficult to
uncover; estimates of labor supply and savings elasticities vary widely. We
have seen that there is much dispute over why people save or make gifts, and
over the motives for their working and amassing of fortunes. What should real-
world policy planners do in the face of this uncertainty?
Beyond dispute, the process of data gathering should continue and indeed
accelerate. There is much that we simply do not know about the behavior of
the very wealthy that seems unquestionably relevant to the questions before us.
The IRS maintains no systematic studies or records on gift tax returns. We
have little if any idea of the extent of use of the annual, medical, or
educational gift tax exclusions. We do not know very much about the
presumably quite wealthy individuals who are using up some or all of their
unified credit in making inter vivos gifts. The IRS also maintains no records
on the type of charitable gifts qualifying for estate tax deductions, so that we
do not know, for example, the extent or incidence of split-interest giving, or
how much "charity" may actually be sophisticated tax minimization.
Uncertainty about our ability to reach determinate answers is not a good reason
for not trying, however, especially since ad hoc assumptions and anecdotal
evidence drive so much of the literature on wealth taxation. 3
But there is still more to say. The typical advocate of the estate tax reasons
somewhat along the following lines: The data on contrary effects is
inconclusive if not indeterminate, and therefore we should fall back on our best
political instincts and intuitions, which favor taxation of the very wealthy in
general and of wealth transmissions in particular. Rawls' reliance on "hunch"
is perhaps the leading example of this type of reasoning. 274 Estate tax
advocates often begin with the tax as a means to an end, say of revenue raising
or equal opportunity or progressivity, and then continue to cling to it even
when its relationship to that end has been called into question. The means
become an end, and we evaluate facts in light of existing patterns of belief. If
popular opinion or our actual practices seem to conflict with the dictates of
prior theory, the people must be wrong or deluded. I have tried to suggest that
this way of thinking might be dangerously wrong.275 A happy invocation of
272. DWORKIN, MATrER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 20, at 207.
273. I readily concede that many of the relevant pieces of information will be hard to uncover. See,
e.g., Robinson, supra note 2, at 43.
274. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 278.
275. In this regard, this Article parallels my arguments in McCaffery, Slouching, supra note 194,
an article that otherwise reflects a rather different set of concerns and a different normative and
methodological approach. There I argued, in part, that focusing on the gender wage gap in salaries might
also be a "dangerously wrong measure[] of what truly matters," id. at 598; see also id. at 674, and more
narrowly that the equal pay aspects of Title VII might be means masquerading as ends to the detriment
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a priori insights cannot allow us simply to dismiss what evidence we do have,
nor can we ignore the possibility of significantly counterproductive results. We
should, at the very least, engage in a more careful risk-of-error analysis. Which
consequences seem worst, and for what reasons? What are our best-guess odds
of various outcomes obtaining? What are the worst-case scenarios that can
emerge from any particular reform option?
I believe that we can also go beyond this more sophisticated risk analysis.
We do know some things. We know, for example, that wealth inequality
remains rather severe, regardless of the presence of a nominally steep gift and
estate tax. We know that the estate tax raises little revenue, in absolute or
relative terms, with or without adjusting for administrative costs and possible
income tax losses. We know that individuals are making large inter vivos gifts,
and that they are taking many other steps to avoid the sting of the tax. We
know that the tax features high marginal rates, against which general economic
theory cautions. 6 We know that large public and private resource costs are
involved in implementation and enforcement of the estate tax. We know that
there is general concern about the level of American capital accumulation, and
that the capital stock has important intra-generational effects. And we know
that wealth transfer taxation is not popular, even though it applies only to a
tiny segment of society.
These known facts ought to cast some doubt on the received wisdom and
heighten the call for alternative approaches. The case for a change of approach
is all the more compelling when we can reason our way toward alternative
means for furthering liberal goals and achieving some of the aims that matter
to wealth taxation advocates, such as greater equality of opportunity and the
improved welfare of the lower classes. Questioning the estate tax does not
require that we fall into naive libertarianism or the comforting arms of trickle-
down theory. We can design a tax system that constrains the private use of
wealth without creating all of the perverse incentives and resource costs of the
status quo. This is the point of the progressive consumption-without-estate tax.
Is not this-or something-worth a try?
of more creative and structural reform. Id. at 655-56. Both articles reflect my quest for a richer political
and moral theoretical basis for tax policy analysis. Here. I consider the more or less internal (to tax) logic
of wealth transfer taxation, income versus consumption, and progressivity There I looked at the interface
between taxes and gender discrimination. It seems to me that a complete liberal theory of tax must do
both things: look at the internal logic of tax and consider various interactive effects on a % de range of
matters. In both cases we ought to be political: creative, imaginative, and free of metaphysical constraints
in our search for alternatives, respectful of the often implicit and inchoate spirt of our actual practices.
and always on guard against the seductive skepticism that would have us do nothing at all The broader
project of bringing liberal political theory to tax. present in both articles, is enormously challenging but.
I believe, both necessary and promising.
276. See McCaffery, Slouching. supra note 194. at 658 n.216 and sourees cited therein. Slcmrod.
supra note 133, at 166-68.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This Article began with a puzzle: Liberal egalitarian political theory has
long advocated some form of wealth transfer taxation, but our settled practices
and popular opinion in contemporary democratic societies are strongly opposed
to any effective gift and estate tax. Working it through, we came to the
curiously surprising conclusion that the people and our practices may just be
right, on strictly liberal grounds. The estate tax penalizes the productive work
and savings efforts of our wealthiest citizens, while doing nothing about,
indeed even inducing, their large-scale consumption of resources. In contrast,
a progressive consumption-without-estate tax, with certain sensible
modifications, consistently implements the logic of a political concern over the
private use of resources. Liberal society reasonably likes work and savings, but
only or at least especially reasonably dislikes large-scale private consumption.
This position emerges both interpretively, from a sympathetic reading of our
practices, and normatively, from an objective ethical approach to the urgency
of wants.
In conclusion, I want to generalize the story a bit, to move to an even
larger plane. Here is a bigger puzzle: At the very time that our leading liberal
political philosophers are telling us that it's all politics, our practical liberal
politics are in disarray and retreat. Republicans and centrist Democrats have
occupied the White House for nearly three decades, and an antigovernment,
antitaxation fervor has been shaping state and national politics, with no
apparent end in sight. This history is a bit odd, for a commonsensical view
would predict that a reasonable liberal politics, say in a Rawlsian vein, would
be redistributive-that, even if we did not take matters all the way to the
radical redistributive point inherent in Rawls' difference principle, modern
democracies would at least tend toward exacting a greater sacrifice from the
wealthy. Yet our actual tax systems are at best only weakly progressive, and
at worst not progressive at all.2 77 This Article suggests one rather large part
of an answer to the puzzle. Practical liberal politics have gotten our objective
social values wrong, have dwelled on poor institutional means for advancing
the liberal program, have put the people to hard choices between progressivity
and productivity, and have, most and worst of all, failed to listen. The people
are not illiberal; their liberal leaders have failed them.
The estate tax illustrates the problem. While a priori liberal theory
supports the tax, and it was hardly negligent to implement it in 1916, the
people's opposition and seventy-five years of increasingly settled practices
have shown that democratic society does not want any meaningful wealth
277. 1 detail some of this movement-e.g., the trend towards reliance on payroll, sales and use, and
corporate income taxes, and not on personal income ones-in McCaffery, Cognitive Theory, supra note
10. That article also presents what I take to be another part of the answer to the puzzle: Persistent
cognitive error favors broad-based and regressive tax systems.
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transfer tax. Yet it is apparent that the liberal theorists and the people have an
alignment of ends on this score. Opposition to effective estate taxation is not
a case of the majority of the people acting out of envy or spite, and having to
be checked by a noble liberal elite; the people are resisting a tax on the
wealthiest minority of citizens. Rather than listening to the inchoate voices of
the people and our practices, liberals have continued to insist on some form of
wealth transfer tax. even moving recently to up the stakes and implement
confiscatory taxes. The call for stronger wealth transfer taxes has come
politically, from the likes of George McGovern. and theoretically, from
philosophers and legal academics. But we ought to begin by presuming that the
people are at least sensible, and entitled to respect, and it indeed turns out that
there are good liberal reasons to oppose wealth transfer taxes. As mentioned
above, such taxes hit at work and savings and induce consumption, especially
the large-scale, distortionary consumption of the very wealthy. In contrast, a
progressive consumption-without-estate tax-a system toward which our
practices may best be seen as moving-reverses these effects, to punish only
excessive use, while changing the very meaning and hence the dangers of
private possession. A progressive consumption-without-estate tax makes
literal-takes to the hilt. so to speak-the longstanding, objectively grounded
metaphor of the common store or pool of social resources.
In the beginning and in the end, tax is politics. It is all politics, politics
through and through. No dictionary definitions, no metaphysics of natural
rights or entitlements theory, no quasi-science of individual utility functions,
can see us through, can dictate the choices we must make. But while it is often
thought or said that all reason and logic stop at the point where we reach the
conclusion that something is all politics-as if all politics meant just politics,
in some trivializing sense-the trend in modern liberal theory points decisively
otherwise. If tax is indeed all politics, we have all the more reason both to
probe our liberal reasons and to pay careful, respectful attention to our
practices. This logic is even, and indeed especially, true where such attention
to practices takes us to surprising, counterintuitive places, as in the case of
estate taxation. If liberal politicians are to use the power implicit in the
emergent program of political liberalism wisely and well, they must try harder
to get it right. It is too important not to do so.
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